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 1  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
During the 1970s and 1980s a word disappeared from the American 
vocabulary.  It was not in the speeches of politicians decrying the multiple 
ills besetting American cities.  It was not spoken by government officials 
responsible for administering the nation's social programs.  It was not 
mentioned by journalists reporting on the rising tide of homelessness, 
drugs, and violence in urban America.  It was not discussed by foundation 
executives and think-tank experts proposing new programs for 
unemployed parents and unwed mothers.  It was not articulated by civil 
rights leaders speaking out against the persistence of racial inequality; 
and it was nowhere to be found in the thousands of pages written by social 
scientists on the urban underclass.  The word was segregation. 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton  
1993, 1 
 
If 1970 to 2000 trends continue, Latinos will overtake Blacks as the most 
segregated racial/ethnic group by the end of the present decade. 
Jeffrey M. Timberlake and John Iceland  
2008, 359 
The Importance of Segregation for Understanding Latinos in the United States 
 Is the United States a racially segregated society?  Ask almost anyone on the 
street and the answer usually will be a hesitant “no,” followed by the observation that 
“segregation is illegal.”  However, from 1970 to 2000, although segregation declined 
marginally for both African Americans and Asians, segregation among Latinos rose 
dramatically (Timberlake and Iceland 2008).  In 1960, less than half of the Latino 
population lived in a highly segregated city; by 2000, over two-thirds did. 
 The 2000 Census revealed that for the first time in U.S. history, Latinos were 
hypersegregated in two cities (New York and Los Angeles)—up from none in 1990 
(Wilkes and Iceland 2004).  In new Latino immigrant destinations such as Lexington, 
Kentucky, and Sanford, North Carolina, segregation is on the rise.  In many places, 
Latinos, particularly in new destinations, are more segregated than we would expect on 
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the basis of their socioeconomic status.  Segregation in new areas is partly a product of 
white flight, suggesting that white preference for homogeneous neighborhoods continues 
(Wahl, Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007).  Regardless of what we call it—de facto or de 
jure—the fact remains: beyond a very low threshold, Latinos are unwelcome in white 
communities. 
 In addition to simple segregation by race, Latinos and African Americans are 
much more likely to be concentrated in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than are 
whites or Asians (Timberlake and Iceland 2008, 348).  Racial segregation is tantamount 
to poverty concentration.  Even middle class minority communities house more 
impoverished people than do white communities.1  In short, for Latinos and African 
Americans, living in segregated communities often means living in communities with far 
fewer economic resources.  In this respect, America remains a racially and economically 
segregated society. 
 In their landmark 1993 book American Apartheid, Douglas Massey and Nancy 
Denton argued that residential segregation was the "missing link" to the formation and 
perpetuation of a black urban underclass.  Segregation, they maintained, "constrained 
black life chances irrespective of personal traits, individual motivations, or private 
achievements" (3).  At the time, several other theoretical approaches explained persistent 
poverty in the black community as a consequence of a "culture of poverty" and the 
availability of welfare (Lewis, 1965; Banfield 1970; Mead 1986).  Each of these theories 
placed blame on individuals for the perpetuation of black poverty in the United States and 
                                                 
1 For example, Massey and Fisher (2003) find that blacks are far more likely to live in 
concentrated poverty neighborhoods, and Iceland and Timberlake (2004) find that both African 
Americans and Latinos are more likely to live in concentrated poverty neighborhoods regardless 
of personal incomes. 
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disregarded the structural constraints, primarily residential segregation, that limit 
socioeconomic mobility. 
 Today, similar theories purport to explain Latino socioeconomic stagnation.  
Politicians and pundits blame Latinos, particularly Latino immigrants, for the economic 
woes of state and local governments, and for the decline of American cultural identity.  In 
books such as Pat Buchanan’s State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and 
Conquest of America, MacDonald, Hanson, and Malanga’s The Immigration Solution, 
Otis Graham’s Unguarded Gates, and Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We?, academics 
and political pundits argue that Latino immigrants come to the United States to abuse the 
social safety net.  They cite their low earnings and the lower than average educational 
attainment of the second generation to argue that Latinos have personal and cultural 
failings.2  However, as was the case for theories explaining African American 
socioeconomic immobility, these commentators overlook how important structural 
constraints are to the social status of Latinos living in the United States.  
 As a result of this mentality, policies aimed at the Latino community are 
intertwined with the politics of immigration.  Conservative politicians and commentators 
such as former U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, Rush Limbaugh, Pat Buchanan, Lou 
Dobbs, U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter, and former California Governor Pete 
Wilson, to name a few, have singled out Latinos as second class immigrants whose 
personal failings warrant changing our (admittedly broken) immigration policy to reduce 
or eliminate immigration from Latin America.  In response to studies showing low 
                                                 
2 Not to mention Carol Swain’s (2007) edited volume in which she and several colleagues argue 
that, as a result of sharing a border with a poorer nation, the United States finds itself “endlessly 
battling illegal immigration and unassimilated foreigners who reject the culture and values of the 
host nation” (4). 
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socioeconomic mobility in the Latino community, these elected officials and pundits 
almost never call for increased school funding, job training programs, affirmative action, 
and inclusionary zoning policies to facilitate the residential and social integration of 
Latino communities.  Instead, they favor policies that would increase immigration by 
"model minorities," such as Southeast Asians, and limit immigration from undesirable 
countries south of the U.S. border.  They advocate mass deportations of Latino 
immigrants and changing the U.S. Constitution to eliminate birthright citizenship.3 
 Many commentators say that the slow assimilation and socioeconomic 
advancement of the Latino community shows that Latinos fail to take full advantage of 
the opportunities the United States offers to those who want to succeed (not unlike the 
criticisms of African Americans addressed by Massey and Denton).  Further, this 
contention is used to give credence to new immigration proposals that end family 
unification and all but end permanent legal immigration and citizenship attainment for 
Latinos (such as the introduction of a new guest worker program).  Buchanan, Dobbs, 
and Limbaugh may be the loudest proponents of such reforms, but these arguments are 
heard on both sides of the aisle and also permeate the academy.  Perhaps the most famous 
scholarly argument to take this approach is that presented in Samuel Huntington's (2004) 
Who Are We?  Huntington argues that in the past, immigrants quickly adopted the 
“American creed” and assimilated and blended into the middle class.  He posits (187) that 
even southern and eastern Europeans who came with very low levels of education (and 
often were considered racial minorities) became as evenly distributed in upper and 
                                                 
3 The “Model Minority” argument was cited recently in Forbes Magazine to justify the exclusion 
of Latino immigrants.  Differences over whether to create a path to citizenship or conduct 
massive deportations probably led to the failure of the 2006 immigration reform bill.  In 2007 
alone, several states passed bills calling for Congress to repeal the birthright to citizenship.  This 
also has been a major battle cry of Pat Buchanan. 
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middle class occupations as “other Americans.”  Thus, he argues, the failure of Latinos, 
particularly Mexicans, who make up the majority of Latino immigrants to the United 
States, to assimilate to the socioeconomic middle class norms of Anglo Protestant 
Americans shows that they are a lower class of immigrant—one that needs to be excluded 
or else the future of the United States will be imperiled. 
 Huntington bases his conclusion on the overwhelming number of Latino 
immigrants in the United States consolidated into isolated ethnic enclaves.  White 
immigrants of the past, he argues, while nestled in ethnic enclaves, generally lived in 
areas where several immigrant groups resided and tended to melt into their “urban 
environment in the course of two or three generations” (Huntington 2004, 244).  While 
there may have been one predominant language for a few blocks, another dominated on 
the next few.  As a result of the relatively small numbers of any one ethnic group in the 
larger immigrant area, the move toward English was quick and assimilation rapid. 
 Huntington contends that race is no longer a meaningful dividing line in America:  
By the end of the 19th century…ethnicity virtually disappeared as a defining 
component of national identity.  So did race, following the achievements of the 
civil rights movement and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  
Americans now see and endorse their country as multiethnic and multiracial.  As a 
result, American identity is now defined in terms of culture and creed (Huntington 
2004, 38). 
 
However, as is clear from Huntington’s own conclusions—that Mexicans are not as 
deserving of U.S. citizenship as European immigrants—as well as the research on racial 
profiling, and research suggesting the continued importance of skin color to job 
acquisition in the U.S., this clearly is not the case (Romero 2006; Espino and Franz 2002; 
Hill 2000; Hughes and Hertel 1990; Mason 2004; Telles and Murguia 1990; Hunter 
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2007).  Race and ethnicity still matter, and the darker the skin (that is, the more clearly 
minority the individual), the less likely he or she is to move up the economic ladder (also 
see Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006; Iceland and Nelson 2008).  Just as Massey and 
Denton argued that cultural theorists missed the structural constraint imposed by 
segregation on individual life chances, so too do scholars and commentators such as 
Huntington who see segregation as the consequence of individual failings and not the 
result of larger structural constraints that limit the upward mobility of Latino immigrants.  
In short, segregation remains the missing link, the word that disappeared or, more 
precisely, never appeared to help policy makers understand Latino mobility. 
Recently, Timberlake and Iceland (2008, 359) speculated on the consequences of 
the changes in segregation in the United States and found that it was difficult to reach 
conclusions as to whether the changes represented “‘good’ or ‘bad’ news.”  The erosion 
in African American segregation, they argue, indicates that white resistance to living with 
African Americans may be decreasing.  Given that there has not been the same antipathy 
toward living in proximity to Latinos as to African Americans (Emerson, Chai, and 
Yancey 2001; Krysan 2002), the relative increase in segregation simply may be a result 
of high levels of immigration (Alba and Nee 2003; Fischer and Tienda 2006; Gimpel 
1999; Alba and Logan 1991) and may, therefore, be relatively short- lived.  However, if 
high levels of segregation continue, “we may observe a slowing down of the typical 
process of Latino assimilation.  Put simply, large barrios of first generation immigrants 
may prove more difficult to 'escape' than the smaller, more heterogeneous (with respect 
to nativity) ethnic enclaves of the past” (Timberlake and Iceland 2008, 31).  As a result, 
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the moderate assimilation rates of Latinos into American society (Alba and Nee 2003) 
could decline as immigrants become further isolated from the broader society. 
We have a good idea about the consequences of segregation for African 
Americans, and most of the theoretical expectations I develop are derived from what we 
know about segregation and its pernicious impact on this group.  Thus, much of the 
literature informing my expectations is drawn from the African American experience and 
is discussed in the next chapter.  However, as noted above, segregation is a recent 
phenomenon among Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 2007; Massey and Denton 1993); 
therefore, the consequences of segregation for Latinos are not well understood.  Since the 
Latino population is predominantly immigrant and second generation, many social 
scientists deem Latino segregation to be little different from what was experienced by 
past waves of immigrants.  However, whether Latino neighborhoods do mirror the 
immigrant enclaves of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or are more similar to 
segregated urban ghettos remains an empirical question. 
 White ethnic enclaves facilitated immigrant incorporation, whereas black ghettos 
isolated African Americans and concentrated poverty, producing a racially defined 
underclass (Massey and Denton 1993).  Understanding the appropriate model for 
segregated Latino communities is fundamental to setting effective housing and 
urban/suburban policy.  Likewise, segregation is important to study because of its effect 
on the racialization, stereotyping, and socialization of Latinos as “others.”  Segregation 
has been considered an important causal mechanism in the development of stereotypes 
about African Americans and Latinos as undeserving, unemployable, unintelligent, and 
lazy (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004).  Scholars also find that segregation increases white 
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antipathy toward Latino immigrants (Rocha and Espino Forthcoming).  The impact of 
segregation on Latino socioeconomic mobility, political incorporation, and discrimination 
are understudied. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to show that segregation is the missing link in 
explaining why Latinos fare more poorly than whites and other immigrant groups in the 
United States and why they are a handy political scapegoat for politicians to blame in 
hard times.  Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1944 that Black-white segregation: 
Exerts its influence in an indirect and impersonal way: because Negro 
people do not live near white people, they cannot—even if they otherwise 
would—associate with each other….  Residential segregation also often 
becomes reflected in uni-racial schools, hospitals, and other institutions.... 
It further permits any prejudice on the part of public officials to be freely 
vented on Negroes without hurting whites (618).   
 
Little has changed, except segregation now is never officially written into policy.  There 
are no "whites only" signs in apartment buildings, schools, or polling places, no racial 
covenants outlawing the sale of homes to minority buyers.  Instead, America has a much 
more pernicious form of residential segregation—an extensive web of policies that limit 
the likelihood of minorities ever even considering moving into predominantly white 
middle class neighborhoods.  By labeling segregation "de facto," we have rendered 
invisible the government's role in perpetuating powerless communities and placed the 
responsibility on individuals when, in fact, structural barriers persist (Massey and Denton 
1993, 97). 
 The structural barriers of segregation are particularly prevalent in Latino 
communities.  Most Latino areas lack upwardly mobile jobs and contain overcrowded 
and underfunded school systems.  Political parties systematically disregard Latino areas 
for mobilization because their participation in the political process is so low.  In this 
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dissertation, I argue that these barriers keep Latinos from progressing up the 
socioeconomic ladder and hinder Latino political participation, leaving Latino 
communities both economically and politically disadvantaged.  
 I address a previously unstudied question: How does segregation affect the 
political incorporation of Latinos?  I explore the impact of residential segregation on the 
experiences of Latinos in the United States.  I seek to understand the affect of where 
Latinos live on their lives and the way governments respond to them. 
 I see this relationship as a complex path dependent phenomenon that results in a 
vicious self-perpetuating cycle.  Latinos in segregated environments have low levels of 
socioeconomic mobility because their neighborhoods house few opportunities for 
education and economic growth.  As a result of low socioeconomic status, Latinos 
participate in politics at a much lower rate than higher income whites and African 
Americans.  Low aggregate political participation has important consequences.  Elected 
officials are less accountable to areas that have muted political voices (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Because they are highly motivated by reelection (Mayhew 
1975), elected officials are primarily concerned with delivering both symbolic policy 
gestures and government monies and assistance to those who could deny them their seat 
in the next election.   
 In recent years, Latino immigrants have become a popular scapegoat for many 
problems facing the United States.  State, local, and federal officials blame Latino 
immigration for skyrocketing social service budgets.  Republican members of Congress 
have explained their oppositional votes on popular bills in terms of immigration: They 
argue that SCHIP (the State Children’s Health Insurance Program) would give medical 
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coverage to immigrant children (and children of immigrants), or that the stimulus 
package would give jobs to illegal immigrants in the construction trades.4  Popular 
academics and pundits alike blame Mexican immigrants for the decline of American 
culture.  Commentators from both the right and the left claim that Latino immigration 
threatens the commonality of the English language in the U.S.5  As the number of things 
for which to blame immigrants has escalated, anti-immigration voices have become 
vehemently more anti-Latino.  State and local anti- illegal immigrant policies have taken 
similar anti-Latino messages to a large audience, and, according to the Southern Poverty 
Law Center, anti- immigrant fervor in the U.S. has led to a sharp rise in hate crimes 
committed against Latinos (Crary 2008). 
 When Latino voices lack a place in pluralistic government discourse, they are 
likely to be punished for their absence.  As Robert Dahl (1961) noted, although low-
income citizens may partake less in some forms of pluralistic government discourse, they 
still have power in government through the ballot box.  However, when demonized and 
underprivileged communities abdicate their ballot power by failing to participate, they 
lose their voices in the formation of public policy.  As a result, Latinos bear the brunt of 
anti- immigrant legislation that stands to further erode their communities.  In this way, 
residential segregation creates a feedback loop.  Because Latinos in segregated 
environments are relegated to the worst schools and their neighborhoods house the 
fewest opportunities for economic growth, they lack political power.  Because they lack 
political power, Latinos are on the receiving end of punitive legislation that adds more 
                                                 
4 See Frank Sherry’s argument at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-sharry/when-will-the-
gop-ditch-t_b_162375.html, site visited on January 29, 2009. 
5 See, for example, http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Pat_Buchanan_Immigration.htm, site 
visited on March 29,2009 
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barriers to socioeconomic mobility and leads to further degradation of their 
neighborhoods. 
 There is nothing inherently wrong with ethnic enclaves, barrios, or isolated Latino 
communities.  Places where people feel comfortable and where cultural practices are 
widely shared are beneficial to building social capital and strengthening communities 
(Putnam 2000; 2007).  We all want to be surrounded by people with whom we identify.  
Few of us want to spend our lives in environments where we feel like an “other,” where 
we constantly wonder if our actions are acceptable, or where we stand out in a crowd.  
Furthermore, racially homogeneous places facilitate the development of bonding social 
capital, which is critical to neighborhood life and vibrant communities (Putnam 2007).  If 
racial and ethnic segregation did not come with other consequences—if segregated 
neighborhoods were indeed separate and equal—this dissertation would be unnecessary.  
Unfortunately, the United States is not yet a land of equal opportunity for every person in 
every neighborhood. 
 Despite the many psychological benefits of living in homogeneous communities, 
segregation may work against people who are otherwise disadvantaged.  Arguing in favor 
of integration is not meant to be an endorsement of all things white or a condemnation of 
minorities.  Unfortunately, despite the economic and political gains minority 
communities have made over the last twenty years, whites continue to hold the power, the 
wealth, and the resources that minority groups in the United States —be they African 
American, Latino, Asian, or Native American—require to compete on an equal footing in 
politics and the economy.  In other words, if racial and ethnic segregation were not 
coupled with poverty, strained resources, and dilapidated schools in neighborhoods where 
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residents are more likely to see a scam artist than a candidate going door to door, 
integration would be less imperative. 
 Having introduced my basic argument, in the rest of this chapter I discuss how 
segregation harms the economic and political prospects of the Latino community.  First, I 
expand on the consequences of economic immobility and low educational attainment in 
segregated communities.  Second, I discuss how segregation contributes to political 
inequalities between whites and Latinos.  Third, I discuss briefly why I focus my 
investigation on Latinos.  The final section outlines the chapters of my dissertation and 
describes the data and methods employed in the analysis.  
 
The Economics of Segregation 
 In the United States, minority neighborhoods are distinct from white 
neighborhoods due to the pronounced socioeconomic disparities between the wealth held 
by whites and minorities.  It is not my intention to suggest that socioeconomically stable 
minority communities are inherently flawed.  To be sure, where they have been able, 
minority groups have set up strong middle class enclaves where they can reap the benefits 
of residential homogeneity and provide educational and economic opportunities to their 
children, but these locations are few and far between.  Furthermore, even middle class 
suburban enclaves such as majority African American Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, or majority Latino Montebello, California, are not as wealthy as white suburbs 
made up of people with identical incomes.  Even when minority workers have the same 
income, the total assets held by minority families tends to be significantly lower due to 
differences in generational transfer of wealth (Blau and Graham 1990; Gittleman and 
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Wolff 2004).6  Therefore, African Americans and Latinos generally do not possess the 
amount of economic capital that facilitates buying a home in a more expensive 
neighborhood; as a result, concentrated minority neighborhoods are less wealthy and 
stable than their white counterparts. 
In 1999, before the 2001 recession hit, the median household net worth of Latino 
families was $10,495, about $2,000 more than the median net worth of African American 
families ($8,774) but $76,000 less than the median for white households (Witte and 
Henderson 2004).  The acquisition of wealth—not income—is how savings are 
accumulated and where people find money to purchase homes, fix up properties, and 
make long term investments.  Such investments increase wealth in the future and raise 
neighborhood property values.  Immediately following the economic downturn at the 
beginning of this decade, Latino and African American net worth took a significant 
plunge.  By 2002, the median family net worth of Latinos had decreased to $7,932 
($5,998 for African Americans), while white family net worth continued to rise, albeit at 
a slower pace (Witte and Henderson 2004).  This example shows how Latino and African 
American neighborhood resources decline substantially when the economy sours. 
Economists and historians agree that “wealth begets wealth” (Witte and 
Henderson 2004).  Stocks pay dividends, houses increase in value (at least typically, over 
time), and these assets offset the pernicious effects of unexpected costs on family 
budgets; medical emergencies, college tuition, and temporary unemployment all are less 
harmful to families with substantial wealth, regardless of income.  Families without 
significant assets are closer to falling into the poorhouse regardless of their education 
                                                 
6  Amy Orr (2003) argues that the difference in wealth, not income, between minority households 
and white households explains a large percentage of the educational achievement gap as well.  
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level or their current earnings statement.  Whatever wealth is left at the end of one’s life 
can be passed on to the next generation, giving inheritors an extra financial boost to 
reinvest and continue the cycle of wealth accumulation.  This means that even middle 
class minority enclaves usually have more renters with little to no investment in the 
community, less wealth, and less stability in times of economic downturn like the one we 
are enduring today. 7  Thus, concentrated minority neighborhoods are less likely to 
weather fluctuations in the economy or to accumulate value at the pace of white 
neighborhoods.  
 All of this is to say that segregated housing patterns contribute to income 
inequality between whites and minorities among the middle class and, even more so, for 
the poor.  Racial minorities simply have a harder time escaping poor neighborhoods 
because they do not have the financial capital to help them purchase or rent homes in 
higher priced areas.  Segregated racial and ethnic enclaves usually are marked by 
significantly higher poverty rates, lower employment, and, as a consequence, fewer 
opportunities for their residents.  For these reasons, racial and ethnic segregation in the 
United States is a problem.  It is not because minorities have personal or cultural failings, 
as suggested by political scientists such as Samuel Huntington, but because when they 
                                                 
7  It also is important to note that, on average, minorities pay higher interest rates on their 
mortgages, even when controlling for income and assets, and are more likely to be given 
subprime loans.  The Federal Reserve showed that of mortgages given in 2005, about 46 percent 
of Latinos and 55 percent of African Americans got higher-cost loans.  The rates among whites 
and Asians were only 17 percent.  The rates among high-income Latinos and African Americans 
were even more striking.  In Boston, one study estimated that over 70 percent of high-income 
African Americans and Latinos who live in minority areas received subprime loans in 2005 
(Kirchhoff and Keen 2007).  Given that these mortgages run a higher risk of foreclosure, the 
impact on the entire neighborhood can be extreme.  Some experts estimate that a single 
foreclosure can decrease the value of other homes on a block by about 1 percent (Melia 2005).  In 
fact, as a report by the Woodstock Institute illustrates, minority neighborhoods, regardless of their 
median income, have been disproportionately affected by the foreclosure crisis (Immergluck and 
Smith 2005).  
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live in isolated neighborhoods that have been ignored and disinvested in by society, these 
forces produce structural disadvantages that, for most residents, no amount of internal 
social capital or personal motivation can overcome (Massey and Denton 1993, 3).  The 
cumulative advantage of the white middle class rolls over into cumulative economic 
advantages for white middle class neighborhoods (see DiPrete and Eirich 2006, 287 for a 
review of cumulative advantage in neighborhoods).  
 
The Political Consequences of Segregation 
Impoverished populations produce impoverished governments.  Funding for 
schools, public health, and other essential community services is often tied to local tax 
bases that are protected from the redistributive powers of the state.  By giving county and 
city governments sole responsibility for both running and funding schools and providing 
other social goods and services, state governments often create unequal localities with 
inequitable opportunities (Massey 1996; Massey and Fischer 2003). 
 Segregation thus benefits some locales over others by vesting them with good 
schools, small classes, and new equipment.  The localized structure of education funding 
in most of the United States guarantees that places with lower income earners will have 
schools with less funding, while places with concentrated wealth will have the best 
educational facilities.  As Massey and Denton (1993) found, even middle class minorities 
are more likely to attend a school with many more impoverished students and fewer 
resources than their white counterparts.  Since economic segregation is greater for 
Latinos and African Americans than for whites, poor white students are more likely to 
attend a significantly richer school than poor black and Hispanic students (Boger 2005).  
In this way, segregation still creates a situation in which some are granted opportunities 
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to move up the socioeconomic ladder and have more economically diverse social 
networks, while others are left to fend for themselves. 
 Educational opportunities are critical for the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino 
community.  While discrimination continues to hamper individual life chances for 
minorities in the United States, even more consequential is the absence of working class 
jobs that served as stepping-stones for the immigrants of the past—jobs that did not 
require high levels of education.  Those jobs and the socioeconomic ladder they presented 
no longer exist.  Today, if Latinos are to surpass their parents’ economic status, they first 
must attain a quality education.  As a result of the bifurcated economy, we judge Latino 
socioeconomic assimilation over a single generation against the multi-generational 
assimilation process of white ethnics (see Huntington 2004).   
Perhaps this judgment is justified or at least arguable.  With the advent of an 
economy in which jobs are clustered at the unskilled and highly skilled tails, the 
socioeconomic ladder is no longer evenly spaced; instead, it is a series of leaps and 
bounds.  “Increasing labor market inequality implies that to succeed socially and 
economically, children of immigrants today must cross, in the span of a few years, the 
educational gap that took descendants of Europeans several generations to bridge” 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 58), and when they cannot, the second generation is left with 
few opportunities for advancement.  The post- industrial economy confronts everyone 
with only two simple but unfortunate alternatives: join the ranks of the working poor or 
the un- or underemployed or get a college degree and join the middle or upper-middle 
class.  There are few paths by which individuals can surpass the socioeconomic standing 
of the previous generation without significantly surpassing their educational attainment.  
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Because segregation results in augmented (or concentrated) poverty in minority areas and 
little to no poverty in others, many white areas have the means and the tax base to fund 
good schools while barrios and ghettos are left behind.  Thus, the concentration of 
Latinos into neighborhoods with impoverished minority schools, and where the 
government lacks the resources to provide the students the services they require, in turn 
precludes socioeconomic mobility. 
 Segregation also increases the political distance between minority and white 
communities.  The unequal distribution of resources across neighborhoods contributes to 
unequal revenues for state and local governments, which in turn creates parochialism 
among state politicians and competition for state funding (see Oliver 2001, 17; Massey 
and Fisher 2004).8  Perhaps a story from my own experience will illuminate this dynamic.   
During the 2007 session of the Maryland General Assembly, I was working as 
legislative director for a state delegate.  To help solve the state budget shortfall and to 
fund the state’s program to help impoverished governments with additional monies for 
public education, the governor proposed a new tax on high-earning individuals.  This 
meant that Montgomery County, the richest in the state, would be hit hardest by the new 
tax because of its overwhelming concentration of wealthy constituents, while Baltimore 
City, the most impoverished jurisdiction, would benefit most through increased state 
investment in the city’s schools.9  In a closed-door session of angry lawmakers, one 
typically progressive Montgomery County delegate criticized the plan, saying, “Let 
                                                 
8  Oliver argues that the problem with the public choice argument in which individuals “shop” 
neighborhoods to find the best services, schools, parks, etc. is that it applies only to the wealthy, 
since those without great wealth do not have the financial means to shop between municipalities. 
9  As of 2005, only 3 percent of family incomes in Baltimore were over $200,000 a year (about 
4,000 families).  In Montgomery County, over 18 percent of family incomes were in this top 
income bracket (about 42,000 families).   
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Baltimore raise their own taxes, we shouldn’t be funding their programs.”  I later pointed 
out to him that raising taxes on the wealthy in Baltimore would result in little increase in 
tax revenue, given the low median income of Baltimore City residents, and that raising 
state revenue was the only way to increase funding for the city’s school system.  His 
response was, “That’s their problem.” 
 Just as individual states do not like to give more to the federal budget than they 
get back in return, counties and cities protect their own interests.  The result is a system 
that rewards parochialism and exacerbates inequality.  Rich areas get richer and their 
already superior services get exponentially better.  Wealthy counties benefit from their 
resource advantages in more than just tax dollars.  Because of their wealth, they gain 
reputations for good schools, services, and quality of life.  Because of these reputations, 
they are able to recruit the best teachers, police chiefs, and administrators.  They receive 
awards and kudos for being the “best schools in the state,” “best place to live,” and “most 
effective government.”  Their advantages over their neighbors give them strength and 
prestige.  In an attempt to hold on to these rankings and perform for their constituents, 
even the most progressive state legislators become resistant to redistributive policies that 
benefit other communities at the expense of full funding for their own priorities.10 
 While some of these wealthy communities institute progressive housing plans 
such as inclusionary zoning (like those found in Montgomery County, Maryland) to 
increase economic and racial diversity within their borders (Rust 1999), they do so only 
                                                 
10  The Montgomery County delegate described above explained to me why he believed his 
jurisdiction shouldn’t help the Baltimore schools.  To summarize his argument: Montgomery 
County money was needed at home—mainly for transportation projects.  Without equal funding 
for their pet projects, the Montgomery delegates felt slighted by the idea of raising a progressive 
tax that would largely hit their county when they would not reap the rewards.  The fact that the 
lines between counties are arbitrary was of no consequence. 
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because they can afford it.  Their neighbors who have higher poverty rates and lower tax 
bases cannot afford the luxury of taxing and regulating businesses and developers; 
instead, these governments find themselves forced to provide incentives to entice 
corporations and investors in order to attain or retain any economic vitality.  In so doing, 
they deplete the tax base further and give away their only chance of increasing 
government revenue.  
 Segregation has other political consequences as well.  While some concentration 
can enable unrepresented or underrepresented minorities to achieve political 
empowerment via the election of co-ethnics, over-concentration can dilute their influence 
by taking the concerns of minorities out of the reelection constituencies of the majority of 
the legislature.  This paradox has led some to speculate that there is a tradeoff between 
increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that promotes 
minority group interests (Hill 1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Lublin 1997).  The debate 
remains: Which is more effective for passing pro-minority bills: a few more minority 
legislators or many more legislators who are accountable to minorities? 
Why Study Latinos? Who Are They and Why Do They Matter? 
 By 2000, the year of the last Census, Latinos had become the largest minority 
group in the United States.  By 2025, it is expected that Latino Americans will make up 
almost a quarter of the population.  Because they represent such a large proportion of the 
populace, it is important that we understand what barriers the Latino community faces.  
As of 2000, almost 71 percent of Latino adults had never attended college.  Just over 10 
percent had a college degree.  While much of this discrepancy is due to low college 
education rates among adult immigrants, Latino children continue to lag behind the 
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national average in terms of high school completion and college enrollment—a statistic 
commonly associated with the concentration of Latinos in high poverty segregated 
schools.  Latinos also have lower turnout rates in elections and are less likely to be 
politically engaged. 
More importantly, Latinos do have political interests.  About two-thirds of 
Latinos are either first- or second-generation immigrants.  Immigration policy and 
policies that single out immigrants for punitive action affect the Latino community more 
than any other group.  In addition, the low aggregate socioeconomic status of the Latino 
population means that education and fiscal/labor policies have a substantial impact on the 
Latino community.  Perhaps most significantly, as anti- immigrant rhetoric has flared, 
Latinos have become more likely to experience discrimination and outright hostility.  It is 
clear that studying Latinos is both meaningful and necessary. 
 It is important to note, however, that the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are 
American political artifacts, a concept produced for the sole purpose of categorization by 
statisticians.  These terms capture neither the array of circumstances and identities among 
the many subgroups commonly called “Latino” nor the lack of group membership felt by 
many individuals officially classified as Latino (Idler 2007).  So, why study these 
individuals as a group? 
 To say the least, the diversity within the Latino community is vast—so much so 
that the factors dividing that community can sometimes appear to make the term “Latino” 
meaningless.  The forces in various sending nations that prompt immigration to the 
United States differ widely, and how and when individuals and their families immigrated 
is extremely important as well. These differences have inhibited the development of a 
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meaningful pan-ethnic identity among much of the Latino population (Kaufmann 2003).  
But while the interests of groups within the Latino community may be distinct, depending 
on their members’ specific ancestry or the circumstances under which they immigrated, 
in political terms, more policies unite the Latino community than divide it.  Any survey 
of Latino public opinion will reveal a high degree of agreement on policy issues across 
Latino communities (Leal 2008). 
Despite differences in national origin, for purposes of the Census, the U.S. 
government has decided to classify these many immigrant groups as encompassing a 
single ethnic group: Latino or Hispanic.  Moreover, the average American can no more 
distinguish between Latino subgroups than she or he could pick out a member of the 
Supreme Court in a crowd.  Thus, Latinos, having been placed by the federal government 
in a distinct ethnic category, likewise have been defined as a distinct group within the 
population.  If nothing else, despite the divisions within the Latino community, it is 
important to understand how policies and socioeconomic forces affect the largest 
minority population in the United States, which now comprises more than 45 million 
Americans.11 
Chapter Outline 
In the subsequent chapter, I develop a theory of how segregation affects Latino 
socioeconomic mobility and political power.  Drawing on literature from demography, 
political science, and sociology, I build the argument that segregation negatively affects 
Latino sociopolitical outcomes.  Chapter Three presents a summary of how elected 
officials, community activists, and organizers view the problems facing the Latino 
                                                 
11 According to the latest Census projections, in 2007 there were just over 45 million Hispanics in 
the United States. 
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community.  This chapter presents a first-hand account of the barriers to social mobility 
and political participation witnessed by individuals actively working in the Latino 
community.  In their own words, Latino elected officials and activists describe the effects 
of segregation.  Although almost all of my interview participants note both benefits and 
drawbacks to neighborhood concentration, the interviews I conducted and my 
experiences in these communities led me to conclude that integration, while certainly not 
without its own problems, benefits Latinos far more than concentration.  
My quantitative investigation of the link between residential segregation and 
sociopolitical mobility begins in Chapter Four.  Here, I consider how residential 
segregation is affecting the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino population.  I find 
evidence that segregation erects five specific barriers: in segregated areas 1) Latino 
immigrants are less likely to become citizens and 2) less likely to have sufficient English 
skills; 3) U.S.-born Latinos have lower educational achievement; 4) all Latinos have 
lower incomes; and 5) more isolated social networks.  
Chapter Five takes the analysis to the political level, empirically investigating the 
link between segregation and political participation.  This chapter tests the hypothesis 
that Latinos living in segregated areas are less likely to be civically engaged, less likely to 
be interested in political affairs, and, as a result, less likely to be politically active.  I find 
support for the hypothesis that the connection between segregation and political 
participation works through education, citizenship, English ability, and income.  To be 
clear, segregation indirectly constrains political interest and activity by limiting 
socioeconomic mobility but does not directly constrain political activity.  However, 
segregation has a large direct effect on civic engagement.  Segregated communities are 
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socially flat- lining, indicating that isolation prevents the creation of vibrant community 
institutions in Latino neighborhoods that could cultivate political participation. 
In Chapter Six, I expand my investigation of segregation and Latino politics to 
consider the effect of Latino concentration in states (as opposed to cities).  Historical and 
recent immigration trends have resulted in some states housing the majority of the Latino 
population while other states are home to very few.  In this chapter, I attempt to develop a 
theoretical understanding of why some states respond to Latino immigration by passing 
punitive immigration legislation while others do not.  I find that legislatures are more 
likely to introduce and pass punitive immigration bills as a response to large increases in 
the Latino population. 
Chapter Seven extends this analysis to investigate where Latinos find 
representation in state government.  Residential segregation has made the political 
empowerment of Latinos and African Americans easier to achieve (Massey and Denton 
1993), and these symbolic victories have been critical to the political incorporation of 
both groups (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986).  However, the substantive impact of 
political empowerment is less clear.  Studies of the legislative behavior of Latino elected 
officials certainly have shown that they are more likely to introduce and vote for 
legislation that benefits the Latino community, particularly in areas such as education, 
poverty, and anti-discrimination measures (Bratton 2006).  This chapter extends the study 
of Latino legislative empowerment to investigate the behavior of Latino legislators on 
immigration bills that could lead to discrimination in the Latino community—legislation 
that could harm Latinos.  I find that empowerment is not necessarily always beneficial to 
Latinos.  Although segregation does enable political empowerment, the benefits of 
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empowerment when Latinos are segregated appear to be contingent upon the political 
context and history of the state.  Simply put, empowerment is not always worth the 
socioeconomic price of segregation.  Chapter Eight concludes this analysis and discusses 
the future of Latino socio-political incorporation. 
 
Data Overview and Methodological Approach 
I approach my research questions using several sources of data.  Each has its 
strengths and weaknesses, which I will discuss in turn.  By drawing on multiple data 
sources, I hope to validate my findings.  Traditional data sets used by political scientists 
and sociologists to investigate social mobility and political participation, such as the GSS 
and ANES, fail to survey enough Latinos to produce confidently valid results.  Other data 
sets fail to include geographic codes that enable researchers to investigate contextual 
effects.  Thus, there are limited resources to turn to in order to investigate the impact of 
residential context on Latino political behavior. 
For this reason, I employ several sources of data, including qualitative interviews 
with Latino elected officials, activists, and community organizers.  I use a mixed-
methods triangulation approach in an attempt to confirm and cross-validate my findings.  
Utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods helps to offset the inherent 
weaknesses of each method when used alone (Creswell 2003, 217).  The quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected and analyzed concurrently.  Although more pages are 
devoted in the dissertation to the quantitative data, I give equal weight to the 
contributions made by both data sources.   
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Qualitative Research on Latino Mobilization and the Policy Process 
 I obtained Institutional Review Board approval to go out into the field and 
interview individuals who work in Latino neighborhoods and who represent Latino areas 
in the policymaking process.  The interviews were conducted in three locations: the 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of Washington, DC, Baltimore, Maryland, and New 
York City.  These three places were chosen because they represent different types of 
immigration destinations.  New York City is a traditional “gateway” city.  It also has one 
of the highest levels of Latino residential segregation in the country (Wilkes and Iceland 
2004).  New York City has a Latino isolation score of .68—the 15th highest in the country 
for Latinos—and it houses the nation’s second largest Latino population.  It is one of only 
two cities in the U.S. to be considered "hypersegregated" for Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 
2004).  The Washington, DC MSA is considered a “new gateway” city.  About 8.2 
percent of its population is Latino, and with an isolation index of .35, its La tino 
population is the 80th most isolated in the country.  Baltimore is a brand new destination 
for Latinos.  Baltimore’s isolation index is .075, making it the 235th most isolated in the 
country.  Only 2.4 percent of Baltimore’s population is Latino. 
Initial interviews were conducted with Latino elected officials and organizers of 
high-profile Latino interest groups.  At the end of each of these interviews, I asked the 
participant for references to other individuals in the community to whom they believed I 
should speak.  This technique worked fairly well and quickly expanded the scope of the 
interviews, allowing me to find community activists I would not have found on my own.  
The interviews took approximately one hour, and follow-up interviews were conducted 
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with some subjects if they were warranted.  I conducted more than 20 interviews.  The 
IRB documents are available in Appendix A. 
U.S. Census 2000 and U.S. Census Current Population Estimate, Voter Supplement 
2000 
The quantitative data for this project come from a variety of sources.  Data on 
tract level Latino isolation is derived from the 2000 U.S. Census.  Data on Latino 
socioeconomic mobility is derived from the U.S. Census Current Population Survey 
(CPS).12  This data set contains 50,000 individuals and almost 3,000 Latinos across the 
United States.  The CPS sample is scientifically selected to represent the total population 
of the United States.  Published data are available for those ages 16 and over.  The CPS is 
well suited for this study, as it inc ludes information on country of origin, immigration 
status, citizenship status, educational attainment, income, and English proficiency.  
Unfortunately, the lowest geographic code available for the individuals in this data set is 
the MSA.  Thus, for models incorporating the CPS, I rely on MSA isolation estimates for 
the Latino community generated from the 2000 U.S. Census as developed by Massey and 
Denton (1993) and reproduced by Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002).13  Although 
this is not the ideal contextual measure, it does correlate well with isolation measures 
produced at the tract level. 
The CPS includes information on registration and voting, but because it does not 
include a number of the other variables pertinent to the theory I have developed, I do not 
use this data set to investigate the relationship between context and civic and political 
                                                 
12 Data are available from:  http://www.census.gov/cps/ 
13 These data are available from: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/front_toc.html 
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engagement.  Instead, for this investigation, I turn to the Social Capital Community 
Benchmark Survey, 2000. 
Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 20000 
The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000 (SCBS), conducted by 
the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University, is the largest study on civic engagement in the United States.  Implemented in 
2000, the survey contains over 3,000 Latinos.  By obtaining Institutional Review Board 
permission and permission from the Roper Center, I was able to gain access to the census 
tract geographic identifiers for the respondents included in the survey.  The SCBS 
contains information on civic and political engagement as well as on friendship diversity 
and social and political trust. 
 State Policy Data 
The American states are an important arena for immigrant incorporation.  In fact, 
state and local governments create most contemporary immigrant and economic 
integration policies (Fix et al. 2008).  State governments also have become more active in 
immigration policies that are particularly meaningful to Latinos (NCSL 2007).  The 
Migration Policy Institute produced a data set of all the immigrant-related legislation 
introduced in state legislatures in 2007.  Using this collection, I identified bills that were 
pertinent to the Latino community.  After cataloguing the data, I used state legislature 
websites to retrieve detailed information about each bill, including whether it came to a 
vote and which legislators supported or opposed it.   
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State Legislative Data 
 For the final substantive chapter in this dissertation, I compiled district and 
individual information on state legislators from four states: Texas, Arizona, Georgia, and 
Montana.  In addition to the legislation used in the previous chapter from the Migration 
Policy Institute, I utilized immigration law data from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures to expand the sample to include bills passed in states in 2006 and 2008.  
Also, I conducted key word searches on the four states used in the case studies to ensure 
that I had a full list of immigration bills for the three-year time span.  I then added 
individual legislator and district data.  For this, I drew upon a multitude of sources, 
including state legislature websites and state redistricting websites, the Almanac of State 
Legislative Elections (2007), and Kathleen Bratton's state legislature data.  A full and 
complete description of the data sources is included in the chapters in which they are 
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Chapter 2: Residential Isolation and Latino Sociopolitical 
Incorporation: A Theory 
 
Why study Latino Participation 
The Importance of Participation for Democracy  
“Given that past studies have shown that minority representation has consequences not 
only for improving racial and ethnic relations but also for the distribution of public 
goods in cities, there is a real possibility that minorities are losing out” (Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2005, 531). 
 
In the American republican system, citizen participation determines the 
composition of political leadership and its responsiveness to citizen concerns.  Political 
participation, particularly non-electoral participation, provides the forum in which 
citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs to 
elected and appointed officials, and apply the political pressure necessary to generate 
meaningful and substantive policy responsiveness (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  
In U.S., elected officials are most responsive to those who participate at the highest levels 
(Dahl 1961; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Since election and reelection are vital 
to politicians’ career ambitions, pleasing (or appeasing) mobilized interests is first and 
foremost on most elected officials’ list of things to do (Mayhew 1974).  Democracy 
implies both responsiveness by elected officials and broad consideration of public 
interests; thus, it is important that every group participate at more or less equal rates.  
Moreover, because groups participate in a battle for resources when they vote (or work) 
for different political regimes in local and urban elections (Kaufmann 2004), unequal 
participation can result in the exclusion of groups from both the democratic process and 
the resources provided by government that are vital to their economic and social well-
being.  In addition, individuals participate in political and non-political forums that can 
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determine the quality of service delivery that is necessary for daily lives, and contribute 
to the overall quality of their neighborhoods and the socioeconomic mobility of 
neighborhood residents.  Contacting an elected official when the trash has not been 
picked up or attending a PTA meeting or school board meeting to improve the quality of 
the local school can have positive effects on the daily life of the individual and the future 
socioeconomic status of the next generation.  If citizens contact public officials, they are 
more likely to get the basic services that their communities require (Berry, Portney, and 
Thompson 1993). 
At its core, democracy rests on citizens participating in the political process.  
However, Americans do not participate in large numbers, especially compared with other 
developed democracies.  In the United States, in a national election, roughly half of 
eligible citizens participate; in local elections, as few as ten percent of adults may vote 
(Bridges 1997; Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch. 2002).  The numbers for nonvoting acts of 
participation, such as attending town meetings, volunteering for campaigns, or writing to 
elected officials, are far lower (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Even 
recent rosy pictures of the state of participation in the United States (including voting), 
point to the uneven distribution of participation across class, racial, and ethnic groups 
(National Conference on Citizenship 2006). 
Study after study bemoans the fact that the people who turn out to vote, call their 
legislators, write letters to the editor, and volunteer their time and money in campaigns 
look very different from the general public (Piven and Cloward 2000; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1993).  As Hanjal and Trounstine (2005, 
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515) note, “the skewed nature of the vote raises real concerns about how well the 
interests of different groups are served in democracy.”  
This assumes that electing representatives who make promises and seem to 
represent a community is enough to guarantee substantive policy returns and adequate 
services.  Unfortunately, elections alone are unreliable information conduits.  Why one 
individual voted for one candidate over another is impossible to determine based on their 
push of a single button in the voting booth. In order for elected officials to gauge the 
interests, needs, and desires of various constituent groups, individuals representing 
various constituencies must participate in actions that communicate clear desires.  
Without significant engagement by members of minority and low income communities in 
these higher “quality” political activities, public policies will likely remain skewed in 
favor of the white upper class (Burns 2006; Lowi 1969; Schattschneider 1975; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).   
Most studies on the factors that influence political participation look primarily at 
whites and, through the use of statistical controls, wash away the effects of racial group 
dynamics (Leighley 2001).  As Jan Leighley (2001, 6) notes, “our theories of 
participation assumed to be generalizable across racial and ethnic groups are tested 
primarily on Anglos and typically ignore the contextual characteristics emphasized in 
theories of minority participation, while theories of group mobilization are rarely tested 
empirically in a systematic fashion across racial and ethnic groups.”   
This omission has severe consequences for the explanatory power of 
contemporary theories of political behavior.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 67.4 
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percent of the residents of the United States in 2004 were non-Hispanic whites.14  
Although whites currently are the majority in this country, they have the lowest 
immigration rates into the United States and the lowest per-capita birthrate of all racial 
groups.  It will not be long before whites are no longer the majority.  The immigration 
rate into the United States has increased and the origin countries for most immigrants 
have changed from Europe to Latin American and Asian.  Foreign-born individuals make 
up almost 15 percent of the total population of the United States.15  For this reason alone, 
immigrant and minority-specific issues need to be part of our discourse. 
Today, Latinos make up the majority of immigrants to the United States and more 
than fifty percent of Latino immigrants hail from Mexico.  As of 2006, Mexico alone sent 
31percent of all new immigrants to the United States.  Latino Americans on average have 
more children than either whites or African Americans, making them the fastest growing 
racial group in the United States.  As of 2006, there were over 44 million Latinos living 
in the United States and that number is growing.16 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 
Latinos comprised fewer than 13 percent of the U.S. population and census projections 
estimate that by 2006 the Latino population in the United States had increased by 25 
percent since 2000.17  Thus, if what is known to be true about whites does not apply to 
                                                 
14 The U.S. Census Bureau defines non-Hispanic whites by combining two questions. The first 
question asks for the race of the individual (white, Black, Native American, Pacific Islander, etc.) 
and a second question asks if the respondent is Hispanic.  Non-Hispanics whites are individuals 
who checked that they were white and indicated they were not Hispanic. 
15 http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/final.fb.shtml 
Source: The 2006 data are from the 2006 American Community Survey, the 2000 data are from 
Census 2000 (see www.census.gov). All other data are from Gibson, Campbell and Emily 
Lennon, US Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-
Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990, US Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, 1999. This report is available on-line. 
16 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey 
17 SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, July 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006. 
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Latinos, our research will quickly be outdated and inapplicable to more than a quarter of 
the population. 
Above and beyond their overall numbers in the United States, Latinos are also 
distinct in several ways from other immigrant groups and native-born whites and African 
Americans.  Latino immigrants come to this country with very low levels of education 
compared to other groups.  Fifty percent of the foreign-born Latino population has less 
than a high school education, compared to 10 percent of whites and 20 percent of African 
Americans (PEW 2006).  Of Latinos born in the United States, 25 percent lack a high 
school diploma.  While the U.S. born Latino population is moving up the educational 
ladder, they are still far more likely to drop out of high school than all other racial groups 
and they are the least likely to attend college (Zhou 2003).   
Latinos are also becoming much more residentially concentrated in the United 
States. Seven states have absorbed most of the influx of Latin American immigrants 
(Camarota and McArdle 2003; Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn 1999).  Figure 2.1 shows how 
Latino Americans are concentrated in specific states and counties in the United States.  
As a result of this concentration, not only does Latino political behavior have the 
potential to drastically affect the political context of the United States, but Latinos have 
the potential to be the majority stakeholder in a select number of states and localities—
many of which are key swing states for presidential elections and control of the Senate.  
Since Latinos are further concentrated into counties and cities, their role in local 
governance is herculean. 
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Figure 2.1 Latino Population in the United States by County. 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
Looking specifically at the barriers to participation for minority groups in the 
United States is essential to understanding governance, opportunities, and political 
influence.  Race transcends the barriers of class in the United States (Massey and Denton 
1993; Massey and Mullan 1984; Nelson Jr. 2005; Williams 2004).  Simply due to skin 
color, many individuals are systematically disadvantaged economically and politically.  
As William E. Nelson notes,  
The existence in the United States of a hierarchical system of white 
domination and control has served as a crucial barrier to Black and Latino 
political incorporation and empowerment.  What Blacks and Latinos have 
faced is an enduring system of institutionalized power that promotes white 
privilege and advancement while simultaneously marginalizing the 
competitive capacities of non-Whites.  The perpetual denial of Black and 
Latino entrance into the most important sanctuaries of power constitutes a 
critical contradiction of U.S. democratic principles of freedom, justice, and 
equality (Nelson Jr. 2005, xiii). 
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By controlling away the effects of race, we limit our understanding of the barriers 
to socioeconomic mobility and political incorporation.  Inattention to minority group 
participation is not only a problem with traditional models of political participation; 
recent research into the effects of context also is guilty of the same ommission.  Social 
“homogeneity” theories contend that racial and social group diversity increase conflict 
and decrease the likelihood of participation (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Campbell 
2006; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999; Masuoka 2006; Putnam 
2007; Sanchez 2006).  These studies, though, fail to look at how diversity uniquely 
affects minority groups.  I propose that residential “homogeneity” essentially constitutes 
segregation and social isolation for Latino Americans, the consequences of which 
constrain the opportunities for political socialization and participation, increase the threat 
posed by Latino immigrants and their families to local host communities, and undermine 
their ability to get the quality policy outcomes their communities require. 
 To summarize, I argue that segregation results in political and social isolation for 
Latino Americans.  Segregation and social isolation constrain socioeconomic mobility, 
limit access to political information, decrease political efficacy and motivation, and 
increase feelings of alienation from the democratic process.  Because of the negative 
consequences of segregation, community institutions face great barriers to mobilization.  
Local communities and elected officials react sharply against Latinos with punitive and 
discriminatory legislative actions because they have no understanding of the interests and 
needs of these communities.  Cultural differences are exacerbated by social distance, 
which impedes understanding, empathy, and acceptance. 
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This Study’s Contributions  
 This dissertation puts these arguments to a test.  Is Latino socioeconomic mobility 
hampered by residential isolation?  Are Latinos who live in isolated environments less 
likely to participate?  How does Latino isolation affect the actions of elected officials?  
How does low Latino political participation affect the quality of representation they 
receive?  While research has shown that whites are more likely to participate in civic 
activities when they live in homogenous areas (Putnam 2007; Campbell 2006) and are 
more likely to vote the less diversity they face in their communities (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003), the evidence for Latinos is less well 
understood.  Preliminary evidence suggests that racial minorities in fact participate more 
in diverse environments (Rubenson 2006).  The effects of residential context are still 
relatively new to political science and are often overlooked or underspecified.  
 A finding that residential segregation is associated with lower levels of 
socioeconomic mobility, political participation, and increased anti-Latino sentiment could 
have important implications for the future of race relations, American electoral politics, 
and public policy.  Such a finding would be a positive contribution to the literature on 
political participation and contextual effects, one that has largely emphasized the benefits 
of social homogeneity and the detrimental nature of diversity (Putnam 2007).  Politically, 
at issue is the future of the power of the Latino vote and the Latino “voice” within 
democratic institutions.  
 I also contribute to the ongoing discussion about the future of Latinos in the 
United States.  Will they follow traditional patterns of past immigrant groups and work 
their way up through the generations, finally putting a foot solidly in the ranks of the 
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middle class? Or will they constitute a new sociopolitical “underclass” that faces extreme 
hardships and lacks a voice in governmental institutions?   
 In summary, this dissertation makes two contributions.  In addressing the degree 
to which segregation impedes socioeconomic mobility among Latinos, it subjects a 
largely untested hypothesis to empirical analysis and thus fills a gap in the literature on 
Latino socioeconomic mobility and contextual effects.  By addressing how these 
impediments translate into low levels of political participation and political power, it 




Why do some people participate while others do not?  Of the factors that contribute to 
the likelihood of participation, some explain variation between individuals and others 
explain variation between groups in the aggregate.  Individual explanations of 
participation usually are grounded in socioeconomic status (SES) and the recruitment 
opportunities that accompany increased levels of social and economic resources.  For 
groups, aggregate levels of trust in government, civic duty/obligation, political efficacy, 
cynicism or disaffection, political empowerment, group consciousness, and mobilization 
by political parties and interest groups are found to be important to explaining variation 
between racial and ethnic groups.  Finally, contextual effects research suggests that social 
networks are constrained by location and that these constraints can have dismal 
consequences for the political behavior of the resource poor.  Each of these phenomena 
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influences participation differently for Latinos than for other racial groups.  In this 
section, I will discuss each of these factors and how they inform my project. 
 
Resource-Based Models of Participation 
Two major factors influence the decision to participate: motivation and capacity 
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  The resource-based model of participation posits 
that as social and economic resources such as income and education improve, so too does 
the likelihood of participation (Campbell Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960).  This has 
implications for both motivation and capacity.  A rational actor model of participation 
argues that voting and other acts of participation are more costly for individuals who lack 
resources.  There is a “cost” to gathering the information necessary to participate.  The 
assumption is that the more education one has, the easier it is to understand and draw 
conclusions from limited information, as well as to take cues and use heuristic shortcuts 
(Downs 1957; Zaller 1990; Zaller 1992).  In addition, the skills necessary to participate 
beyond voting, such as organizing, public speaking, and writing skills are often gained 
through formal education (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Verba et al. 
1993).  
 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show that the reason income is such a good 
predictor of participation has nothing to do with the direct effect of having money—most 
political acts other than campaign contributions are reliant on time, not cash.  Income 
captures the type of occupation the person is likely to hold.  Higher income earning 
occupations are likely to cultivate the skills necessary to participate.  Individuals in white 
collar positions learn to organize others and speak confidently.  Higher income jobs are 
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also more likely to cultivate networks of politically interested and knowledgeable 
individuals, which increase the likelihood that an individual in the network will be asked 
to participate.  In short, socioeconomic status often is associated with a 
friendship/colleague network of politically motivated individuals.  These networks cut 
the costs associated with information gathering and increases the likelihood that people 
will feel pressure to participate.  When participation is expected in social circles, non-
participation creates negative social consequences, so socioeconomic status constrains 
motivation. 
Most research to date on the effect of resources on political participation treat all 
racial groups equally.  Hanes Walton (1985) argues that the individual resource model is 
problematic to the study of racial group participation because it carries with it normative 
implications for how we interpret minority political participation.  With regard to African 
American political behavior, Walton notes that the “individual-centered behavioral 
approach in black political behavior has produced a vast literature that proposes the 
individual weaknesses and imperfections it uncovers are a result of blacks’ individual 
shortcomings and not the result of any systematic factors under which they have labored” 
(Walton 1985, 3).  The same may be true of the research on SES and Latino American 
participation.  By focusing on individual explanations, we overlook the societal and 
cultural differences that may produce different participation rates.   
 African Americans are considered “exceptional.”  They over-participate given 
their aggregately low socioeconomic status because of their unique history of group-
based oppression in the United States.  African Americans have considerable social 
cohesiveness and social institutions (Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Dawson 1994; 
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Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Mangum 2003; Southwell and Pirch 2003).  However, the 
discussion as to whether or not African Americans are “exceptional” assumes that white 
behavior is a perfect model from which only African Americans deviate.  There may 
simply be additional variables that mitigate the impact of socioeconomic status which 
vary in importance by race.  Racial group identification adds unexplained variance and 
decreases the applicability of the SES model.  There are several reasons why this may be 
the case. 
Given that the individual resource based model in essence relies on the presence 
of social networks, it affects the aggregate voting behavior of different groups over time.  
Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (2003) argue that racial and ethnic minorities are “unequal 
at the starting line.”  That is, political socialization and political background are “rooted 
in the legacy of class…and in the experiences throughout the lifecycle…. [T]he race [for 
political and economic resources] does not start anew with each generation: instead, 
parents are able to pass on class status to their offspring and, thus socio-economic 
stratification persists from generation to generation” (2003, 45-46).  Thus, Latinos may 
be less likely as a group to participate due to their group-based resource disadvantages, 
even if individuals hold the socioeconomic keys to participation. 
 One important takeaway point from the resource-based literature is how it 
predicts the behavior of high SES Latinos.  The resource model predicts that individuals 
with high levels of education or income should live in locations surrounded by other high 
SES individuals who have political knowledge and interest, but this may not be true of 
Latinos.  Many Latinos who graduate from high school or college and make significant 
incomes are the first in their family (or even their neighborhood) to do so.  Thus, the 
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social and network resources they attain via their economic and educational status may be 
much smaller than those of their white counterparts, limited much more to their 
workplace and not reinforced in the home environment.   
 Susan Brown (2007) finds that among Latinos, there is “delayed spatial 
assimilation.”  Second and often third generation Latinos are constrained in their social 
networks and residential context by their economic responsibilities to their (often much 
more financially disadvantaged) parents and family members and their extended families 
in Latin America.  Because they are helping their families survive, they are more likely to 
live in higher poverty neighborhoods in multigenerational housing (Brown 2007).  In 
short, Latino social resources may be greatly reduced compared to those of whites with 
the same level of education and income because their family and friends and their 
childhood experiences were not accompanied by the socioeconomic resources they later 
acquire.  This may help to explain why many minority groups, particularly Latinos, 
participate less despite economic and educational advancement (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; 
De Sipio 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Verba, 
Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
Even middle class Latinos are more likely to come from immigrant, and working-
class or poor families with less political engagement.  Thus, socioeconomic status alone 
does not capture the effects of their social network isolation.  For Latinos, social network 
diversity may be critical to political participation since they are unlikely to gain political 
knowledge from within Latino and largely immigrant social networks and familial 
relations.  The benefits of exposure to whites may increase participation not because of 
race-specific variables, but because middle class whites are more likely to have been 
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raised by middle class parents who were more likely to engage in political discussion at 
home (Lopez 2003).   
Given that most individual- level models, either ignore or control for race, it is 
assumed that all races and ethnic groups are motivated by a similar set of factors—that if 
these groups would simply become economically and educationally equal to whites, we 
would see equal participation rates.  Unfortunately, that is neither a realistic solution to 
the normative problem of unequal participation rates nor a theoretically sound empirical 
explanation.  As the next section explains, due to their minority status in the United 
States, racial and ethnic groups are motivated by particular factors that have long-term 
implications for participation even once class taken into account.  
Some scholars suggest that “racial differences in participation either: become very 
small, disappear entirely, or even favor minorities, once SES is controlled” (Berry, 
Portney, and Thompson 1993, 85).  This assertion discounts the fact that minorities are 
not equally distributed across class lines and are unlikely to be in the near future.  
Scholars that have examined the importance of SES and sociodeomgraphic factors on 
Latino participation (Hero and Campbell 1996; DeSipio 1996) present a morose picture 
of the future of Latinos in the democratic process.   If SES proves to be the sole key to 
participation, and aggregate SES remains low for Latinos, their voice within the political 
process will be considerably constrained. 
 
Latino Participation: What We Know 
As with African Americans, the socioeconomic status model has proved limited 
for explaining Latino political participation (or the lack thereof).  Instead, naturalization, 
length of residence in the United States, English language skills, trust, discrimination, and 
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the limited role of political parties in Latino neighborhoods are important indicators for 
Latino turnout and participation.  Even controlling for citizenship status and SES, Latinos 
are much less likely to participate (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; De Sipio 1996; Hero and 
Campbell 1996; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989).  One important finding is that 
education, more so than occupation or income, is key to explaining levels of participation 
among Latinos (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001).  In addition, Garcia (1982) and 
DeSipio (1996) find that the relatively limited range of occupational choices and lack of 
variation in Latino incomes, as well as the higher percentages of foreign-born and limited 
English speakers, are confounding factors diminishing the applicability of the SES 
model.  
 Length of residence in the United States is associated with higher levels of 
partic ipation, but it still does not eliminate the gap between Latinos and other groups (De 
Sipio 1996; Highton and Burris 2002; Jones-Correa 1998; Ramakrishnan 2006).  For 
Mexican Americans, although group consciousness per se does not boost participation, 
increases in political knowledge, a sense of civic duty, subjective group membership, and 
concern for ethnic issues do seem to increase turnout (Lien 1994; Michelson 2003b; 
Sanchez 2006).  Still, group consciousness appears to motivate Latinos to participate only 
in activities that are Latino-centered and not directed at the larger political system 
(Sanchez 2006).  However, if Latinos reach out to other Latinos (i.e., direct within group 
mobilization), political participation, and voter turnout in particular can increase 
(Ramirez 2005; Shaw, de la Garza, and Jongho 2000).  In fact, mobilization efforts seem 
to be more effective with Latinos than with other racial groups (Hritzuk and Park 2000).  
Thus, since contact matters but message seems not to, some authors argue that a return to 
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party-based individual face-to-face mobilization could be very important to the future of 
Latino political incorporation (Michelson 2003b; Shaw, de la Garza, and Jongho 2000; 
Wong 2006). 
 Mobilizing institutions other than political parties are particularly important to the 
Latino community (Hritzuk and Park 2000).  Like African Americans, the church is an 
important part of Latino life and is very important to the group’s political fortunes, but 
whether the effects of church attendance are positive or negative is not clear.  Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) first noted that while religious institutions are important to 
Latino political participation, the choice of denomination had consequences for Latino 
political skill development.  In particular, they found that Catholic churches were less 
likely to provide the opportunities for skill acquisition and development that decrease the 
costs of participation.  This finding came under fire (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001), but 
recent evidence suggests that Latino immigrant churches sometimes have negative 
consequences for the political development of their members, regardless of denomination 
(Foley and Hoge 2007).  
In short, while some Latino churches and other membership organizations do 
mobilize their members, others actually appear to impede social integration and 
interracial and inter-economic networking.  As Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, “the 
most segregated hour in America is 11am on Sunday morning.”   Foley and Hoge (2007) 
find that churches of any denomination that service primarily immigrant congregations 
often had null or detrimental effects on their congregants’ political socialization.  
Immigrants, they argue, already isolated by language barriers and economic status, find 
strong communities by attending church, but the networks they find have strong 
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“bonding” social capital—social capital that increases intra-group networking—and weak 
“bridging” capital—social capital that facilitates inter-group networking.  Thus, 
immigrants in these situations are unlikely to be privy to costly political information that 
is available only through the development of interactions with other, more rooted 
communities.   
While the church plays a critical role in the Latino, and particularly the immigrant 
Latino, community, non-religious based community groups also are essential to the 
political socialization of these networks.  Labor organizations, workers' centers, advocacy 
and social service organizations, and ethnic voluntary associations engage La tinos and 
immigrants in political organizing and mobilization efforts (Wong 2006).  Janelle Wong 
(2006, 11) argues that these institutions overcome barriers that political parties and other 
outside groups face in largely immigrant neighborhoods.  "Community groups organize 
immigrants by recognizing the complexity and multiple aspects of immigrant identity and 
by being sensitive to the unique histories, traditions, language, and policy needs of local 
immigrant communities.”  They have daily contact with their target population, speak the 
language, and have strong ties to the community, enabling them to apply some social 
pressure to individuals.  Unfortunately, as will be discussed further in Chapter Three, 
these institutions also often lack the financial resources and staff needed to take on long-
term political socialization and mobilization efforts.  In addition, since many of these 
institutions are service providing organizations, who need their financial resources for 
basic social service provisions, they may not have the expertise required for effective 
mobilization over time (Krasner and Pierre-Louis 2006; Wong 2006).  
 
 46  
Hritzuk and Park (2000) find that Latinos who are exposed to mobilization efforts 
or affiliated with at least one community organization are more likely to participate at 
higher levels.  Likewise, de la Garza and Lu (1999) found that Latinos in voluntary 
groups and organizations have higher voter registration rates and turnout.  However, 
access to these institutions is limited.  Latinos are less likely to take part in the traditional 
civic activities in which many Americans learn about participation and through which 
they are recruited to participate in political affairs in and outside of church (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 317; Foley and Hoge 2007).   
When discussing the political behavior of a group, there is usually some implicit 
expectation that individuals within the group identify as group members and that the 
group holds meaning politically for those individuals (Conover 1984).  However, in the 
Latino community this assumption is complicated by the fact that Latinos do not 
necessarily identify as members of a coherent political group (Marquez 2006; Kaufmann 
2003).  Immigration status, generation, and country of origin fragment Latinos into 
different sub-groups.  Mexican Americans in California or Texas have little in common 
with Puerto Ricans in New York or Salvadorans in Washington, DC.  Just as the third 
generation Mexican American in Monterey, California may have little in common with 
the undocumented day laborer in Los Angeles.  Intragroup differences are detrimental to 
the development of many of the psychological factors that increase participation for other 
minority groups, particularly African Americans, such as feelings of linked fate, group 
consciousness, and responsiveness to group-based mobilization on a national level. 
However, many of the constraining factors for Latinos across subgroups are the 
same.  They have aggregately low levels of education and income.  They are often from 
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families and social networks that are new to this country and lack experience with and 
knowledge of U.S. government institutions, and their social networks are, as a result, 
unlikely to discuss and be informed about political affairs (Hritzuk and Park 2000).  In 
fact, recent studies of Latino participation show that Latinos, of all nationalities, often 
report little political discussion and/or interest among their peers (Hardy-Fanta 1993; 
Lopez 2003; Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003; Garcia Bedolla 2005).  The composition 
of Latino social networks is more important to their potential political participation than 
social network composition for other groups, because of Latinos’ general lack of political 
socialization and unfamiliarity with the workings of American political institutions.  As 
Hritzuk and Park (2000, 161) note, “Since Latinos tend to be less familiar with American 
politics than are their white or black counterparts, having connections to a politically 
active social network may help provide them with the requisite knowledge and political 
socialization to facilitate their entry into the political realm.”  Diverse social networks 
that include non-Latinos should be more likely to increase exposure to political 
discussion and mobilization than Latino-only social networks. 
Latinos are also likely to have low levels of trust and to be cynical about 
government as they become more acculturated, experience racism, and are cast as 
“others” (Michelson 2003a; 2003b).  Racial profiling for documentation and the political 
attacks on immigrants, particularly Latino immigrants, that has proliferated in the past 
few years are likely to exacerbate these feelings.  
From this review, it is clear that Latinos are barred from participating by a 
multitude of factors, which can be combined into 4 basic groups: 1) individual factors 
(low socioeconomic status, relatively young aggregate age), 2) social networks factors 
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(lack of knowledge about the democratic system and low levels of discussion about 
politics, lack of access to “weak ties” that can increase information and interest), 3) lack 
of access to mobilizing civic and political institutions and 4) cynicism toward and 
exclusion from American Government. 
 
Why Residential Context Might Matter 
Politics is a social activity, imbedded within structured patterns of social 
interaction…. Political behavior may be understood in terms of 
individuals who are tied together by, and located within, networks, 
groups, & other social formations that largely determine their 
opportunities for the exchange of meaningful political information.  In 
short, the environment plays a crucial role in affecting the social flow of 
political information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 124). 
 
When scholar James Gimpel and his colleagues went into the schools of 
Baltimore, Maryland to interview students about their views on political participation, he 
found that black and Latino student’s political participation faltered due to their local 
contexts.  “If their participation in class is any indication, very little is standing in the way 
of their good citizenship other than the fact that no one has come along to tell them that 
their voice matters, that someone is listening.  We concluded that in order to become 
engaged, these youth simply had to be asked” (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003, 5).  
The problem was, no one was asking.   
At least to some extent, social structure determines the values that groups hold 
and the socialization of children into those value schemes (Blau 1964).  By abiding by the 
social norms in communities, individuals release a certain amount of control to others 
(Coleman 1990). What type of norms our communities condone and which they rebuke is 
critical to understanding the starting point for individuals within a community.  Social 
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structure seems to be more critical to individuals located further down the economic 
ladder. 
Technological changes over the past century, particularly in the areas of 
transportation and communication, have made it increasingly easy for people to move 
further and further from their social communities, but not everyone does.  Higher income 
professionals have more dispersed networks that transcend their neighborhoods (Dreier, 
Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001, 2) whereas lower education and income individuals 
have more spatially constrained social networks (Fischer 1982; Pastor and Robinson 
Adams 1996).  Higher income individuals use “weak ties” to gain information that their 
immediate family and friendship networks lack (Granovetter 1973; 1974; 1983).  
Individuals with lower incomes, however, are less likely to own a computer or to have 
one hooked up to the Internet (Fairly 2004) and are more likely to rely on immediate 
social ties for job referrals and other information (O’Regan 1993).18  Their lives are 
simply more constrained due to their financial hardships (Fischer 1982; Pastor and 
Robinson Adams 1996). 
Place matters for those of higher income status too.  While they may have more 
technological resources and have access to more dispersed social networks, where they 
choose to live still affects the public policies by which they must abide, where their 
children go to school, and their friendship networks.  In regard to political information, 
for individuals who are not particularly interested in politics, where we live largely 
determines the amount of political information we receive (Huckfeldt 1979; Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1992; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Gimpel, Kaufmann, and Pearson-
Merkowitz 2007).  Living in a politically homogeneous area in which only one party has 
                                                 
18 This phenomenon appears to be particularly true for immigrants (Waldinger 2001). 
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the chance to win local, state, or even national elected offices decreases the amount of 
political information available because there will be no major general election 
campaigning and people will see the election as a foregone conclusion (Gimpel, Lay, and 
Schuknecht 2003).  This may explain to some extent why Campbell (2006) finds that in 
politically homogeneous areas, people are more likely to be engaged in civic than 
political activities.  Even congressional candidates who undertake national fundraising 
efforts restrict their requests for funds to districts with a history of high donations 
(Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007), leaving historically dry districts without 
solicitations that spark interest in candidates and the political process.  In short, despite 
innovations in technology and transportation, place still matters.  Where we live is still a 
critical determinant of our access to information and our socialization.   
Context also matters for the policy making process.  Many public policies that 
particularly impact racial minorities are determined at the state and local level.  
Legislation is introduced and policies are implemented in the midst of the residential 
context.  Policies are generated out of a need or a desire from local communities and 
residentially biased interest groups.  Neighbors and neighborhoods can bind together to 
ensure equality and redistribution or they can fight for limited resources and protest 
redistributive efforts that help disadvantaged minorities escape poverty.  Unfortunately, at 
the local level, where community resources are decided, race-based voting prevails 
(Cataldo and Holm 1983), and state officials appear to “respond” to white constituents 
and “react [negatively] to” minority constituents in developing and working for 
legislation (Johnson 2003, 163).   
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The history of American politics is marked by such racial conflict.  In Detroit in 
the 1950s, whites protested in both peaceful and violent ways when African Americans 
attempted to integrate suburbs and workplaces.  Eventually, whites in these locales 
passed discriminatory public policies including white-only residential covenants, racially 
segregated unions, and local zoning ordinances designed to keep African Americans out 
(Sugrue 1996; Massey and Denton 1993).  The social distance resulting from these 
policies exacerbated animus towards African Americans as a group and objections 
towards policies that were perceived to disproportionately help African Americans such 
as welfare, affirmative action, and pub lic housing (Massey and Denton 1993; Gilens 
2000).   
Today, communities are protesting the presence of Latinos who move to formerly 
white neighborhoods (Smith and Furuseth 2006; Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008) and 
there has been another increase in local ordinances that are designed to keep Latino 
Americans out of otherwise all-white neighborhoods.  These ordinances include local 
regulations on the number of extended family members who can live together in a house 
and other maximum occupancy regulations (Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008).  
Several cities and towns also have implemented laws mandating that sheriffs begin anti-
immigrant raids and to demand identification of “suspected” illegal immigrants.  These 
measures encourage racial profiling and increase suspicion of all people of Latino 
descent, particularly those with fewer financial resources (Romero 2006).  On the state 
level, proposed regulation attacking Latinos has also been flourishing.  For example, 
there has been a rise in the number of bills that would require government issued 
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identification for actions for which it was not previously required and bills imposing and 
increasing penalties for hiring undocumented workers.   
These policies are shaped and implemented because of the dynamics playing out 
in states and locales.19  Legislators respond to issues that are at the forefront of their 
constituents concerns.  Locations with no minorities are unlikely to lobby for anti-
minority legislation.  For decades, social scientists have noted the apparent negative 
correlation between the presence of racial minorities and popular support for (or 
opposition to) welfare and other programs stigmatized as disproportionately favoring 
minorities and how this lack of popular support translates into stricter and more stringent 
social policies in states with the largest minority populations (for a review of this 
literature, see Johnson 2003).  However, it is clear that the presence of minorities means 
different things in different communities.  In one community, having a large minority 
presence could produce group conflict or threat (Key 1949; Blumer 1958) while in 
another it can reduce prejudice and increase inter-group empathy (Mutz 2002; Allport 
1954; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995).  Interracial contact appears to mitigate negative 
perceptions of racial minorities.  To summarize, meaningful interaction among members 
of different races reduces group threat, racial prejudice, and animosity (Forbes 1997; 
Carsey 1995; Voss 1996); it also improves race relations and generates support for (or, 
more precisely, offsets opposition to) social policies that promote inclusion and 
redistribution (Johnson 2003).  It is this dynamic, to which I turn next. 
                                                 
19 It is interesting to note that Barack Obama’s support among whites flourished in states with 
little to no historical Black presence, whereas it is more tepid among whites in states with a 
history of racial conflict.  Thus, the historical and current context of a locale can even shape 
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Residential Segregation, Social Isolation and the Policy Process 
To date, the scholarly literature addressing the causes and consequences of 
residential segregation primarily addresses its effect on African Americans.  Recently 
there has been a growth in attention to economic residential segregation as well (Dreier et 
al. 2001; Widestrom 2008).  When thinking about Latinos, there are critical lessons to 
consider from what these scholars observe.  Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) 
argue that segregation among African Americans was the key component in the making 
of the “underclass:” "Residential segregation is the institutional apparatus that supports 
other racially discriminatory processes and binds them together into a coherent and 
uniquely effective system of racial subordination"(8).  They note that segregation creates 
"barriers to spatial mobility” and that these obstructions create obstacles to 
socioeconomic mobility because “where one lives determines a variety of latent factors 
that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of housing, exposure 
to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's peers" (150).  For 
African Americans, they argue, segregation has meant bad schools, where children are 
likely to receive lower quality educations and be exposed to fewer and more cons trained 
life choices, which in turn decreases their chances of achieving economic success.  For 
adults this segregation creates less access to jobs and services as well as dampening 
support for programs that would help alleviate the poverty and rampant joblessness 
common in segregated African American communities.  Similar findings appear in non-
black areas of concentrated poverty (Dreier et al. 2001), indicating that the consequences 
of concentrated poverty are not unique to African Americans.  
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It is clear from a plethora of literature on the black experience and housing policy 
that segregation among African Americans concentrates both poverty and people with 
similarly bleak life experiences which, in turn, creates lower levels of education and job 
skills, less access to quality and stable employment, and increased mental and physical 
health problems (Wilson 1990; 1996; Massey and Denton 1993; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; 
Popkin et al. 2004; LaVeist et al. 2008). 
Key to these segregation-related outcomes is the experience of both children and 
adults and their access to various types of knowledge and information.  Educational 
outcomes are often considered to be contingent upon the role models available to 
children.  Are their role models high school graduates?  Do experiences in their 
community teach children that high school degrees (or beyond) are useful or necessary 
for economic and social success?  Concentrated poverty or even lower middle class 
concentration denies many children of the role models necessary to increase educational 
attainment.   
The lessons discussed above are likely to apply to Latinos living in segregated 
communities.  Latino economic fortunes have been found to be negatively affected by 
residential concentration (Waldinger 2001; O’Regan 1993) and there is good reason to 
believe that Latinos have lower educational outcomes in residentially segregated 
environments for reasons similar to those found for African Americans.20  Schools that 
are attended by a largely second language majority (or child ren of limited-English-
speakers (LES)) face greater challenges getting children up to speed than schools trying 
                                                 
20 See for example, Orfie ld and Lee (2005) and the other publications of The Civil Rights Project 
at the University of California, Los Angeles: 
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/diversity_gen.php.  Cite last visited on 
April 14, 2009. 
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to overcome class factors without the complication of limited language skills.  As 
mentioned above, Latinos have lower educational achievement than either African 
Americans or whites (Pew 2006).  So, as Latinos are concentrated into segregated 
neighborhoods, schools have to battle both language barriers and problems associated 
with parental education.  There is evidence from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
program that indicates that children of low-SES parents fair far better when they live in 
higher median SES communities, where they can be exposed to a more mixed-class 
group of peers, something not available in racially and economically segregated 
neighborhoods.21 
The consequences of high levels of segregation have important implications for 
the socialization of new immigrant Latinos and their children. Portes and Zhou (1993, 82) 
find that: 
 "Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and 
prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today 
several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the 
time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel 
integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight in 
the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into 
the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement 
with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values 
and tight solidarity.”   
 
These differing trajectories of new immigrants are largely determined by 
residential context.  In their study of second generation immigrants, Portes, Fernandez-
Kelly, and Haller (2005, 1024) find that attending a majority minority school decreases 
                                                 
21 More information on the Move to Opportunity Project can be found at: 
http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/mto.cfm  MTO is a research based program that combined tenant-
based rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low income families find housing in 
areas not suffering from concentrated poverty. 
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educational and occupational outcomes as well as reducing overall family income even 
when controlling for a host of familial and individual characteristics. 
The evidence so far suggests that increased segregation of Latino immigrants into 
both the ranks of the working poor and the geographic isolation of the inner cities or 
impoverished suburbs may have detrimental effects on the future of the next generation.  
Recent evidence on second generation Mexican-Americans shows that more recent 
cohorts have experienced slower economic gains than those before them (when the 
Latino population was smaller and their segregation almost non-existent) (Waldinger and 
Feliciano 2004, 396) and that acculturation is accompanied by lower levels of political 
trust (Michelson 2003) and potentially political efficacy.  As Waldinger and Feliciano 
(2004, 395) ask ,“if less skilled immigrants make up a working poor, locked into low 
wage jobs, and therefore confined to inner cities and their failing school systems, can we 
expect that their U.S.-born and –raised children will find progress?”  The question 
therefore, is not whether these immigrants and their children will assimilate, but rather to 
what segment of society will they assimilate to (Portes et al. 2005, 1000)?  And by 
extension, whether they will they take on the traits of the civically and political engaged 
or the disaffected and socially isolated. 
The consequences of Latino segregation for political outcomes are likely to be 
constrained if segregation impedes their socioeconomic mobility.  In addition, if 
segregation results in isolated social networks of other Latinos, as the literature indicates 
it should (Fischer 1982; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001), Latinos should be 
more isolated from political discussion than African Americans or whites.   
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There are, of course, reasons to believe that segregation could produce beneficial 
outcomes in terms of political participation as well as political capital (see Bledsoe, 
Welch, Sigelman & Combs 1995).  For example, segregation can facilitate the attainment 
of “political empowerment” via the election of co-ethnics (descriptive representation) at 
the district/ward, city, and congressional level (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Grofman 
and Handley 1989; Lublin 1997; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982).  Empowerment has been 
found to help facilitate certain political outcomes such as more racially diverse and 
culturally aware police, and to stimulate co-ethnic political participation among Latinos 
(Barretto 2007).  In addition, segregation is strongly linked to widespread racial solidarity 
among African Americans (Bledsoe et al. 1995), which is thought to increase political 
participation in segregated black communities.  As Alozie (1999) notes in regard to 
segregation and African Americans, “the very stimulus that is widely entertained as the 
beacon of institutionalized discrimination, and as retarding Black socioeconomic success, 
has been the cornerstone of Black political success and group solidarity."  Further, 
Putnam (2007) argues, that individuals seem to respond to diversity by “hunkering down” 
and retreating from the community.  He argues that communities only flourish when they 
are culturally and racially homogenous.    
From the perspective of ethnic exceptionalism, I do not expect Latinos to walk 
lock step in the path la id for them by African Americans. They have key differences.  For 
one, group-solidarity is lacking in many Latino communities.  Their diverse national 
origins divide and differentiate Latinos from one another, complicating the emergence of 
racially based solidarity (Kaufmann 2003; Stokes 2003; Marquez 2006).  Moreover, they 
do not have the histories in the United States that facilitate the passage of civic norms 
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from parent to child.  As Sears and Savalei (2006) note, the unique history of African 
Americans in their fight for political equality is not shared by the majority of Latinos or 
other racially distinct ethnic groups:  “[T]he often malign treatment of the small pre-1965 
Latino and Asian populations may not have produced the strong group consciousness 
analogous to that of African Americans among today’s far more numerous counterparts” 
(Sears and Savalei 2006, 898-9). 
 In fact, just the opposite may be true.  While residential segregation among 
African Americans may produce political awareness, group consciousness, and political 
efficacy, for Latinos, their lack of experience with the United States political system is 
likely to delay the production of group-based or individual political participation. 
 Segregation also has consequences for public policy outcomes.  Just as African 
Americans have suffered politically from the social distance between them and the white 
majority in terms of policies that could be beneficial to socioeconomic mobility and the 
overall quality of their neighborhoods, so too should Latinos.  Diversity when 
accompanied with high levels of social interaction increases cross-cultural understanding, 
but diversity lacking social interaction produces group threat and a competition for 
resources.  As a result, areas with large Latino populations but high levels of segregation 
may appear more threatening and produce more conflict with their white neighbors than 
areas in which Latinos and whites interact.  When this conflict makes its way to state and 
local policy makers, legislation may be introduced that has a negative influence on the 
Latino population.  Likewise, they may be unable to gain the passage of and funding for 
initiatives that benefit their neighborhoods and significant numbers of individuals.  In 
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short, when there is conflict between Latinos and whites or African Americans, and 
Latinos lack political power, Latinos may be the recipients of punitive public policies. 
Residential Homogeneity and Mobilizing Institutions 
The thesis of this dissertation contradicts an idea that has ga ined a large number 
of scholarly proponents in recent years.  This is the notion that residential “homogeneity” 
(i.e., sharing a neighborhood with all people who are alike) is critical to the “transfer” and 
development of civic norms (e.g., Campbell 2006; Putnam 2000; 2007; see also Brown 
1988; Hill and Leighley 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Hero 2003; Costa and Kahn 
2003).  These theories posit that communication is more difficult in diverse settings.  
White residents living in all-white communities appear to have higher levels of trust and 
social capital, both of which increase the amount of communication that occurs between 
individuals.  This in turn fosters the transfer of social and civic norms across members of 
the community, from one generation to the next.  In short, racial segregation is better 
because it increases (1) communication, (2) trust, and (3) social capital. 22 
The argument that residential racial homogeneity facilitates greater levels of civic 
engagement relies on the supposition that all homogenous contexts foster political and 
civic participation as a social norm.  Residential and network homogeneity certainly do 
                                                 
22 Due to limitations of most statistical data sets, most researchers have been forced to aggregate 
to the state, county, or metropolitan level, which can yield highly misleading representations of 
real minority segregation.  There are few places in the United States that are majority-minority 
and can also be considered homogenous that are larger than a census tract, but nonetheless, even 
at smaller contextual levels, minorities can be hyper-segregated to the point where their racial 
isolation is in effect no different then living in a racially homogenous state (Wilkes and Iceland 
2004).  Many studies that investigate the effect of diversity on participation focus either on the 
state (Hero 2003), county (Campbell 2006), or metropolitan area (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; 
Rubenson 2006); however, the immediate social context is very important to group perceptions 
and behavior (Gimpel et al. 2003; Huckfeldt 1986; Kenney 1992; Welch et al. 2001).  Thus, 
aggregating at these large levels can mask the contextual realities in which individuals live. 
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promote the transfer of cultural norms—such as religious traditions and proper 
etiquette—as well as in-group affinity.  However, residential isolation should not affect 
all racial and economic groups identically.  Whites are part of the governing class.  As the 
majority, they are socialized to feel as if they are a part of the process.  Voting and civic 
engagement have long been an element of their shared experience as part of the dominant 
group, and homogeneity facilitates communication between those who already hold this 
norm and new members of the community.  In other words, homogeneity facilitates a 
transfer of the norms the population holds at time 1 (t1) to community members at time 2 
(t2). 
 While it is logical to assume that white homogeneous communities will hold 
participatory norms at t1 and will pass it along to whites at t2, we cannot assume that 
Latinos (as well as other minority groups) behave in the same way with regard to the 
transfer of civic duty and the development of participation as a cultural norm.  While at t1 
Latinos have cultural norms such as religious beliefs and practices and social etiquette, 
they do not necessarily have the civic norms that increase participation.  Instead, at t1, 
Latinos generally are immigrants with little information about, or experience with, 
democracy and U.S. civic institutions, and are seen as outsiders and sometimes invaders.  
Furthermore, if they move into impoverished neighborhoods they may develop low 
efficacy, disenfranchisement, lack of trust in government and democratic systems, and 
posses a heightened awareness of being outsiders to the political process.  Whites, by 
contrast, are more likely to start at t1 with a greater sense of efficacy, trust, etc.  Each of 
these communities produces distinct cultural norms for their members that interact with 
civic and political participation in different ways.  From where should participatory 
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norms originate for Latino communities?  The idea that they should magically bubble up 
from within is contrary to the way in which socialization processes operate.  Thus, 
without either 1) exposure to participatory groups (whites, higher SES individuals, etc.) 
or 2) access to mobilizing institutions (civic institutions, education, etc.), it is unlikely 
that participatory norms will develop. 
I have already discussed why segregation decreases social interaction with non 
Latinos, but why does it affect the likelihood of mobilization by external groups such as 
political parties?  Political parties and most traditional mobilizing interest groups other 
than labor unions mobilize areas that are likely to turn out with or without mobilizing 
institutions (Gershtenson 2003).  If a group or neighborhood has the resources that 
historically predict mid-to-high levels of turnout, interest groups, parties, and candidates 
will focus their attention on them.  Thus, mobilization is path dependent and reciprocal in 
nature.  Unfortunately, minorities are, as a group, at a resource disadvantage (Verba, 
Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993).  Even in mayoral races where minorities inevitably are 
important to electoral outcomes, candidates and interest groups are unlikely to start 
mobilization activities early enough or have the resources to recruit those who are 
unregistered, and historically, non-participants.  Instead, they work from existing voter 
rolls and concentrate their activities on turning out those who have turned out before. 
Thus, context and institutional resources cannot be completely separated.  If an 
individual or a group lacks the desire to participate, requests to participate will largely go 
unheeded (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  If, as a group, minorities lack the 
political efficacy and social pressures that facilitate political participation, then minorities 
and the poor are more costly to mobilize and therefore may be ignored by political parties 
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and interest groups (Drier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001; Leighley 2001).  
Particularly if a person lives in a one-party dominant location, if they do not have a 
history of participation, they are unlikely to ever receive any mobilization requests or 
information about campaigns.  Lacking support from the political parties, primary 
candidates are often cash strapped.  They focus their attention on “super voters” leaving 
those with a spotty history of participation by the wayside.23 
To summarize, there are at least three reasons why minority groups are not 
mobilized by the traditional mobilizing institutions that may compound the fact that 
minorities are socioeconomically disadvantaged.  First, unless they make up a majority of 
the voting population, elites are not inclined to mobilize a group that usually takes more 
resources to mobilize (Leighley 2001) and who may threaten the existing coalition 
(Wong 2006).  Second, local community groups may have other, more pressing matters 
to attend to, such as providing social services, or may lack the resources to engage in 
long-term political mobilization and socialization campaigns (Foley and Hoge 2007; 
Skerry 1993; Wong 2006).  Third, the attempts to mobilize these groups may go 
unheeded because there is no social pressure within the group that makes participation a 
social norm. 
Segregation compounds these factors.  While segregation can help minorities 
reach a threshold of the population, at which point political parties require their votes, 
segregating them away from higher participating populations gives parties, candidates, 
and interest groups a choice as to whether or not to mobilize them.  On the other hand, if 
neighborhoods were more integrated, minorities would be mobilized as part of existing 
                                                 
23 Super voters are defined as voters who regularly vote in primary elections. 
 
 63  
mobilization campaigns.24  Likewise, because parties and groups can ignore entire 
neighborhoods, it puts additional stress on community groups to provide political 
socialization and mobilization.  For example, when Verba et al. (1995) critiqued Latino 
churches for not sufficiently socializing Latinos, Michael Jones-Correa and David Leal 
noted that it may not, in fact, be a problem with the church per se.  Instead it follows from 
the fact that Latinos are generally so isolated from any civic engagement other than the 
church that the church can only do so much (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, 766).   
Policy Consequences 
Segregation also affects the way whites view minorities.  Many recent public 
policies—from desegregated schools and fair housing to Affirmative Action—are 
predicated on the idea that not only are separate institutions inherently not equal, but also, 
contact with minorities decreases racial and ethnic tension and reduces prejudice 
(Lockhart et al., 1996; Dubofsky 1969; Massey and Denton 1993; Bowen and Bok 1998; 
Hurtado 1999).  Despite the vast research investigating the causes and consequences of 
prejudice, we know little about how white-minority contact actually affects the 
development of prejudice.25  Contact theory, as posited by scholars such as Allport 
(1954) and Sigelman and Welch (1993) purport that contact between whites and 
minorities challenges anti-minority stereotypes and leads to the development of inter-
group understanding and greater cultural awareness.  On the other hand, group threat 
theory posits that living near minorities increases inter-group conflict and heightens 
                                                 
24 There is the possibility, of course, that integration could hamper group-specific mobilization by 
race-based groups because racial minorities would be harder to identify. So if the same messages 
do not mobilize whites and minorities alike, integration could be detrimental to political 
communication. 
25 The best study to date was done by Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004). 
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stereotypes (Blalock, 1967; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; Bartos and Wehr 2002).  It is 
also likely that there is an interaction between the collective images of minority groups 
and the way in which whites view them—regardless of their contextual proximity (Huddy 
and Sears 1995; Gilens 2000).   Little research has been done on how exposure to Latinos 
affects the attitudes of whites (but see Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Espino and Rocha 
Forthcoming).  Since whites are the governing majority of the country, their attitudes 
towards the deservedness of Latinos is critical to their support for policies that 
disproportionately affect the Latino population, just as it is for African Americans 
(Kinder and Mendelberg 1995).  
Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) found evidence that in 2000, contact in an 
“interactive setting ameliorated anti-black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes” (257).  
Critically, contact with Hispanics in a community setting was important for decreasing 
anti-Hispanic attitudes in particular.  However, their study was conducted in 2000 before 
the press and politicians began a major assault on immigration which focused primarily 
on Latinos.  While immigration certainly played a role in the 2000 election, it became 
one of the top issues by the 2004 election, causing both major party candidates to visit the 
U.S.-Mexico border and discuss their immigration enforcement policies.  Now that the 
media have focused heavily on Latinos and their presence has played a major role in 
political debate, both at the local and national level, it is necessary to revisit the question 
of how contact affects interracial relations.26 
                                                 
26 The perceptions of the majority may also decrease Latino political participation.  Quiroga 
(1997) finds that Latino communities that are perceived negatively participate less and have 
greater apathy toward government institutions. 
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The social construction of Latinos also potentially dampens their ability to 
achieve legislative goals and leads to the introduction and passage of legis lation that 
harms the Latino community.  Public perception (or misconception) of target groups 
affects support for government policies in the public domain as well as in legislatures.  
Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that the social construction of target groups affects 
the tools policymakers choose. Social construction refers to characteristics that 
differentiate the target group from other individuals.  These characteristics include value-
laden symbols, stereotypes, and images that society assigns to the group.  Policies 
directed at groups with negative social constructions tend to draw upon more punitive 
elements than policies directed at groups with positive social constructions.  Thus, the 
stereotypes that permeate the public perception of Latinos affect both the preferences of 
the public and the policies that legislators will support.   
The theory of social construction explains why politicians rally around anti-
immigrant initiatives.  Because Latinos have little political power and are perceived 
negatively by the public (as well as in the media), legislators respond by taking up anti-
immigrant/anti-Latino agendas (Magana and Short 2002).  These perceptions should be 
dependent upon contextual characteristics.  If legislators have voting Latinos in their 
district, they may be more inclined to support programs that disproportionately benefit 
Latinos; whereas legislators who are isolated from and fearful of Latinos and immigrants 
may be more likely to take up the anti- immigrant battle cry.   
Gaps in the Literature 
In sum, the existing literature indicates conflicting propositions in two areas: 1) 
how context affects political participation and 2) how residential integration affects 
 
 66  
interracial conflict and policy outcomes.  In regard to participation, the literature indicates 
both that 1) residential homogeneity has beneficial outcomes that facilitate civic and 
political participation and 2) segregation constrains civic and political participation.  The 
results for proposition 1 are primarily driven by research on whites and the results of 
proposition 2 are primarily driven by research on African Americans.  In regard to policy 
outcomes, the literature indicates that 1) residential proximity increases inter-group 
understanding and support for policies adversely affecting minority groups and 2) that 
residential proximity produces inter-group conflict and group threat resulting in a 
backlash against policies that help minority groups.  The majority of this literature 
focuses on black-white interaction.  Clearly the literature shows that the effect of 
residential segregation is multifaceted and group-specific. This dissertation attempts to 
extend our understanding of the way residential context and interracial contact affects 
Latino political outcomes—from socioeconomic mobility to political participation to 
policy outcomes. 
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Chapter 3: A View from the Ground: How Segregation Affects 
Latino Lives  
 
Most of the social science research conducted on the effects of residential 
segregation has focused on the plight of the black community.  Perhaps first noted by 
Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, black segregation produces institutional and structural barriers 
that feed a “vicious circle.”  Social and residential segregation “makes inequalities in 
politics and justice more possible and seemingly justifiable” (Myrdal, 1944, 642).  The 
consensus is clear: for blacks, residential segregation leads to numerous negative social 
and psychological outcomes.  It precludes high quality educational and economic 
opportunities, engenders the loss of personal efficacy, and often manifests itself in 
negative psychological and behavioral adaptations that run counter to larger societal 
norms (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996; Jencks and Mayer 1990).  On the 
positive side of the ledger, residential segregation most certainly facilitates the ability of 
blacks to achieve descriptive representation, yet little evidence exists that political 
empowerment bestows substantial benefits to blacks who fall below the middle class.  
Years of research strongly suggests that local black representatives are constrained from 
delivering poverty-oriented, redistributive programs that could result in meaningful 
community uplift for the urban and suburban poor.  One only needs to consider the 
condition of poor urban neighborhoods in empowered cities to appreciate the substantial 
limits to descriptive representation.  In the words of Norman Fainstein (1995, 131-132):  
Whatever advantages blacks have gleaned from ghettoization—
mainly in political representation—constitute a silver lining in an 
otherwise dark cloud that has negatively affected communal life, 
economic success, and, most generally, the political situation of 
blacks and whites alike.  For ghettoization is not compatible with 
racial equality; separation, as it has been established in the 
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American system, reflects and supports subordination. 
 
Far less research investigates the various effects of residential segregation on poor 
immigrant communities.  There are many reasons to believe that segregation poses social, 
political and economic challenges to vulnerable immigrant communities that mirrors the 
black experience in some respects.  The history and circumstances of the Latino 
immigrant community, however, are distinct from the black community in a number of 
important ways.  Many Latino immigrants face language barriers and few come to this 
country as citizens.  In many cases, they come without documentation and are therefore 
categorized and stigmatized as illegal. Vital resources and skills necessary for the social 
and economic progress of the Latino immigrant community must be acquired locally.  
Because language acquisition can be a slow process, naturalization requires information, 
and school systems often are tied to local budgets, segregation has the potent ial to both 
help and hurt Latino immigrants.  In some cases, for example, segregated Latino enclaves 
may provide beneficial short-term support for non-English speaking immigrants and their 
offspring.  These short-term benefits are likely outweighed, however, by the long-term 
detriments associated with social and economic isolation.  To the extent that segregated 
Latino communities are simply way stations for immigrants as they socially and 
economically assimilate into the larger society, they may pose only minimal threats to the 
long-term well being of Latino communities.   
Substantial research on the residential trajectory of first and second generation 
Latino immigrants, however, provides little support for this thesis.  Rather, Hispanic 
immigrants and their offspring often remain trapped in high poverty, ethnically 
segregated barrios long beyond their initial period of immigration (Brown 2007; Wahl, 
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Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007), particularly if they have darker skin (Icleand and 
Nelson 2008).  As the rate of Latino segregation continues to grow rather than dissipate, 
questions surrounding the consequences of Latino isolation become all the more pressing 
(Timberlake and Iceland 2007; Zhou 1997). 
Drawing from the literature on segregation and the Black community, I set out to 
explain how segregation affects Latino immigrant communities, particularly in regard to 
adaptation, socioeconomic mobility, political participation, community relations, and 
political empowerment.  Drawing on interviews with Latino community leaders and 
observations of organizational meetings in Latino communities, this chapter identifies a 
number of segregation-related challenges to the Latino community.  In this chapter, I use 
on-the-ground evidence to indicate that the correlative relationships I explore in this 
dissertation appear in both micro and macro level analysis.  In addition, the qualitative 
evidence provided here provides causal weight to the large-n correlative findings 
presented in the next few chapters.  Based on a set of interviews conducted from January 
2008 to February 2009, I highlight a number of serious concerns that correspond with the 
residential concentration of Latino immigrants.  The most deleterious consequences of 
segregation fall into five main categories that include economic obstacles, the diffusion 
of fear and institutional distrust within the community, inadequate educational 
opportunities, and the lack of social capital for political action.  Moreover, each of these 
obstacles is exacerbated by anti- immigrant fervor and the designation of Latino 
communities as “illegal” by elected officials and street level bureaucrats.  To a large 
extent, the testimony of community leaders confirms and expands upon what little we 
know about segregation as it pertains to Latino immigrants.  In this regard, this chapter 
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constitutes an important foundation for the empirical analyses I conduct in the remainder 
of this dissertation but also serves to validate many of my theoretical claims.     
Methodology 
Most of my interviews took place between January, 2008 and February, 2009 in 
three locations: New York City; Baltimore, Maryland; and the Maryland suburbs 
surrounding Washington, DC.  These places were chosen for their proximity (due to my 
limited research budget) but also for the diversity they offered in terms of their respective 
Latino populations in terms of size, duration of immigration flow, and nationality.  New 
York City, a traditional immigrant gateway city (Singer et al. 2008) is one of the most 
segregated cities in the United States for Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 2007).  Although it 
has traditionally been very segregated for African Americans, over the last twenty years 
the rapid growth of the Latino population and the limited options for affordable housing 
have led to a “hyper-segregation” of the Latino community (Wilkes and Iceland 2004).  
As a traditional immigrant gateway site, numerous community and nationality-specific 
organizations that focus on organizing and providing services to the immigrant 
community exist in New York.  New York has had sustained Latino immigration over the 
last century.  In 1970, about 20 percent of the population of New York was Latino; today, 
just over 35 percent of the city’s population is Latino.  People from Latin America also 
make up over half of all the foreign born population in New York.  The school system is 
one of the most segregated in the country.  According to the American Communities 
Project at Brown University, the average Hispanic student in New York City attends a 
school comprised almost entirely by other Latino students and where over three-quarters 
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of the children are poor.27  
The Washington suburbs, on the other hand, are categorized as a new immigrant 
gateway (Singer et al. 2008).  Over the last 30 years, immigrants from almost every 
nation have made their homes in this area, mainly in the suburbs immediately 
surrounding the district.  Although they are not a majority of the immigrant population, 
the largest immigrant group is Latinos—primarily from Central America.  The inner ring 
DC suburbs all have large Latino populations and their recent influx into the area has 
sparked several anti- immigrant initiatives in Northern Virginia.  The Latino population of 
the Washington suburbs has grown exponentially.  Although it varies by county, in 1970, 
Latinos barely registered on the population thermometer.  Today, Latinos make up 
between 20 and 30 percent of the population in the counties that border the District.  
Several immigrant and Latino-focused interest groups have formed over the last decade 
to serve the Latino community but few have been around longer than a few years. 
Finally, Baltimore’s Latino population has been growing quickly but still is 
extremely small compared to Washington and New York.  There are few civic groups 
focusing on organizing the Latino community.  Despite their relative newness, the Latino 
population of Baltimore has a strong presence and has revived shopping districts that 
previously held blocks of vacant retail stores.  Latinos make up just fewer than 2 percent 
of the population.  Organizations serving the Latino community are rare and those that 
exist are very new. 
These three distinct locations enable me to compare and contrast the benefits and 
drawbacks of residential segregation for established and newcomer Latino communities.   
Each area also houses some integrated Latino communities and some segregated Latino 
                                                 
27 See: http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/index.htm  site visited on March 31, 2009. 
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communities. 
The interview and observational data represent a purposeful, not random, sample.  
Interview participants were chosen for their extensive knowledge and experience working 
in and with Latino immigrant communities.  I identified interview subjects using a 
snowball method.  For each city, I compiled a list of high profile Latino elected officials 
and elected officials who represent large ly Latino communities, Latino/immigrant social 
service and political organizations, political organizations that lobby on behalf of 
immigration issues, and organizations listed as affiliates of several national Latino and 
immigrant interest groups.  I sent letters to the elected officials and directors of the 
organizations requesting an interview.  Letters were followed up with phone calls to 
schedule interviews.  At the end of each interview, I asked the interviewees for 
recommendations for other organizations, elected officials, and activists with whom they 
thought I should speak.  I then followed up with these people, repeating the process at 
each interview.  I also requested from my interview subjects the date and times of 
community meetings that I could attend.   
I should note that starting a project such as this requires some amount of social 
capital and established relationships with interview participants.  My personal experience 
working in county politics in Prince George's and Montgomery County, Maryland and in 
Maryland state politics gave me prior knowledge of and experience with the most high 
profile Latino leaders in Maryland.  To be clear, my pre-existing social networks made 
my quest for interview participants in Maryland far easier.  Several Latino elected 
officials and lobbyists made calls on my behalf to help me set up interviews with people I 
did not previously know.  In addition, during the first 5 months of this dissertation I 
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worked in the House of Delegates in Annapolis, which enabled me to attend committee 
hearings addressing immigration and I used these hearings as a networking opportunity in 
which I could approach members of interest groups for interviews.  
Setting up interviews in New York proved to be more difficult.  My initial phone 
calls and emails were successful in only a few cases.  Several friends and professors at 
universities in New York City, thankfully, helped me establish connections with a few 
critical community organizations. Once I established relationships with a few people in 
New York through these means, they were happy to help me establish contacts with 
others who they believed could provide valuable insights. 
Finally, I signed up for several community listservs to identify other meetings that 
I could observe.  I attended as many community meetings as my schedule allowed.  Due 
to travel and budget constrictions, I only attended community meetings in Baltimore and 
the DC suburbs. 
My interviews were generally conducted either in or near places in which my 
interview subjects were employed.  As a result, I was able to spend many hours observing 
the activities in the front offices of community organizations and government offices.  
This enabled me to witness the goings-on of community organization and learn who 
sought the ears of Latino elected officials.  Because many community organizers and 
activists lack personal office space, I enjoyed the added benefit of getting to eat at my 
subjects' favorite restaurants and sample many local cuisines (and on more than one 
occasion was invited into people’s homes for home cooked versions).  It was not 
uncommon to meet at a community organization and then walk to a local restaurant or 
café.  This permitted me to get a feel for the neighborhood and often get at least a partial 
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tour of the important meeting places and the largest geographic problems facing the 
community.  All of the interviews were conducted in person and each lasted between one 
and two hours.  All interviews were conducted in English, except one.  For the one 
exception, a town mayor and a ten year old child served as translators.  The formal 
interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed.  Discussions held while on walks 
around a neighborhood or elsewhere were not recorded, but I did my best to note the 
exact wording of what people said immediately after the conclusion of the discussion.  At 
community and organizational meetings I took detailed notes about the topic and tone of 
discussions, including if there were interpreters present and who participated in the 
discussion.  
The interviews were conducted in an "open-ended" interview format.  A list of 
basic pre-established questions is available in Appendix A as part of the IRB approval.  
These questions led the discussion but at all times I encouraged participants to elaborate 
on points they made in response to questions and allowed the conversation to move to 
different areas of discussion so as to allow the participants to give their thoughts about 
Latino communities uninhibited by the structure of the questions.  
To evaluate the data gathered through the interviews, I read all of my transcripts 
and notes looking for themes that consistently arose in the interviews.  I coded interview 
results by these themes, noting when the participant's response was contrary to other view 
points.  Contrary viewpoints were given separate theme codes.  For example, if a 
participant discussed English language learning, the response was given an English code.  
A sub code was then given if they were discussing how segregation benefited English 
acquisition and another sub code if they were explaining how segregation hurt English 
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attainment.  Although I employed a coding scheme, I did not attempt to translate my 
qualitative data into a quantitative data set.  The coding simply helped organize the 
project for interpretive purposes and to validate my interpretations of the frequency of 
various themes.  Unfortunately, due to space restrictions I am unable to address all of the 
themes that came up during my interviews.  Here I only present the themes that were 
most relevant to the questions I set out to answer and that were the most prevalent themes 
in the interviews.  
Given the sensitivity of the information provided by my interview subjects, and as 
a means to increase the comfort they felt with me, I agreed not to release the names of the 
interview subjects.  The few times I refer to names in the text, I have changed them so as 
to protect their identity.  In general, I refer to my interview participants solely by their 
titles (elected official, community activist, etc.).  I have also removed the names of other 
elected officials mentioned in the interviews as well as geographic identifiers.  I am 
greatly indebted to the time that my interview subjects granted me despite their 
overwhelming work schedules and extremely demanding jobs.   
In the following pages, I first discuss the drawbacks of segregation and how 
problems that are common among immigrants and the poor are compounded by 
segregated housing patterns.  In particular, I focus on the psychological and 
socioeconomic consequences of segregation.  In the second section, I evaluate the 
benefits that segregation confer to Latinos—primarily the rewards of co-ethnic 
empowerment and the ease of mobilization.  In the final section, I discuss the fact tha t my 
interviews indicate that the drawbacks of segregation appear to far outweigh the 
advantages. 
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The Disadvantages of Segregation: Psychological, Socioeconomic, and Political 
Participation 
  The Psychological Consequences of Segregation 
Segregation stigmatizes and leaves scars on the psyches of Latinos coming of age 
in segregated areas.  Mary Romero (2006) argues that because immigration control 
mechanisms require the use of phenotypes to profile for potential illegal immigrants, 
Latinos, particularly poor Latinos, are under constant suspicion from police as well as 
business owners and others in positions of power (also see Aguirre 2004; Espino and 
Franz 2002).  Accordingly, because the Latino poor are often segregated in urban and 
suburban barrios, racial profiling contributes to “identifying urban space racially” 
(Romero 2006, 469) where whole neighborhoods become suspicious and are targeted for 
ongoing immigration raids.  According to Romero, the use of profiling instead of 
probable cause in immigration control, combined with the relative concentration of the 
Latino poor, results in a “petite apartheid” (also see Georges-Abeyie 2001): 
Immigration law enforcement in US cities is not structured around 
systematic or random checking of identification but rather a pattern of 
citizenship inspection that maintains the landscape of suspicion.  Given 
the class and racial segregation perpetuated by exclusive residential 
zoning, the INS targets ethnic cultural spaces marked by Mexican-owned 
businesses, agencies offering bilingual services, and neighborhoods with 
the highest concentration of poor and working-class Latinos.  Within these 
areas, INS agents engage in ‘typing’ suspected aliens (Romero 2006, 453). 
 
Their association with illegal immigrants hurts Latino neighborhoods.  When 
Latinos, citizens and foreign nationals alike, are isolated together by restrictive housing 
opportunities, whole communities become suspect by police and employers as potentially 
being “illegal.”  Macro discrimination results in a significant number of second 
generation Latino immigrants who see little place for themselves in the economy and 
who have little optimism of their chances of success in the United States (Portes and 
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Rumbaut 2001).   
When discrimination is common against a population and that population is 
confined in a designated geographic location, the effects of discrimination multiply 
exponentially.  Everyone in the community begins to live under the radar.  Residents 
distrust police and other members of the establishment, are less likely to report crimes 
and other abuses, and become pessimistic about their ability to change their situation or 
get authorities to listen.   
The fear associated with living in segregated Latino neighborhoods was a 
consistent theme in the interviews I conducted.  Without being prompted, almost every 
interview subject, regardless of location, mentioned the psychological consequences of 
segregation to the Latino community.  
Several community organizers noted how the fear of calling attention to their 
families and their neighborhood complicated community organizing, making it difficult 
to convince people to take part in the political process, or even to stand up for their basic 
rights with landlords or employers.  One organizer said, “People definitely come with all 
sorts of fears, like the fear of making their families vulnerable.  Sometimes there is the 
fear of being exposed to the police, things like that.”  Another noted that “with the 
immigrant community, they’re worried about who they are going to talk to, what they’re 
going to say, and where that person is going to bring that information.”   A local 
community activist in New York noted that when they organize, they first have to 
convince people it is safe, which can be very a very difficult task. “If you are living in 
constant fear that you’re going to be picked up, of course that’s going to affect people 
because they’re going to worry about coming out.  The question we often get when we’re 
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going somewhere is ‘Is it going to be ok? Is it going to be safe?'”  One community 
organizer suggested that people fear that if they participate in politics there will be 
“repercussions.” Another noted that these fears were justified because there had been a 
major uptick in raids in their neighborhood after they organized a protest.   
The fear that Latino immigrant families face rolls over into interactions with their 
landlords and employers.  Unpaid and underpaid wages are so common, that several of 
the organizations I met with have assigned staff exclusively to help ing people claim their 
wages.  All of them expressed that the number of reported wage issues was far lower than 
the actual number of unpaid wage cases.  Underreporting was always attributed to the 
fear that immigrants faced.  If they complain about their wages, they might lose their jobs 
and many feared that the employer could even report them (documented or not) to the 
police.   Even among documented immigrants, many have so little grasp of their rights 
that they fear that employers will have sway over citizenship decisions.  Moreover, since 
Latino immigrants often feel disenfranchised, they tolerate a very high level of abuse.  
Several community organizers and elected officials commented that, in effect, the 
immigrants they worked with thought of unpaid wages as a tax for their status.   
Landlord abuse is even more rampant and leads to whole apartment complexes 
maintained in a state of dilapidation.  One community organizer that worked particularly 
on tenant rights explained that the Latinos living in concentrated Latino housing 
developments often do not know their rights, but even when they do, they are afraid that 
if they complain to management there could be retaliation.  Either the landlord would 
evict them, or call Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  Even if they were 
citizens and did not fear for their own status, the knowledge that they could be putting 
 
 79  
others at risk weighs heavily.  
Several interviewees also noted that the fear of repercussions is not isolated to the 
undocumented or documented non-citizen population.  “There is a general reluctance 
found for people who are eligible, naturalized, to become more connected because of 
family members or others who may not be here with proper documentation…I think there 
is a little bit of pressure to stay in the shadows.”  Another posited that, “Even naturalized 
citizens fear deportation because of loopholes in the law.  So people just stay out of the 
public, they stay quiet.  Fear is a big issue.” 
The impact of this fear of attention on children was a major concern of many of 
the people I interviewed.  Segregated communities increase the chances that parents will 
be picked up by the police and detained while they check for immigration violations.  
Several interview subjects noted that in the most segregated neighborhoods, the children 
were on constant alert and were very fearful that they would come home from school to 
find out that one, if not both, parents had been detained or deported.  Children in this 
environment learn to avoid interaction with authorities by whatever means possible.  
They also endure extreme psychological stress not completely dissimilar from that which 
occurs in a war zone.  When raids happen, word spreads fast in concentrated Latino 
communities.  Children will hear at school that a raid occurred  somewhere in the 
community and they can spend the remainder of the school day fearing that they have, for 
all intents and purposes, lost a parent.  This situation led one interview subject to 
prophesize that a majority of the second generation who live in segregated Latino 
immigrant communities will have some sort of post-traumatic stress disorder when they 
grow up.  She told me about a small girl who panicked at the sight of police lights 
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passing by.  Fearing and loathing police leads to poor community relations, adverse 
consequences for the socialization of immigrant youth, and an inability of police to get 
information from people when violent crimes occur.28 
Segregation also appears to socialize children to accept substandard living and 
work arrangements.  They grow up in an environment that rewards brushing institutional 
and structural problems under the rug and punishes those who stand up for their rights.  
Because they live in areas stigmatized as “illegal,” people become socialized to believe 
that they do not have rights within the system.  As one community organizer noted, 
children “become very disillusioned” and feel as though they are second class citizens, 
lacking basic rights.  Many organizers expressed frustration over their observations that 
second and third generation Latinos who grow up in segregated and impoverished living 
conditions are socialized to accept poverty and dilapidated buildings and schools.  Often, 
second and third generation immigrants, many interview subjects noted, know and 
understand their rights, but their concern for their neighbor’s (and parents) safety can 
keep them from engaging.  In addition, even if they know how the system works, they 
often lack the organizing skills or the resources to help mobilize their communities.  In 
effect, the decision to try to keep the neighborhood out of the minds of officials, coupled 
with few applicable skills for community organizing compounds the inability of these 
neighborhoods to mobilize. 
Segregation also seems to exacerbate both the amount of discrimination that 
                                                 
28 It is important to note that several interview subjects told me stories about very serious 
problems with the police.  Perhaps the most instructive was about a Latino teenager who had been 
raped.  She reported it to the police and while investigating the crime, police found that her father 
had immigration issues.  As a result of reporting a rape to the police, her father was deported.  
Many police departments have decided to not investigate immigration status for victims and their 
families for just this reason, but stories such as this have become urban legends that instruct 
children to not cooperate with the police even when it is in general the right thing to do. 
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Latinos face on a daily basis and the fear/distrust of government that immigrants often 
bring from their home countries.  Discussing discrimination in segregated communities, 
interview subjects noted that it was “a big problem,” “everywhere,” and “just a daily 
reality.”  Being the victims of discrimination seems to aggravate the fear that people feel 
toward contact with public officials and organizing politically, since Latinos, having 
experienced significant discrimination, feel sure that whatever they do, they will be taken 
to jail.  Many of my interview participants noted that experiences in home countries 
exacerbate the fear Latino immigrants feel toward political participation. 29   According to 
one community activist, “people come from countries where a protest will surely land 
you in jail and make things even worse.  So they have all that stuff, and they are very 
scared of protesting, very scared of doing things that would [back home] get you killed, 
get you tortured, put you in jail.”  And another said that the distrust of government 
originates “from their home countries…they think ‘don’t go to the police.’  Just this 
distrust from the corruption in their home countries is a direct correlation.”   One elected 
official even took me to meet a constituent who lived down the street to find out why she 
did not call the police when there were problems (she did, however, complain to him, but 
there was nothing he could do if she never reported it to the police at the time of the 
trouble).  Her response highlighted the community's distrust of the police.  When asked 
what her experiences with the police had been in the past she noted that in her home 
country “you call and they take days to come, in my town they would have to hitch a ride 
to get to you, and who knows what you would end up dealing with for having called 
them?”  Of course, her experiences in this country didn’t help matters either.  “Here, they 
always ask for papers and I’m a citizen, but my husband isn’t.  I don’t want to deal with 
                                                 
29 Peter Burns (2007) found the same reaction from his interview subjects. 
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that.”  
Having a parent or grandparent who distrusts the police and is afraid of contact 
with government institutions can be overcome when children are exposed to different 
opinions and witness that the fear and hesitation they see at home is not necessarily 
widespread in the community.  However, when children grow up in segregated 
environments where these feelings are not only widespread but reinforced by raids, 
random police searches and other anti- immigrant initiatives, then fear, distrust, and 
cynicism about government is passed down from one generation to the next and 
permeates whole communities.  One elected official explained to me that his grandmother 
used to tell him almost every day to “be careful what you do, this is not your country.”  
But growing up in a largely white middle class suburb, he never took her seriously.  
However, he thought his own reaction would have been quite different if he had grown 
up in the segregated barrio that he now represents: “There it would have meant 
something.”  
Segregation appears to dampen both internal and external political efficacy.  
Latino immigrants and their children in segregated environments, according to many of 
my interview subjects, appear to neither feel that they have a voice or if they mobilized 
their community they could achieve change.  Of course it is important to note that even 
some of the community organizers felt similarly.  One even noted that impoverished 
immigrants are right to have low efficacy because, "they're right, nothing does ever 
change."   The low political efficacy of these neighborhoods resounded in community 
meetings.  At one meeting I attended a community organization was drafting a master 
plan for the community and prioritizing community projects so their elected officials 
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would know which projects were most important to the residents, several members of the 
group openly expressed that they were wasting their time.  The economy had just begun 
to sink and even the community leaders felt that there was no way that their community 
would be receiving any funds for projects from the state in the coming years.  Thus, there 
was no point in even submitting requests.  Interestingly, I attended a similar meeting in a 
middle class, predominant white, neighborhood the next week as part of my job.  Since 
the state legislative session was about to commence, this group was undergoing the same 
discussion, prioritizing projects and laying out their vision for their community.  Again, 
everyone was cognizant of the fiscal climate, but the overarching message communicated 
by attendees at this meeting was “we better get our requests in first” and that they were 
just going to have to fight harder to make sure they got what they “deserved.”  
The anti- immigrant climate in the United States does not encourage immigrants to 
return home.  Instead, anti- immigrant fervor heightens the fear and anxiety Latino 
immigrants and their children feel, and increases the likelihood that Latino communities 
will attempt to control crime from within (or learn to live with it) instead of going to the 
police.  As one elected official noted, “I think it’s [the reluctance to engage authorities] 
exacerbated by a national climate that's anti immigrant.  The raids, the punitive measures 
…you know it’s scary for people.  People who risked everything to come here, to give 
their kids a shot at a better life.  Why risk it?”  Another explained that the documented 
and undocumented communities are so connected that anti immigrant legislation sends a 
message to everyone that they are not welcome.   
Everybody who is here legally, there is at least one person guaranteed, I 
can guarantee you at least one person close to us is not legal.  Whether it 
be an uncle or a cousin…we know somebody.  And we may not love them 
to death, but we aren’t going to say ‘go screw yourself’….[anti- immigrant 
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initiatives] differentiate between two groups that are very, very close 
together and for you to say one thing about the other, I mean clearly, tha t’s 
going to affect everybody. 
  The Socioeconomic Consequences of Segregation 
Levels of segregation for black and Latino students have been steadily increasing 
since the l980s (Orfield and Lee 2004).  Studies of both African American segregation 
and concentrated poverty identify socioeconomic mobility as the major problem with 
segregation.  Wilson (1996) argues that segregating the poor creates a culture in which 
children grow up with few employed role models, which cultivates a disorganized social 
structure unique to the inner city poor.  Massey and Denton (1993) likewise posit that 
racial segregation is the core reason for concentrated poverty and also argue that even 
wealthy segregated minority communities are worse off than their white counterparts.  
Both largely attribute the problems of segregation/concentrated poverty to the lack of 
opportunities for socioeconomic mobility.  As Massey and Denton (1993, 153) state: 
For blacks, in other words, high incomes do not buy entrée to residential 
circumstances that can serve as springboards for future socioeconomic 
mobility; in particular, blacks are unable to achieve a school environment 
conducive to later academic success.  In Philadelphia, children from an 
affluent black family are likely to attend a public school where the 
percentage of low-achieving students is three times greater than the 
percentage in schools attended by affluent white children.   
 
While Wilson attributes the persistent socioeconomic problems to a lack of 
economic integration and not to race per se, Massey and Denton argue that they cannot be 
separated.  Economic segregation for Blacks, Latinos, and whites is on the rise (Dreier et 
al. 2001) but the impact of poverty appears to be more detrimental to minority students 
than their white counterparts, and economic segregation is more extensive for racial 
minorities than for whites.  According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, 
only four percent of white students were enrolled in a “high poverty” school during the 
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2005-2006 school year, even in urban and rural areas.30 
Today, over sixty percent of Hispanics attend a high poverty school and over 77 
percent attend a school that is majority-minority (Orfield & Lee, 2005).  Even middle 
class Hispanic students, like their African American counterparts, are likely to attend a 
school with a greater number of students in poverty and a larger number of second 
language learners.  The state of Latino education in segregated schools is disheartening.  
Latinos who attend a majority-minority school are more than five times less likely to 
graduate on time than Latinos in majority white schools (Balfanz & Legters, 2004).  
Orfield and Lee (2005, 6) find that in 2002, almost a third of majority minority high 
schools graduated less than half of their students.  Among schools that were ninety 
percent or more white on the other hand, only one school out of the fifty they sampled 
had a graduation rate that low.  They report that two-thirds of the schools in which less 
than a tenth of the student body was white had dropout rates of over 40 percent.  
 In addition, poor white children are more likely to attend a school with 
significantly more middle class students than their minority peers.  Attending a higher 
SES school appears to benefit poor students.  For example, Boger (2005) found that poor 
children attending middle class schools were much more likely to perform at grade level 
than poor children in high poverty schools.  Segregation also creates schools with fewer 
resources.  Schools in segregated poor areas are not only more challenged by social 
factors (such as parents with low education levels who cannot help with homework, 
students working full time jobs outside of school, higher malnutrition rates and health 
problems, more student turnover, and higher concentration of limited English speakers) 
                                                 
30 See: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2008/section4/indicator29.asp site last visited on March 
21, 2009.  But the impact of being in a higher or extreme poverty school is clear--higher poverty 
rates lead to low graduation rates and low overall acheivment rates among all students. 
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but because of the local level funding structure of many school systems, these schools 
tend to have fewer financial resources.  As a result, schools a) are less able to attract and 
retain highly qualified teachers, b) have more unqualified teachers and c) have more year 
to year teacher turnover (U.S. Department of Education 2005, also see Darling-Hammond 
2001). 
The low quality of education that Latino students receive in segregated 
neighborhoods was a persistent concern expressed by my interview subjects.  A general 
malaise passed over my interview subjects when I broached the topic of how Latino 
students fare in concentrated Latino schools.   Several community organizers and elected 
officials felt that Latino students are purposefully funneled into low performance, high 
violence, and low stability schools.  They also generally agreed that very few school 
administrators or teachers feel that Latino students are worth their time and investment.  
Instead, Latino children, and sometimes whole schools, are written off.  Unfortunately, to 
add insult to injury, Latino immigrant parents lack experience navigating the school 
system and other institutions.  Instead of fighting for their children to be transferred to 
better schools or demanding reforms, they often withdraw and feel that their children's 
educations are out of their hands.  Schools benefit from active parental involvement, but 
when parents work two jobs, often have little education themselves and feel that the 
school system is against them, schools with concentrated immigrant populations appear 
to have little if any parental involvement.  As one community organizer from New York 
noted:  
The task of educating a million students is a huge one, and ELLs [English 
Language Learners] and their parents are very new to the country, and do 
not know how to navigate, how to understand the choices that they have, 
and so they all do not take advantage of what exists that may be really 
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positive.  And ELL's routinely are channeled into the most underfunded, 
overcrowded, difficult, violent schools, and so they are kind of set up to 
fail from the beginning.  And then there is a kind of historically 
underfunded base of teachers, so the city does not have enough ESL 
teachers, English teachers.  That has a lot to do with it.  If you ask a 
principal, what is the right way of educating an English language learner, 
more often than not they are going to say, "They’re not going to 
graduate."  I think the expectation of their performance is extremely low.  
And principals have a lot of work to do even with the ones who are not 
trying to learn English.  
 
The absence of role models was also a consistent theme.  Latino students, who are 
concentrated in schools where few parents have a high school diploma, lack role models 
that could set an example of scholarly excellence.  According to my interview subjects, 
low student achievement in concentrated Latino schools is caused by multiple reinforcing 
factors—parents who are not necessarily pushing children to succeed, teachers who do 
not believe that their students will succeed, and then student social networks in which no 
one is thinking about college, or even graduation.  As one Latino elected official noted:  
The role modeling, the messaging, the looking at education as the primary 
thing in that child's life, is missing.  It's just as important to see her 
daughter happy, to go to the mall, because she's never seen that herself.  
She's never had the rigor, and the discipline that has to come if you're 
going to do well at education.  So that self, I mean, in my case, myself and 
my kids, there was absolutely no doubt that we had to excel in school, 
there was no option, and it was the first thing that you needed to do, and if 
you didn't do it, there was all hell to pay.  That push does not exist as 
strongly in the Latino community... [My] county is excellent if you come 
to it, in the standard model, two college educated parents, middle class, 
upper-middle class.  Yes we have wonderful teachers, wonderful 
curriculum, you will excel, you will go to Stanford, Harvard, wherever.  
But if you don't come like that, the model breaks down.  We don't know 
how to teach that kid, and you know, there may be the cure for cancer 
sitting right there. 
 
Many of my interview subjects advocated new ways of engaging parents in the 
schools and education programs to help Latino parents access the schools and also to 
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teach them what their roles are in their children’s education.   In New York, a Latino-
focused community organization recently became a partner with the city to open up a 
second language learner charter school as an innovative way to deal with this problem.   
By making the community organization a part of the structure, the school enables the 
parents of the community who were already active in the organization to have greater 
access and to take a larger part in the school.  The school is making great progress and 
has all bi- lingual teachers and staff to facilitate parent involvement. 
However, even with a focus on teaching second language learners, many of my 
interview subjects were quite conflicted over the benefits of educating ELL students in 
concentrated environments, even when the schools are specially designed to meet ELL 
students’ needs.  In general, schools with a greater concentration of Latino and second 
language learners have the potential to cater to their special needs.  They can offer 
services that other schools do not and can specialize in educating ELL children.  But, 
how beneficial is this model?  One community organizer in Maryland noted that 
concentrated Latino schools could provide some level of comfort for Latino students, but 
given the typically low level of Latino parent involvement, he felt that it was generally 
better to have more integration.  "I mean, there is the possibility that when they're all 
together as Latinos, they at least have the cultural and linguistic capacity to at least begin 
to interact and relate.  But it doesn't happen in the academic context for Latinos, 
unfortunately.  Parent engagement in the education of their youth is pretty abysmal."  A 
New York activist was extremely conflicted about how much benefit these ESL-specialty 
schools benefited her community.  While she was happy that they had been able to raise 
the graduation rate from 25 percent to almost 80 percent in just a matter of years, she also 
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felt that it was a step back for the rights of the ESL population.    
We've created all these ‘international high schools ’ [high schools 
explicitly for ELL students], but it doesn't matter how many international 
high schools you create, the solution  is not to segregate all immigrants to 
only these schools, although these schools are very successful, and we 
love ours, but what about if an ELL wants to go to an art school? What 
about if they want to go to an intramural school?  So I think the policies 
have not been very mindful of the potential, and instead have reproduced a 
system of real discrimination and segregation of students because they are 
new in the country and they don't speak English. 
 
Several states have also recently come under fire for school policies that create 
segregated schools within schools in an attempt to better meet the needs of ESL students.  
At this point, weighing the social costs and benefits of "newcomer schools" whether 
housed within or outside mainstream K-12 schools is too complicated to decisively 
condemn either approach.  There are both benefits and problems for ESL students when 
they are removed from mainstream classes and there are social costs to removing Latinos 
from integrated classrooms where students of all colors would otherwise learn to interact 
in a multicultural environment.  The key question remains, do separated schools help or 
harm at-risk children by isolating them from the mainstream (Belluck 1995; Stewart 
2009)? 
Perhaps more disconcerting to many of the elected officials and activists are the 
vulnerability of students in de facto segregated Latino schools.  In particular, gang 
recruitment in schools compounds the other problems that concentrated Latino schools 
face.  Concentrating underprivileged kids creates situations in which students are ripe for 
the picking.  As one youth organizer noted, "the segregation of Latino students, sort of 
residentially, but also educationally, makes it completely easier for gangs to recruit, to 
gain strength, and to really have a strong presence in particular communities."    
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School desegregation seems to be the fix that most people pointed to, mainly to 
deplete the power of the gangs, but also to expose the kids to more role models.  One 
Latino youth organizer who works with both integrated and segregated schools in the DC 
area argued: 
If there's only a couple here and a couple there, well, it's easier to reach 
out to the very few students.  But gangs need numbers in order to be 
strong and in order to claim territory and defend themselves from other 
gangs.  And that missed outpost, you know, in some school way over there 
that's four people strong is just not going to survive, either in sort of the 
gang culture or, frankly, because there's going to be so many other 
influences that those four or five other students are going to be exposed to 
that are, I think, going to lead them out of that alternative.    
 
Another organizer supported this view, saying, "Gangs target concentrated Latino 
schools and the kids don’t know other options.  It’s either join a gang or drop out to help 
support the family…. The kids in integrated schools just have more options.  They see 
their friends succeeding, thinking about college, you know…. I think it helps."  The 
overwhelming agreement appeared to be that the concentration of Latino students either 
on purpose through the creation of newcomer schools or de facto concentration based on 
housing patters made the students more susceptible to "bad apples" as one elected official 
put it. 
The situation was so extreme in many areas that elected officials felt that there 
was little hope for many of the children they represented.  During one of my interviews, 
we took a walk around a neighborhood and met some of the local school children.   One 
little girl entertained us with a long explanation of what she was learning in school (long 
division) and what she wanted to be when she grew up (fashion designer, real estate 
agent, maybe a nurse).   When we left, I commented that the girl appeared to be doing 
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great and that she had a lot of potential.   My tour guide, the town mayor, was not as 
enthusiastic.  He had watched several kids like her start their educations with optimism 
but with such bad schools, they became discouraged and dropped out.   Looking back at 
the playground, he sighed and said "a lot of these [Latino] kids are enthusiastic learners 
in elementary school.  But then they get to high school, and the gangs, the social 
pressure… It changes.”  He proceeded to point out all the places in the neighborhood—
the bike path, another playground, a grocery store—where, he just learned, kids avoided 
because of the local gangs. 
The other infringement to socioeconomic mobility that segregation negates is the 
opportunity for employment.  In this regard, the economic implications of segregation on 
Latino immigrants are often not as extreme as they are for African Americans (Wilson 
1996, 51-52).  Martha Van Haitsma commented that in Chicago, “Mexican immigrants 
living in Chicago poverty areas may well be residents of crowded and dilapidated 
buildings, but they are surrounded by small local businesses, many of them owned and 
operated by persons of Mexican origin, and by Mexican-targeted social service agencies.  
Poverty-tract blacks are more isolated from jobs and from employed neighbors than are 
Mexican immigrants” (Van Haitsma as quoted in Wilson 1996, 52).  While there is no 
doubt that segregated and socioeconomically disadvantaged Latinos are much more likely 
to be surrounded by employed role models than African Americans in similarly 
segregated areas, the opportunities for socioeconomic advancement are still limited in 
segregated Latino neighborhoods.   
As Suro (1999), and Rumbaut and Portes (2001) note, concentrated Latino social 
networks often lack connections to opportunities for economic growth.  When no one 
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within a social network works in a higher-paid, higher-status job, it is hard to gain 
connections for upward mobility (Granovetter 1973; 1983).  Concentrated working-class 
and working-poor social networks are a great benefit to new immigrants who need 
employment upon arrival but they can be damaging in the long term by isolating Latinos 
from people with more knowledge of other employment opportunities (Waldinger 2001).  
Further, while Latino children are surrounded by employed adults (often in multiple 
jobs), their American socialization teaches them to expect more than the meager salaries 
and hard working conditions that their parents endure.  Thus, the second generation is 
often reluctant to accept the few employment options available if they have not 
adequately acquired the education necessary to gain middle class employment (Suro 
1999).  In addition, economic downturns cut most deeply in the Latino community, often 
taking their first toll on employment sectors where Latinos are disproportionately 
represented—construction, service workers, and domestic workers.  In a depressed 
economy, service and domestic workers are the first to go.  Nannies, yard workers, day 
laborers and others are typically employed only when there is excess cash available to the 
middle class, and thus fall prey to tightening purses in tougher times (Kochhar 2009). 
In addition, even if everyone in the neighborhood is employed, most are not 
employed in ways that inspire the children to stay in school and work toward better 
futures.  Instead, the economic and social prospects for the second generation remain 
bleak, and the children are often ignorant as to how to escape their current economic 
situation.  As one community organizer put it,  
I think it’s just harder for them to see alternatives, it is harder for them to see 
people living another way, people acting another way.  And that reinforces a 
degree of hopelessness in their current condition.  I mean, we deal a lot—
there’s a lot of mental health issues in the community and among adolescents 
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in particular.  We deal with a lot of straight up depression, just you know, a 
lack of hope and an inability to envision a future worth 
pursuing…..Segregation only exacerbates it. Because… in more mixed, 
diverse communities, you’ve got different things to observe in life.  You’ve 
got different people to observe and different lifestyles and ways of being that, 
I think, are positive. 
  
In this way, the schools and the economic prospects of segregated neighborhoods 
compound the improbability that Latino children will make it out of school and progress 
up the socioeconomic ladder.   So many forces work against concentrated schools that too 
few children successfully gain the needed skills to make it to college.  
Finally, participants also expressed concern over how residential concentration 
affected socioeconomic mobility in that it led to whole neighborhoods that spoke 
relatively little English.  While several community organizers and elected officials 
lamented the fact that so few natives spoke a second language, many were adamant that 
the most difficult barrier for Latino immigrants to overcome is language.   The impact of 
segregation on language skills is felt most in two ways:  segregation decreased interaction 
with proficient English speakers and English classes in immigrant neighborhoods are 
insufficient to meet demand.   Several people pointed out that without English skills, 
immigrants are stuck in the worst jobs with no ability to report problems or stand up for 
themselves.  In addition, poor English skills leave many Latino immigrants unable to call 
elected officials, interact with schools and other institutions, or feel comfortable 
participating in civic activities.  One community organizer in New York City lamented 
how segregation also fed the belief among natives that Latino immigrants do not want to 
learn English.  "The English classes in Manhattan have no one enrolled while ours have 
waitlists a year long...So the people in the city think that they don't want to learn English, 
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but you can't put the classes an hour from where people live." 
In addition to all of these other ills, residential concentration contributes to the 
accumulation of symbols of otherness to cue white Americans that Latinos from 
concentrated neighborhoods are not like them.  The ghettoizing of poor Latinos in urban 
and suburban “barrios” leads to children unfamiliar with mass American culture and 
fluent only in Spanglish.  The combined barriers of skin tone, social context and native 
language severely limit any prospects of upward mobility and lead to tremendous 
discrimination.  As Alba and Nee (2003, 42) note: “For employers, such cues are a 
‘market signal’ providing a ready rule-of-thumb measure of the individual’s cultural 
capital, especially with respect to the linguistic and social competence needed to perform 
effectively in the workplace.”31  In short, speaking English poorly rules people out for 
jobs they would like to attain. The consequence of living in an environment with few 
English speakers also takes a toll on the second generation.  Although English ability is 
mainly discussed in regard to first generation immigrants, segregation appears to 
contribute to language barriers being a multi-generational barrier.  Historically, 
immigrant enclaves in the United States consisted of immigrants from many nations 
which meant that the only unifying language was English.  Because immigration patterns 
have drastically changed, many of today's Latino immigrants largely live their lives in 
places where there are few opportunities to learn English. 
Laura Reed, whose high school science classes in the public schools of 
Montgomery County, Maryland, are made up almost entirely of second generation Latino 
students, told me of her frustration teaching students grade level science when they spoke 
                                                 
31 Waldinger (2004, 8) argues that even without such characteristics, employers decide whom to 
hire by ranking candidates according to sets of “socially meaningful but arbitrary traits”—
primarily racial and ethnic markers.  He refers to this ordering as a hiring queue. 
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and read both English and Spanish at an elementary level.  “They aren’t fluent in English 
or in Spanish—they have basic understanding of both, but that’s it.  The minute they 
walk out of my classroom they are in a world of elementary- level Spanish, since all their 
friends speak it, there's no real incentive or even opportunity to perfect their English.”  
Low levels of parental education and the reality of living most of their lives in Spanish 
and only part in English, she thought, guarantees that Latino immigrant children will 
have low language skills.  When this situation is coupled with inadequate resources for 
ESL, and school faculty and administrators overwhelmed with overcrowded classrooms, 
poor attendance, and other problems, ESL students suffer, particularly in areas of 
language development.  As a result, many children leave school with insufficient 
language skills to get ahead.  Her students, she contended, were easily identifiable as the 
children of impoverished immigrants, unfit for employment in the modern workforce—
not because of their intelligence but because of their dialects and poor communication 
skills.  
  The Political Consequences of Segregation 
Several studies suggest that residential homogeneity increases civic engagement 
and facilitates neighborhood social capital because people are more comfortable when 
they are surrounded by people who share similar life experiences and views (Campbell 
2006; Putnam 2007).   Studies also find that segregation facilitates political 
empowerment by guaranteeing that minorities have the electoral strength to elect one of 
their own (Canon 1999; Gay 2001; 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990).  Of course, the 
majority of these studies have investigated the benefits of drawing district lines to 
facilitate the election of a minority candidate or the benefits of empowerment on the 
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political participation of different minority groups.  Less studied is the effect of 
residential concentration when the minority group does not have the political power to be 
a major contender in elections.32  In the areas in which I did the majority of my 
interviews, the Latino population is either not large enough to be a critical force in 
elections (Baltimore and Washington, DC), or houses so many non-citizens that the 
number of actual voters dampens their potential voice (many areas in New York and the 
DC suburbs).  In almost every case, interview subjects pointed out that politicians ignore 
their neighborhoods because everyone knows the amount of votes concentrated Latino 
areas actually deliver.  One community organizer noted that, "many people in the 
neighborhood are immigrants, and they're really not included…in those official structures 
like the community boards and the civic groups."  Two organizers noted that they do not 
work on the elections in the area, nor mobilize voters, because there are so few actual 
eligible voters to recruit.   As one said, "I don't really pay much attention to the city 
council elections because we don't have the numbers to really make a difference."   
Elected officials and mobilizing institutions have many reasons to ignore Latino 
neighborhoods.  In addition to the number of nonvoters in Latino neighborhoods, 
concentrated Latino areas are also often located in uncompetitive one-party districts.  In 
one-party areas, the low salience of state and local elections is compounded by the fact 
that the only real competition is in the primary.  In primary elections, candidates typically 
only mobilize "super voters,” voters who have a history of voting in primary elections.  
One Latino elected official noted that if he only knocked and mailed to super voters, he 
would only reach out to a few hundred Latinos, even though his district is equal parts 
                                                 
32 Nevertheless, frequently when minorities have the numerical strength the elect a co-ethnic, they 
often remain underrepresented (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005) 
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white, Latino, and African American.  He thought it was worth the effort to reach out to 
them, but he was just about the only elected official I interviewed who consistently did 
so.  Several others pointed out that they did some organizing beyond super voters, but in 
general, the resources available did not allow for it.  As one elected official who 
represents a majority Latino town in an increasingly Latino area noted: 
 In my town, I try to knock on every single door, no matter if they are 
registered or not.  Because it's a small enough town and sooner or later we 
see and know each other anyway, so, that's at the town level I talk to just 
about everybody.  For the county council race, it was strictly super voters, 
which there's, according to the records, more than 35,000 registered 
Democrats in the district, about 5,000 of them are quote-unquote super 
voters.  But of all the voters—of those 35,000 Democrats—less than 200 
were Hispanic."   
 
He continued noting that he was not sure if, other than himself, a single Hispanic 
voter would be considered a "super voter.” To complicate matters more, many Latino 
voters are registered independent, which, in areas dominated by one political party, 
means they never get to cast a meaningful vote.  As one Latino elected official in 
Maryland noted:  
The one thing about the Latino community in [my] county is the very high 
number of registered independent voters.  And we've done a lot of work 
attempting to educate people that so many of the battles are fought in a 
primary, and uh, you know, [immigrants] don't really know what a 
republican or democrat or independent is.  If you know [Latin American 
political parties], then independent sounds like a pretty good thing to be, 
so part of the challenge here of increasing participation is to have people 
understand better where the action is.  And that may sound somewhat self 
serving, because we want more Democrats, but we spend a lot of time 
reaching out to independent voters to educate them, that if you want to be 
involved in making history, you can't because you've given away your 
vote, because you are only going to get to vote in the general [election]. 
 
The primary political implication of this phenomenon is not that Latinos are 
registered as independent; to shift the spirit of the word, they simply aren’t “registered” at 
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all.  Latinos lack a history of participation and, as a result, they are passively left out.  
Latinos do not register on the radar of the most important cogs in the political machine—
major party primary efforts and interest group mobilization campaigns.  In effect, in 
many locales, the political machine does not appear to know that Latinos exist.  The only 
people who make it onto “the list” for mobilization are strong partisans who have a 
superlative history of engagement. 
Living in a politically competitive area can increase political participation purely 
because it increases the amount of attention given to otherwise low salience elections 
(Gimpel et al. 2003; Campbell 2006).  Competitive political areas appear to increase 
voter knowledge about candidates and campaign issues and engage a much broader 
audience in the political process (Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2006).  
Single party areas often have lower turnout across the board, but if you couple that with 
more independent voters clustered in a single area and few resources with which 
organizations can mobilize their members, the overall impact is likely to be an absence of 
(1) political socialization for Latino youth and new immigrants and (2) political 
mobilization of Latino voters.  As one Latino elected official noted of the Latino area of 
her district, "until me, there was nobody who had ever paid any attention or even cared to 
get people involved, to participate." 
The under-participation of Latinos in elections complicates the efficacy of co-
ethnic empowerment, since Latino elected officials cannot completely rely on Latino 
votes to be elected.  Instead they have to be very conscious of the policy interests of their 
non-Hispanic constituents, including those who are vehemently anti- immigrant even in 
majority Latino areas.  One elected official in Maryland noted that:  
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I mean, one could argue that you know, [segregation] certainly presents 
opportunities for people to get elected.  Although, the district I got elected 
in, certainly it's the most heavily minority district, but when you look at 
the actual Latino vote ...it might have been, you know 6 percent, 7 percent 
of the primary audience, again, I value that, and its important, but it's not 
dispositive. 
 
Another noted that she has two constituencies, one comprised of voters and the 
other of Latino residents.  To her chagrin, there is almost no overlap.   She explained that 
in her campaign she made the decision to expend resources on Latino non-voters because 
she wanted to engage the Latino community, despite the fact that they were not signed up 
to vote: "So we were able to focus and really run two campaigns, one nominally focused 
on outreach to the Latino community and then the more general one, because you can't 
get elected just by the Latino community. The numbers aren't there… so you can't get 
elected without the majority white community also voting for you."   
A similar statement was made by another high-ranking official:  
The response was excitement.  Some had family members who were not 
yet eligible to vote. They were legal immigrants--they hadn't registered, 
whatever, but they understood that they could be part of a… a historic 
shift.  And they also understood that there are other ways to participate, so 
you look at the precincts in [the heavily Latino area], we had a ton of sign 
coverage and probably when you knock on doors, you usually have a list 
of prime voters.  When I was in [the Latino area] I ended up doing a lot of 
door knocking that was on a certain level non surgical.  That is to say, I 
was knocking on doors of non-prime voters and potentially in some cases 
non-eligible voters.  But that is because really you look around, and my 
goal was to get…get people involved in the political process and putting a 
sign in your yard is a way to get involved in the political process. 
 
The discussion thus far highlights the fact that Latino elected officials play a 
critical role mobilizing and engaging the Latino community.  Despite their scarce 
resources, they appear to do much more than political parties and interest groups to reach 
out to low-turnout ethnic enclaves.   Ethnic concentration cultivates the development of 
 
 100  
Latino leadership and guarantees that they have enough support to achieve elected office.  
I address these benefits next. 
The Political Benefits of Segregation: Representation and Mobilization 
Achieving descriptive representation is possibly the most substantial benefit of 
residential segregation for minority communities.  Despite the socioeconomic problems 
generally associated with segregation, segregation often allows minorities to gain 
political empowerment and incorporation.  Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984) found 
that, in Northern California, government effectively represented minorities when African 
Americans and Latinos form active electoral coalitions, and make up at least part of a 
dominant liberal coalition.  These conditions—being descriptively represented on 
legislative bodies, and having liberals control the legislature—facilitated the appointment 
of minorities to boards and commissions, increased oversight of police, and increased 
minority participation in city contracts and municipal jobs.  Likewise, Canon (1999) 
argues that even when minority politicians are not the majority or even a large proportion 
of the legislature, their presence can serve as an educating force to other elected officials 
and can dampen anti-minority rhetoric and attacks.  In short, segregation enables 
minorities to elect one of their own and descriptive representation comes with concrete 
benefits.  
As expected, many of my interview participants were adamant that descriptive 
representation is critical to the Latino community.  As one noted, "I think it's important 
for people to really see themselves represented in the community."  Several elected 
officials explained that they were sure that their presence on the ticket and their campaign 
activities were at least symbolically important to Latinos.  "People were very excited, the 
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voters were.  Those who were voting were very excited, and I'm not sure how many 
voted, but probably close to all of them did.  Lot of excitement; and even here, people are 
very supportive.  I'm second generation Puerto Rican, which is very different from first 
generation Salvadoran, but still, they consider me somebody who hears them and will 
fight for them."  And these elected officials delivered.  One community organizer praised 
the Latino elected officials for sticking their necks out on issues that were risky even for 
liberal politicians. 
At least our folk have the courage to take on what are essentially among 
the most controversial issues of our day. I mean, immigration status, the 
immigration debate on behalf of undocumented people. There's no other 
politician or group of politicians that are taking on representing the 
interests of such vilified and marginalized populations. I think there may 
be a body of African American politicians who represent the interests of 
former felons. They're pretty much vilified, on some similar level, and the 
small number of representatives who represent the interests of lesbians and 
gays, and their rights, are also similarly, I think, vilified. But that's about 
it, you know. Most every other politician, I think... kind of really focus on 
the sort of middle-class interests, which you know, are critical, obviously, 
but it's a very safe space to operate in…. I think that there's a level of 
courage there that has to be acknowledged among our political 
representation. 
 
Descriptive representation also appears to be particularly important because 
Latino issues have not divided the legislature along party lines.  While Democrats appear 
to be more likely to support Latino- interest bills and to vote against anti- immigrant 
legislation than Republicans, it was by no means clear that Latinos could rely on the 
Democratic caucus to deliver on their issues.  The Democratic elected officials in the 
areas in which I conducted my interviews are divided on many issues relating to Latinos, 
particularly Latino immigrants.  With anti- immigrant rhetoric flaring, many Democratic 
legislators are under pressure from the more conservative members of their district to 
take a stand on immigration.  So not only do few non-Latino legislators introduce pro-
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Latino bills, but Latino issues are also losing ground with the democratic coalition.  As 
one Latino legislator noted:  
Right now, I think [the Democrats] will support [bills that benefit 
immigrant communities].  I don't think they will necessarily create it and 
introduce it, though.  I think that's why it's been so good to have [other 
Latino Delegates], I mean [they have] done very targeted legislation and I 
think it's kind of risky legislation, very up in your face kind of thing with 
health, and cultural linguistic things... and we've been successful at 
keeping [state] law what it is, but it's been quite a struggle, I mean I could 
never sit back and say, this is something I can count on my from 
democratic group... the partisan issue has helped us so far, but only to the 
extent that most [Democrats] don't feel that they can lose by going along, 
but it's a reluctant support and I think a waning support...The Senate just 
shocked us all... The Republicans added a lawful presence for [a] driver’s 
license bill amendment to a commercial license bill.  The vote was 23-24.  
Eight Democrats went along with that.  [A specific Democratic Senator] is 
feeling the pressure of the anti- immigrant groups. 
 
She continued, explaining that three other Senators who the Latino interest groups 
used to be able to count on to vo te against anti- immigrant bills voted for the driver’s 
license amendment.   
In New York, community activists expressed different sentiments.  The effect of 
descriptive representation was of particular importance for symbolic reasons, but the 
policy implications were less clear.  Several community organizers lamented that the 
Latino elected officials had come "through the party machine" and not from the 
community organizations and certainly not "from the neighborhood."  Thus, the Latino 
representatives often represented their issues better than more conservative members of 
the legislature, but not necessarily better than their very liberal white counterparts who 
won their seats after years of working in community organizations.  In fact, many 
community organizers felt that the community was better represented by a few white 
elected officials who saw the Latinos in their districts as a critical constituency, than by 
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Latinos who thought they could count on the few votes that the neighborhood actually 
delivered.  One community activist commented that a local Latino elected official “may 
look like us, but he’s not one of us.” 
In Maryland, where there are only a few elected Latinos across the state, the 
general feeling is that having Latino elected officials is necessary, but is not a panacea.  
In fact, most people felt that it is more important to have appointed officials involved in 
policy implementation for the Latino community, particularly given the very few elected 
positions they have gained.   One elected official commented that the number of Latino 
elected officials in the state legislature was "not there yet, it's the onesies and twosies and 
unfortunately it’s too few, I don' t even want to count it."  A community organizer said, 
"here in Maryland we only have three Hispanics representing the community, so people 
feel represented by them, but they know that's so little.  It's just the amount of people who 
represent them is so small, that they don't see how that's going to work."  
A Latino elected official explained that, as a Latino, he knew the issues of his 
community and in his majority-Latino town he was able to meet their needs.  He hired an 
all bi- lingual staff so that the entire town administration would be accessible to the 
Spanish-speaking residents.  But, if his residents need help that only the state or the 
county can deliver, there are very few resources.  He lamented that no one in the state 
foreclosure assistance office speaks Spanish. And, when the town had flooded a few 
years ago because of county neglect, there had been no Spanish speakers to help people 
recoup their losses.  As mayor, the best he could often do was to help his constituents 
navigate county and state resources, but his role in this, I surmised, was often diminished 
to translator.  As he noted: 
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So the execution of the policy is huge. For example, you know [the state] 
regulates banks, lenders, mortgage providers, all of that stuff, of course, 
there's a lot of targeting of minority communities for bad loans and that 
sort of thing.  We have nobody in our financial regulation investigation 
unit who is bilingual.  So you know there's policy in accessibility and 
execution of the policy. So we could have the best laws in the world but if 
the people can't call and talk to somebody, or if they know if they call they 
won't talk to somebody, then that's a policy that's meaningless to an entire 
segment. 
 
A similar sentiment was expressed in New York where community organizations 
noted that even in districts represented by Latinos there are no trans lation services 
available at community meetings or in city offices.  One community organizer expressed 
her frustration over language access in districts represented by Latino councilmen by 
saying:  
The fact that you have community board meetings in predominantly 
Spanish speaking neighborhoods, without any translation services 
available, what does that tell you about a system? What does that tell you 
about a governance structure?  A city like this, New York City, should 
know that they are disenfranchising people very deliberately if they aren’t 
providing translation interpretation services. …When you don’t provide 
language access, you’re actually deliberately taking away people’s ability 
to participate…. it’s the same question like why in our neighborhoods do 
we have the shittiest schools? Why are we the ones who don’t have the 
nice parks, but the upper west side they do?  Because they don’t think 
we’re going to say anything.  They don’t think we can organize. 
 
By taking away the mechanism through which individuals and communities make 
change—by participating in neighborhood governance associations—she felt that the city 
was systematically making sure that only the people they wanted to participate would in 
fact have the means to participate.    
I observed the barrier of language access at several community meetings I 
attended in Maryland.  In Maryland, few community organizers speak Spanish (this may 
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be a product of the newness of the Latino population).  The meetings of the Latino 
neighborhood organizations that I attended held their meetings primarily in English.  
Quite often, the lack of resources prevented simultaneous translation.  However, the fact 
that the leadership of the organizations was often not bi- lingual, as the organizers 
generally came from the ranks of the few white and African American members of the 
neighborhood, meant that many Latinos who came to the meetings struggled to 
participate.   At best, sometimes there would be a community member present who could 
translate, but most of the time there was not.  There were no state, county, or city-
provided resources to make civic associations accessible to Spanish speakers even in 
places that had elected Latino leadership.  The Latino community has few ways to hold 
their elected officials accountable when they cannot participate in community meetings 
that provide community feedback to elected officials and who keep tabs on the actions of 
their elected officials.  The only meetings held that were in Spanish were those held by 
immigrant activist groups.  While those meetings were in Spanish, in general, they were 
only attended by immigrants, and not the rest of the community.  In effect, language 
access produced segregated civic organizations, limiting the potential for building inter-
racial, inter-ethnic bonds within the community. 
  The Consequences of Segregation for Community Mobilization 
 
The most consistent benefit of segregation identified by my interview participants 
were the effects segregation has on community mobilization.  Without fail, community 
organizers and activists felt that it is critical for Latinos to live together or the task of 
organizing them would be too great.  As one organizer in the Dominican community 
 
 106  
noted "If we don't mobilize now when we are all together, how would we ever mobilize 
them when they are apart?"  Another noted that knowing that an entire neighborhood was 
all Latino immigrants was the only way that an organization like his, with few resources, 
was able to do so many great things.   They can easily identify a majority of the Latinos 
in the community without advanced statistical tools or door to door identification 
campaigns because Latinos are relegated to a small area of town.   As a result, it is also 
easy to bring the Latino community together for meetings.  No transportation is necessary 
if the whole community lives in one place.  "I don't know how we would operate if they 
were all over," one noted.  
However, while segregation benefits mobilization from Latino and immigrant 
activist groups, it also means that there is not any cross-mobilization of different racial 
and ethnic groups.  By being segregated, Latinos are mobilized by their groups but not by 
more traditional mobilizing sources.  In addition, because they are able to focus their 
attention so narrowly on concentrated Latino areas, Latino-focused interest groups do not 
mobilize non-Latinos who may support their issues.  In short, the prospects for cross-
cultural mobilization are few. 
Several other organizers noted the advantage of both residential concentration and 
the dense social networks concentration creates.  One community organizer in Maryland 
said, "If I talk to two or three from the community, I find that at least half of the 
community knows what I said.... So I can get information out as fast as possible.  So, you 
know, usually when they live in one community they pretty much try to stay together and 
inform each other about one thing or the other.  That's one thing about having meetings; 
they will meet each other.  So after that it's just friends and neighbors.  That makes my 
 
 107  
job easier."  Another organizer in New York reiterated the point, saying:  
When I get ten members of the community in one meeting, I know those 
ten members…will bring that information that we had at the meeting to 
the others.  And next time I talk to someone who didn't even show up at 
the meeting, they will know what we talked about and what kind of 
decisions that we made....  But that's how strong they are, they will bring 
the information to the others.  And then some of them will tell them, 'you 
know, you have to be in the meetings if you want to give opinions or you 
want to do something,' to try to push each other to help too. 
 
Another organizer in New York thought Latino immigrants and their children 
would be less involved in community activity if there was sufficient integration, 
particularly if they were a small minority.  "Our experience is that people seem to get 
involved when they're with people like themselves." 
There was also a feeling that mobilization and descriptive representation went 
hand in hand but not necessarily always in a positive way.  While Baretto (2007) argues 
that having descriptive representation increases political participation among the Latino 
community, scholars who study descriptive representation have been troubled by the 
possibility that minority elected officials elected from super majority-minority districts 
lack electoral accountability.  Famously, Swain (1993, 73) noted one African American 
Congressman who said that "you can almost get away with raping babies and be 
forgiven."  In short, minority constituencies may turn out in higher numbers when they 
can vote for a co-ethnic, but they may also become complacent and overly loyal.  Several 
community organizers lamented this problem, although perhaps not to as great of a 
degree.  One noted that their legislator had "tried to turn his back" on his Latino base and 
"had to do a lot of soul searching."  Another noted that their Latino elected officials "just 
don't seem to get it."  But many of these community activists felt that the reason that 
there was less substantive representation among Latino elected officials was because the 
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political participation of the Latino community ended after the election.  For example, 
one community organizer in New York noted that,  
I think that there are some of them that are representing the interests of the 
people, and I think getting, for example, predominant Latino communities, 
getting Latino politicians elected is important, especially if they come 
from the community, but I think at the same time people need to 
understand that electing people is not going to change their community.  If 
I was elected tomorrow, and nobody came to me and told me what they 
wanted, I wouldn't do shit.  You know what I mean?...Why would I if I'm 
not being held accountable by a base?  
 
In short, while segregation is seen as helpful for electing candidates and for 
mobilization campaigns, even those successes came with costs.  Without the skills and 
resources to hold elected officials accountable and without competitive, highly salient 
campaigns, the election of co-ethnic candidates appears to have mixed results.  In some 
cases, such as those discussed earlier in this chapter, it produced meaningful policies that 
helped the community to such an extent that concentration could be seen as beneficial.  
At other times, the election of co-ethnic representatives was not helpful to the community 
and did little to change the problems that segregation produced. 
Discussion: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Segregation 
Political mobilization and incorporation is critical for Latinos to gain substantive 
representation and to become powerful players in the political realm.  However, as can be 
seen from the discussion above, most of my interview subjects also felt that the benefits 
of segregation are not as great as the drawbacks.  After discussing how helpful it was to 
have everyone in the same place, one community organizer then noted that the problem 
was that elected officials just ignored the community.  Since all Latinos were located in 
the same precinct, elected officials could just ignore the Latino areas and instead cater to 
the more affluent and larger voting constituencies located in other precincts.  This 
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sentiment was echoed by another organizer who pointed out that they had to stage a full 
protest to get a community park.  She felt strongly that if the upper west side wanted to 
reclaim or repair a park, they would be able to secure the funding easily, without the 
residents taking to the streets. Also, as a result of segregation, mobilization became even 
more important.  Whereas in wealthier neighborhoods a lot of people with busy lives can 
avoid political activity without any consequences, in Latino neighborhoods, no one could 
ride for free on the political participation of their neighbors.  So few people in 
concentrated Latino areas understand how and have the means to actively push for the 
needs of the community that people who would otherwise benefit from the activities of 
engaged individuals in their community are forced to take an active role if they want to 
make change. 
One final concern of the community organizers, particularly in New York, but 
also to some extent in Maryland, is important to note.   Several times during my 
interviews, community organizers noted the problem of ethnicity-based organizing.   
Segregation primarily benefits organizing around shared attributes that distinguish the 
group as distinct from the rest of the polity.  In segregated Latino- immigrant 
communities, shared language and often shared home countries bring people together.  
Community organizations that focus on Latino issues are able to harness the bonds within 
these communities and highlight shared attributes to generate bonding-social capital—a 
social capital based on “otherness.”  The community organizers I spoke to were no less 
aware of the problems of harnessing bonding-social capital than are political scientists.  
As Putnam and Feldstein (2003, 3) argue, “the kind of social capital that is most essential 
for healthy public life [bridging social-capital] in an increasingly diverse society like ours 
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is just the kind that is hardest to build.”  Although it is certainly easier, building 
community strength by highlighting the difference in communities stands to build walls 
between groups and prevent the type of coalitions that are necessary to produce 
meaningful changes in public policy. 
As one Latino community organizer noted, “I just don't think identity based 
organizing is the best kind of organizing you can do.  It’s not good for immigrant 
communities, and working class communities.  The future of organizing should be that 
you're deliberately creating a multi-ethnic, multi-religious base.  Because that's where 
your power is.”  Another community activist expressed her frustration over the lack of 
multi-ethnic coalitions and the divisions in the neighborhood that the ethnicity-specific 
groups created: “I think the fact that there's very little actual work that bridges, that talks 
about the shared interests of Latinos and African Americans, or Latinos and the Asian 
community, and I think that's a real problem because the people that have power in the 
city will use it.  So I, for example, in this case of the hate crime in [a specific 
community], the Ecuadorian organizations want to make this an Ecuadorian issue….They 
don't want to talk about making cultural relationships more profoundly.”  Unfortunately, 
segregated communities naturally lend themselves to civic and community organizing 
that capitalizes on the shared characteristics of groups that are distinct from groups in 
other locales, instead of building bridges between diverse individuals who share common 
interests and common spaces.   
This chapter explored the benefits and drawbacks for Latinos of living in 
segregated communities.  The benefits of segregation are concrete, but so too are the 
detriments.  While segregation appears to help communities organize and achieve 
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descriptive representation, these benefits are not antidotes for the larger social ills 
explicitly connected to residential segregation.  The interviews I conducted and my 
experiences in these communities lead me to conclude that integration, while certainly 
not without its own problems, benefits Latinos more than segregation.  
To be clear, segregation certainly has potential positive byproducts.  Most 
importantly, segregation enables minority communities with the ability to gain 
descriptive representation, to mobilize disenfranchised minorities, and to cater to the 
needs of unique groups (language access, special schools, etc).  As one can see from the 
discussion above, every benefit that people mentioned about segregation was followed by 
a “but” that expressed its limitations. 
Segregated communities build schools that cater to immigrant populations or 
those with limited English skills, but further concentrating challenged students into these 
schools limits their options and may enable gangs to target students more easily.  
Likewise, community organizations find it easier to mobilize Latinos and build on the 
strong bonding social capital that Latino neighborhoods possess, but as a result Latinos 
are largely left out of more traditional mobilization campaigns.  Finally, segregation 
enables Latinos to elect candidates who look like them, but those candidates often are not 
always responsive to their interests. 
This chapter presented the evidence I garnered from interviews with community 
leaders, elected officials, and activists.  Using a triangulation approach (Creswell 2003, 
217), in the following chapters, I investigate these same questions using large-n 
quantitative data.  I use the quantitative data in the next chapters to corroborate the 
findings presented above to show that they hold using national data and not just in the 
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Chapter 4: Location, Location, Location: De Facto Segregation 
and the Keys to Participation 
 
 Real-estate agents know that when it comes to buying a house, only one thing 
matters: location.  Where we live matters (Logan 1978; Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Massey and Denton 1993; Schneider and Logan 1982).  Decisions about where to reside 
determine access to public transportation, major highways, healthcare, and jobs.33  
Location also affects who our friends and acquaintances are, and the quality of the 
schools our children attend.  Further, where we live determines how much time we spend 
commuting to work versus how much we spend with our families.  Importantly for 
political science, location also determines our political socialization.  As David Campbell 
(2006) notes, what you do and if you vote depends on where you are. 
 Moreover, people are constrained by their social location.  If social networks are 
isolated and relatively closed off from other networks, access to information will be more 
limited and adoption of innovations from outside the social networks is unlikely (Rogers 
1979; Rogers and Kincaid 1981).  Despite advances in technology, most people’s social 
networks remain geographically constrained.  So, where we live makes up “constellations 
of opportunities” (Pulido 2004, 86) in that it determines our access to a better quality of 
life as well as to human and social capital.  And, as mentioned previously, physical 
location is potentially more important for the poor than for middle and upper class 
                                                 
33 See literature review in Squires and Kubrin (2006). 
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families whose social networks tend to be more geographically and socially expansive 
and who have access to better and more efficient transportation. 34 
 Over the past decade, increasing numbers of scholars have recognized that place 
determines life choices and political participation rates are correlated with neighborhood 
attributes (Widestrom 2008; Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008; Campbell 2006; Gimpel, Lay, 
and Schuknecht 2003).  Individuals participate if the people in their neighborhoods 
participate.  The reasons for this are multi- fold and include the mobilization decisions of 
parties, candidates, and interest groups, increased rates of political discussion, and the 
socioeconomic and racial segregation of American cities and suburbs. Tam Cho and 
Rudolph (2008) find that, “citizens’ participatory behavior is heavily influenced by the 
participatory behavior of those who live in close proximity to them” (287) above and 
beyond social networks, socioeconomic status, and other individual- level and 
neighborhood- level factors.  In the last chapter, I showed why community organizers and 
elected officials feel that segregation impedes socioeconomic mobility and social network 
diversity for Latino communities.  In this chapter, I explore this question using large n-
data sets to corroborate my findings.   
To review, residential segregation has been increasing for Latinos in the United 
States.  If the rate of increase in Latino-white segregation continues, Latinos will soon 
surpass African Americans as the most segregated group in the United States (Timberlake 
and Iceland 2007).  Segregation has pernicious effects on minority group social mobility, 
yet the majority of research overlooks the potentially critical impact residential context 
                                                 
34 This statement may be best supported by the literature on job seeking in low income 
communities.  The basic finding of which is that the simple lack of cars in low income 
communities hampers the geographic expansiveness of job searches (see Blumenberg 2004 for a 
good review of this literature). 
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can have on Latino political participation.  In addition, the majority of the extant research 
on the effect of context on participation ignores the critical element of race and ethnicity 
in the socialization process (Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008; McClain 2003; also see 
Rushton 2008).  
 This gap in the literature limits our understanding of the political behavior of the 
rapidly growing Latino constituency.  I argue that segregated environments deny Latinos 
the information and access to resources they require to be socially mobile.  As a result, 
Latinos in segregated neighborhoods achieve lower levels of education, make less 
money, and have weaker English proficiency.  Immigrant Latinos are also less likely to 
become citizens.  Finally, Latinos in segregated areas have isolated social networks that 
deny them access to critical information for civic and political participation.  
 In the analysis that follows, I draw upon quantitative evidence from the Current 
Population Study 2000, the 2000 U.S. Census, and the Social Capital Community 
Benchmark Survey 2000.  The results of the analysis corroborate the evidence presented 
in Chapter Three: Latinos in the United States are suffering as a result of segregated 
housing patterns.   
 I begin by discussing the current state of Latino segregation in America and offer 
a theory of why socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English language ability are 
critical to understanding Latino political participation.  Next, I present a description of 
the data and methods used in the analysis and my findings. I close with a discussion of 
the future of Latino socioeconomic mobility and social integration if contemporary rates 
of Latino segregation persist in the United States. 
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Residential Segregation in Latino Communities 
Social and geographic distance between Latinos and other races in the United States is on 
the rise. For the first time in history, Latinos have become “hypersegregated” in the 
largest Latino destinations, a categorization previously only applicable to African 
Americans (Wilkes and Iceland 2004).  While Latinos remain nowhere near as segregated 
as the average African American, the dramatic increase over the last ten years is 
concerning (Timberlake and Iceland 2007; Wahl, Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007).  
According to the 2000 Census, 43 percent of Latinos live in neighborhoods in which 
Latinos are the majority.  This number increased dramatically between 1990 and 2000.  
In fact, the number of Latinos living in majority-Latino districts increased by 76% 
between 1990 and 2000 (Pew 2004).  Given the current rate of change, La tino/white 
segregation will surpass Black/white segregation somewhere between 2014 and 2024 
(Timberlake and Iceland 2007). 
 Many Latinos are also linguistically isolated.  In 2000, Latinos who spoke only 
Spanish constituted roughly 28% of the population in majority-Latino census tracts (Pew 
2004).  Not all non-English speakers are immigrants.  Siegel, Martin, and Bruno (2001) 
found that as of 1990, 52 percent of people five and older who spoke a language other 
than English in their homes were born in the United States.  Over the years, as Latino 
immigration has continued, it is likely that the number of children in linguistically 
isolated homes has increased.  A recent Migration Policy Institute Report found that one 
in ten students in US schools is now Limited English Proficient (LEP) and almost three 
quarters of LEP children enrolled in school are second or third-generation children (Fix et 
al. 2008).  Because of residential housing patterns, these children are clustered into 
schools overwhelmed by large non-English speaking populations.  Over half of LEP 
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students attend schools where over 30 percent of their classmates also are not native 
English speakers (Fix et al. 2008, 50). 
Racial/ethnic segregation among Latinos, like African Americans, cannot be 
solely explained by socioeconomic status (Wahl et al. 2007, 1017).  Even middle class 
Latinos have become more isolated.  As is evident in Table 3.1, the average Latino lives 
in a census tract that is almost 45 percent Latino, and contains large percentages of non-
citizens and non-English speakers.35  They are also likely to live in a census tract in 
which almost half of Latino adults over age 25 lack a high school degree. 
 
Table 4.1. Latino Neighborhood Conditions 
 
Average Latino 





Percent Latino in Census Tract 44% 31% 
Percent Non-Citizens in Census 
Tract 18 15 
Percent Speaking Little to No 
English in Census Tract 24 22 
Percent Without a High School 
Diploma in Census Tract 34 29 
Percent of Latino Population 
without a High School Degree in 
the Census Tract 49 46 
Note: Cells represent the Population Traits for the Average Latino  
 
As a result, Latinos are becoming concentrated into neighborhoods with low 
levels of human capital that contain few highly educated role models for children and 
little access to information held by other communities.  Segregation has historically 
                                                 
35 According to my calculations of the 2000 Census, the average African American lives in a 
census tract that is 49% African American.  This is calculated by using a weighted average of the 
percent of the tract that is the racial group of interest: (Σ(L*P))/N where L= the number of the 
Racia l Group in the tract, P= the percent of the tract that is that Racial Group and N=the number 
of the Racial Group in the United States. 
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resulted in spatial disparities in terms of access to important institutions.  Minorities 
living in segregated communities have less access to everything from banks to healthcare 
facilities (for a good summary of this literature see Squire and Kubrin 2006).  African 
Americans have historically suffered as a result of residential segregation.  Since 
education and other social service dollars are generally collected on the local level, 
concentrated poverty—which is typically associated with residential segregation (Massey 
and Denton 1995)—results in more financially strapped schools and other social 
institutions than similar social institutions in wealthier and more integrated areas.  Recent 
evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Program (MTO) suggests that there is also a 
social benefit from living in economically and racially integrated locations.36  Preliminary 
evidence suggests that students who relocate to integrated neighborhoods do better in 
school, engage in less delinquent behavior, have fewer physical and mental health 
problems, and have more fulfilling family and personal lives (Goering 2005; Goering et 
al. 2002; Goering and Feins 2003; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005; Rosenbaum et al. 
2005; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2002).37  Further, Crain and Mahard (1978) and 
Mayer (1991) found that African Americans enrolled in integrated schools were less 
likely to drop out and scored higher on standardized tests, and that female students were 
less likely to have a child. 
As Latinos become more segregated, they may constitute a new “underclass” or at 
least encounter more barriers escaping impoverished neighborhoods (Timberlake and 
                                                 
36 Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) (commonly called Moving to Opportunity) 
was a 10-year research based program implemented in the 1990s that combined tenant-based 
rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low-income families move from poverty-
stricken urban areas to low-poverty neighborhoods.  For more information see: 
http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/mto.cfm 
37 The literature review for this section is largely driven by Squire and Kubrin 2006). 
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Iceland 2007; MacDonald 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; but see Moor and 
Pinderhughes 1993, and Massey 1993).  In short, increasing Latino segregation is thought 
to have the same effects as segregation has for African Americans: it decreases life 
choices, educational attainment, earning potential, and spatial mobility. 
Residential segregation could have detrimental effects, therefore, on some of the 
key indices that are critical to the development of political participation, namely 
citizenship, English language proficiency, socioeconomic status, and friendship diversity. 
I will now discuss each of these and explain why they are critical to participation. 
 
Place, Citizenship and Political Participation 
“Because of language and recent migration, [Latinos] lack the resources 
to take part in politics.  Because of language and often because of recent 
migration, they are less often in positions where they are encouraged to 
take part” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 79).   
 
 Concentrated immigrant communities may decrease the likelihood that residents 
will become citizens, formally locking Latinos out of the electoral process and limiting 
their involvement in other participatory acts.  Early research on Latino naturalization by 
Grebler (1966) found that Mexican naturalization rates were constrained by 
sociodemographic factors as well as contextual factors, including where they lived (see 
also Pantoja and Gershon 2006).  While more recent literature has focused on cultural 
ties, including family ties to the home country (Garcia 1981), and trans-nationalism 
(Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; 2001; Pantoja 2005), most of these studies primarily 
posit that the greater the attachment to the home country, the less likely the immigrant is 
to naturalize.  But they do not investigate the relationship between where they live now 
and their decisions to naturalize.  Residential context continues to play an important role 
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in the decision to naturalize.  For example, DeSipio (1996) finds that increased contact 
with white Americans stimulates naturalization (but see Portes and Curtis 1987).  
However, few have investigated the impact of residential context on the decision to 
naturalize or the connection between segregation and contact with non-Latinos (but see 
Johnson et al. 1999).   
 It is likely that Latinos who are surrounded by non-citizens and residentially 
removed from the U.S. born population will have less incentive to naturalize and/or less 
information regarding the naturalization process.  Social networks possess information 
and set standards of behavior.  If Latinos live in areas where a large portion of the 
residents are not citizens, then social norms may not enforce naturalization. 38  In addition, 
areas that have significant immigrant populations may lack the resources to provide 
sufficient English language and citizenship classes (Fix et al. 2008). 
 Citizenship is often considered the “single most important obstacle to Latino 
political empowerment” (Pantoja and Gershon 2006, 1171).  Some estimates put 
naturalization rates of Latinos at approximately half of that for non-Latino immigrants. 
The low level of naturalization among the eligible population is distressing to many 
Latino activists and scholars who recognize the critical role citizenship plays in the 
political life of underrepresented minority groups.  Whatever other barriers exist, lacking 
citizenship bars individuals from the most fundamental form of political participation—
voting.  The impact of stalled naturalization does not just affect the political power of 
Latinos as a group, nor the political behavior of the immigrant themselves.  Having a 
non-citizen parent or living among many non-citizens may dampen political participation 
                                                 
38 The social norms that social networks create have recently been found to affect everything from 
educational attainment to the likelihood of obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007).   
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even among U.S. born Latinos, because they may grow up in areas without a lively civic 
and political life.  Individuals who grow up in families or neighborhoods that value 
political participation are likely to retain their commitment to civic engagement even if 
they move away from the location in which they were socialized (Campbell 2006). Thus, 
it is reasonable to conjecture that individuals who grow up in households in which their 
parents are legally barred from voting and in neighborhoods in which the majority of 
residents cannot legally vote are less likely to develop the sense of civic duty many 
political scientists identify as critical to maintaining an engaged electorate. In short, 
living in non-citizen ethnic enclaves may lower political interest, knowledge, and 
commitment (i.e., feelings of civic duty) among future generations.  Thus, understanding 
why many Latinos fail to naturalize is critical to our understanding of Latino political 
participation.  If segregation deters naturalization, then segregation has a direct and an 
indirect effect on Latino political power. 
H1: Latinos living in segregated areas are less likely to naturalize than Latinos living in 
integrated areas. 
Place, English Language Ability and Political Participation 
 As of 2000, there were over 14 million households in the United States that spoke 
a language other than English as their primary language in the home. Of that, over 3 
million can be classified as linguistically isolated (i.e., living in homes where no English 
is spoken).  Over two-thirds of the individuals who live in linguistically isolated homes 
are U.S. born citizens and 53 percent of adults living in a linguistically isolated home 
have less than a high school degree.39   
                                                 
39See:  http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/AmSpks.html 
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It is clear that for many Americans, English language skills are critical to social 
mobility (Tienda and Niedart 1980; Garcia 1987).  English is essential to employment 
mobility and to understanding the majority of information distributed in the United 
States.  According to the U.S. Census, over 40 percent of Latinos speak English “less 
than well.”40  As Figure 4.1 makes clear, U.S. residents who speak a language other than 
English in the home are geographically clustered.  In Arizona, almost 26 percent of the 
population speaks a language other than English compared to 8 percent in North 
Carolina. Within states, English language use is further clustered within counties and 
neighborhoods.  As can be seen in Figure 4.1, in some counties almost 25% of the 
residents do not speak English whereas other counties have very few non-English 
speakers.  
 When Latinos are isolated into segregated areas, it is less likely that they will 
require English skills for daily needs or will have the opportunity to practice English.  
When signs, stores, and services cater to Spanish language speakers, there is little 
opportunity for learning English.  While Spanish language signs and printed materials are 
necessary and proper for facilitating access to services by recent immigrants, English 
language use is essential for Latinos to integrate into American society. 41  
                                                 
40This information can be found on the census website at: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/AmSpks.html.  Cite last visited on 
April 13, 2009. 
41 This should not be taken to mean that we should not offer second language materials or that 
businesses should not offer services in another language than English, only that as much as 
possible, it is important for immigrants and their children to gain sufficient English skills. 
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Figure 4.1 Second Language Concentration in the United States, by County 
 
Source: U.S. Census, 2000 
 
   
English language acquisition is critical to socioeconomic mobility.  According to a 
Pew Hispanic Center study, Latinos who are raised in households that speak Spanish only 
or who themselves speak English “less than well” are more likely to drop out of high 
school (Fry 2003, 10).  Since social networks can facilitate English language acquisition, 
people who speak Spanish at home but are surrounded by a largely English speaking 
community will likely acquire English skills faster and more completely than Latinos 
who live in isolated Spanish-speaking areas.  Likewise, if English acquisition is key to 
educational outcomes, then living in areas that facilitate English skills is also likely to 
improve educational achievement.   
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 English language ability is critical to socioeconomic mobility but it is also vital to 
civic engagement and political participation.  While the use of Spanish language media 
by politicians seeking electoral support from the Latino community has increased in 
recent elections (Ramos 2005), it is still relatively rare in all but a few states housing the 
most concentrated and established Latino populations.  In addition, the investment to 
translate political materials into Spanish and to produce specific Spanish-language 
advertisements takes money that most local and state- level politicians simply do not 
have.  Thus, while American politics makes its way into the Spanish- language media 
every four years with the presidential election cycle, and in some states during a 
competitive Senate or House race, most Latinos with limited English language skills will 
be unable to attain the materials necessary to be fluent in even local political affairs.   In 
fact, at many of the community meanings I attended in Latino neighborhoods, local 
government officials would come to present or to hear from the community but no 
translators were provided and no one from the government offices who attended the 
meetings was fluent in Spanish.  In light of local government’s inability (or 
unwillingness) to provide translation services, English acquisition is critical for Latino 
civic and political engagement. 
Therefore, if segregation deters English Language acquisition, then segregation 
should have a direct and an indirect effect on the potential for Latino political interest, 
knowledge, and engagement. 
H2: Latinos living in segregated communities are less likely to speak English than 
Latinos living in more integrated areas. 
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Segregation, Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation 
Socioeconomic status is one of the most powerful determinants of political participation.  
SES remains the dominant explanation for the difference in rates of political participation 
between racial and ethnic groups (Jackson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen1993; Teixeira 
1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
Socioeconomic status is a way to account for latent variables such as the skills and 
knowledge necessary for meaningful political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995).  Not only are higher SES individuals more likely to overcome the hurdles to 
participation, they are also more likely to feel obligated to do so.  According to Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980, 18), SES, particularly education, captures skills, interest, capacity, 
and civic duty:  
When we classify people by the length of their formal education, we are 
measuring several different attributes. American schools provide a good deal of 
explicit instruction and exhortation on citizenship that emphasizes the obligation 
to vote and thus might be thought to nurture a sense of citizen duty. The better 
educated are more likely to know social norms. . . . It seems reasonable, then, to 
think that education increases the moral pressure to vote….Schooling increases 
one’s capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and 
intangible subjects, that is, subjects like politics. 
 
 It is simply more rational for higher SES individuals to participate because the 
costs of participation for them are lower.  Gaining information about the election is not as 
costly and understanding political cues is easier for higher SES individuals.  They are 
simply more likely to know where, when, and how to participate, and they are more 
likely to feel obliged to do so.  People who feel social pressure to participate are both less 
likely to incur costs for participating and more likely to feel social and psychological 
costs if they fail to participate than those without social pressure to participate. 
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 If the majority of the difference between white and Latino participation rates is 
accounted for by socioeconomic status (Jackson 2003), then understanding the future of 
Latino political power rests on understanding the impediments to socioeconomic mobility 
in the Latino community.  Segregation has the potential to deny Latinos opportunities for 
socioeconomic mobility.  Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) argue that 
segregation among African Americans was the key component in the making of the 
“underclass.”  Segregation created "barriers to spatial mobility” and these barriers created 
obstacles to social mobility because “where one lives determines a variety of latent 
factors that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of housing, 
exposure to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's peers" 
(150).  For African Americans, they argue, segregation has isolated them into bad 
schools, where children are likely to receive lower quality educations and be exposed to 
fewer and more constrained life choices.  This in turn decreases their chances of 
achieving economic success.  For adults, segregation limits the accessibility of jobs and 
services and dampens support among whites for programs that would help alleviate the 
poverty and rampant joblessness common in segregated minority communities (Massey 
and Denton 1993; Sugrue 1996; Wilson 1996).  Moreover, concentrated poverty, a 
common side effect of racial segregation, appears to lead to social disorder and as a result 
impedes the development of vibrant civic institutions (Wilson 1996).  
It is clear from a plethora of literature on the black experience, as well as the 
extensive research on the consequences of housing and local policy, that segregation 
among African Americans concentrates poverty and people with similarly bleak life 
experiences into neighborhoods away from whites and from those with moderate to 
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higher incomes.  This in turn creates lower levels of education and job skills, less access 
to quality and stable employment, and increased mental and physical health problems 
(Cutler and Glaeser 1997; LaVeist et al. 2008; Massey and Denton 1993; Popkin et al. 
2004; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996).  The experience of Latinos 
is unlikely to be significantly different.  The majority of Latino immigrants enter the 
United States with less than a high school education and U.S. born Latinos have lower 
educational achievement rates than any other racial or ethnic group (Pew 2008). U.S. 
born Latinos are likely achieving at lower rates as a product of the schools they attend 
(Orfield and Lee 2005).  Schools in segregated areas face barriers to educating children 
that are far beyond what any school can take on in a given year.  High mobility rates, the 
inability of parents to tutor or mentor their children, unsafe streets, and poor nutrition all 
add to the barriers schools face with regard to educating minority children in 
concentrated neighborhoods (Carr and Kutty 2008).  
 There is, of course, the potential that residential segregation is a product of 
socioeconomic inequalities between whites and Latinos.  The research on immigrants and 
residential segregation, does in fact indicate that immigrants of lower socioeconomic 
status are more likely to settle in concentrated immigrant (and impoverished) areas 
(Iceland and Scopilliti 2008), and economic segregation in the United States is at an all 
time high (Dreier et al. 2002), limiting the choices of the poor in their search for housing.  
However, while adult immigrants may have their context determined by their economic 
situations, their children are a product of the locations in which they live.  Thus, while 
housing availability certainly constrains Latino choices, the contexts in which people 
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live—even if done by choice—have grave implications for their future socioeconomic 
trajectories.  
 It is also likely that Latinos are more segregated than their economic situations 
should predict.  Recent evidence suggests that Latinos are considerably more likely than 
whites to face housing discrimination by private agents.  Recent studies found that 
Latinos face discrimination in 4 out of 5 visits to a rental agent (National Fair Housing 
Alliance 2003), and that Latinos are more than twice as likely as whites to be offered 
only high cost, subprime loans (see Squires and Kubrin 2006; Carr and Kutty 2008) and 
more than one in six Latino homebuyers is treated unfavorably compared to equally 
qualified whites (Turner et al. 2002). 
Even if where people live is determined by their ability to meet housing costs, 
their future life choices and the choices available to their children are determined by the 
opportunities available.  The lessons from the African American experience with 
segregation discussed above are likely to be shared by Latinos living in segregated 
communities. Latino economic fortunes are held down by residential concentration 
(Waldinger 2001; Santiago and Wilder 1991) and there is good reason to believe that 
Latinos have lower educational outcomes in residentially segregated environments for 
similar reasons to those found for African Americans (Carr and Kutty 2008).  Schools 
that are attended by a largely second language student population face greater challenges 
getting children up to speed than schools trying to overcome class factors without 
additional language barriers.  As mentioned above, Latinos are less likely than any other 
group to graduate high school or go to college.  Thus, as Latinos are concentrated into 
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segregated residences, schools will need to battle both language barriers as well as 
impediments associated with parental education.   
 The research to date indicates that Latino concentration hinders the socialization 
of Latino children.  Zhou (2003) finds that Latino children in concentrated areas with 
high levels of Latinos, immigrants, and high poverty rates, suffer: 
These disadvantaged communities have a profound impact on children, 
who find themselves (1) socially isolated from mainstream American 
society, (2) culturally exposed directly to ghetto cultures and to a 
materialistic mainstream culture through television, (3) devastated by poor 
living conditions, unsafe streets, and economic distress, and (4) 
handicapped by inadequate and turbulent schools (overcrowding, a high 
dropout rate, a high rate of below-grade level enrollment, and a problem 
with English) (Zhou 2003, 219).   
 
These are not the socialization criteria often associated with a civically and politically 
engaged electorate. 
H3: Latinos living in more segregated communities have lower socioeconomic mobility 
than Latinos living in more integrated areas. 
Race, Place, Social Networks, and Political Participation 
 The old idiom “birds of a feather flock together” remains true, although in a 
limited sense.  There are barriers and facilitators of social network homophily.  People 
must interact with the other people available to them in their geographic and social 
context.42  “Perhaps the most basic source of homophily is space: We are more likely to 
have contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are 
distant” (McPhereson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001, 429).  Thus, living in an integrated 
                                                 
42 While social networking websites have enabled similar individuals to find each other despite 
extreme geographic distance, the relative impact of this rela tively limited and constrained to those 
with the most access to computers.  Given that computer access continues to be highly unequal 
across racial and economic groups (Fairlie 2004)/ 
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setting is likely to increase meaningful interaction between people of different 
backgrounds (Marsden 1987, pp. 128–29). 
The confines of social networks limit access to information and have powerful 
consequences for the attitudes network participants form, as well as the interactions they 
experience (McPhereson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).43  In effect, concentrated Latino 
neighborhoods are likely to house large populations of non-English speakers and non-
citizens, who have little experience with or information about American politics or 
democratic institutions, limiting the likelihood of political discussion and political action. 
Through social networks, individuals gain access to political information and are 
encouraged and recruited to participate in civic and political activities (McClurg 2003; 
McKenzie 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Research on social networks 
suggests that political information gained through casual conversations can enrich 
knowledge and understanding of otherwise complicated political information, such as the 
effects of public policies, candidate qualities, election news, etc. (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995; Huckfeldt 2001; Mutz 2006; Parker, Paker, and McCann 2008; Walsh 2004).  As 
Coleman (1990) notes, people can “free ride” off of their more attentive peers.  “[A] 
person who is not deeply interested in current events but who is interested in being 
informed about important developments can save the time required to read a newspaper if 
he can get the information he wants from a friend who pays attention to such matters” 
(Coleman 1990, 310). 
Given that Latinos are less likely to discuss politics and be active in political 
affairs, isolated Latino social networks are not likely to cultivate civic and political 
                                                 
43 Djupe and McClurg (2000) find that even when holding media information and socioeconomic 
status constant, individual political agendas are affected by local social context.   
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participation.  Latinos, more than any other group, may rely on “weak ties” (or ties to 
networks of people with a longer history in the United States) to inspire civic and 
political activity.  There is little political socialization from within Latino social 
networks, largely due to the fact that so many Latinos in this country are first or second-
generation immigrants who do not have a tradition of participation in the United States or 
knowledge of how the system works (Krasner and Pierre-Louis 2006).  Also, 
concentrated immigrant neighborhoods will likely have a significant proportion of their 
population that is legally barred from voting and participating in politics through 
institutionalized means and may fear participation or feel they are not allowed to 
participate in other matters that involve government institutions (i.e., writing elected 
officials, protesting, etc.).  This inability to participate should decrease political 
discussion, political knowledge and the potential for mobilization.  In fact, recent studies 
of Latino participation show that Latinos often report little political discussion and/or 
interest among their peers (Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; 
Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lopez 2003).  Thus, diverse social networks may be critical to Latino 
political socialization and participation. 
H4: Latinos living in segregated communities will have less diverse social networks than 
Latinos living in more integrated areas. 
Data and Methods 
The data for this chapter comes from three sources: the Current Population Survey 
2000 (CPS), the 2000 U.S. Census, and the Social Capital Community Benchmark 
Survey (SCBS).  Quantitative analysis on citizenship attainment, English language 
ability, and socioeconomic status are conducted using the Current Population Survey 
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linked with contextual data from the U.S. Census.  The CPS is a monthly survey of about 
50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  In 2000 the CPS included a supplement to include voting and registration of 
the respondents in the data set.  The CPS voter supplement includes over 7,000 Latino 
respondents.  This data set is unique for its large sample of both U.S. born Latinos and 
Latino immigrants.  It includes over 4,000 Latino immigrants and over 3,000 U.S. born 
Latinos.   
Unfortunately, the CPS does not include any questions regarding the social 
networks of respondents; therefore, quantitative analysis on social network diversity is 
drawn from restricted data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 
(SCBS).  The Saguaro Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University compiled this data in 2000.  It includes a national survey of 3,000 people and 
an additional 42,000 respondents in 42 communities inside the United States.  The data 
set includes over 2,000 Latinos.  The restricted data includes geographic codes enabling 
the researcher to link the individual respondents to the characteristics of their 
neighborhood as provided by the U.S. Census. 
Measurement of Variables 
Residential Context 
The smallest geographic unit of analysis included in the Current Population 
Survey is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Although MSAs are large and 
encompass much more than an individual’s neighborhood or even residential context, 
they allow for analysis of housing markets.  As described by Steinmetz and Iceland 
(2003, 1), “Residential housing patterns (often referred to as “residential segregation” in 
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the technical literature) usually describe the distribution of different groups across units 
within a larger area. To examine the residential housing patterns of racial and ethnic 
groups, an appropriate area and its component parts or units of analysis must be chosen.” 
MSAs are the most common area used to measure the housing patterns of racial groups.  
Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002), in conjunction with the U.S. Census, calculated 
racial segregation measures for Latinos in 2000 using 19 isolation/segregation measures 
found in the housing literature.  Each of these measures fit into one of 5 main categories: 
evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, or clustering.  For the purposes of this 
paper, I use the exposure/isolation measure recommended by Iceland, Weinberg, and 
Steinmetz (2002) because "exposure measures the degree of potential contact, or 
possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members" (Massey and 
Denton, p. 287).  The two measures of exposure, isolation and interaction, are highly 
correlated.44  This variable is referred to in the text as “Latino Isolation.”45  
The SCBS allows for a more in-depth approach to neighborhood context because 
it includes census tracts.  Thus, for analyses drawing from the SCBS, the “Latino 
Isolation” measure is based on a factor score of three tract level variables: percent Latino 
living in the census tract, percent of the Latino population in that tract that speaks no 
English, and the percent of the tract that is not a citizen (alpha .7).46  This factor score 
captures not only the extent to which the individual lives in a largely Latino area but the 
extent to which they are isolated among Spanish speakers and non-citizens (factors that 
                                                 
44 For a full discussion of the various segregation measures, see: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html 
45 Unfortunately, these MSA level segregation variables do not allow for analysis of Latino 
isolation with regard to anything beyond isolation based on ethnic identification. 
46 These variables were originally run separately and had separate expectations, however, they are 
highly correlated and overly increase the multicollinearity of the model and wipe out the 
statistical effects of each variable. 
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should decrease the extent to which outside institutions attempt to mobilize the 
neighborhood).  Latino Isolation was created using principal components analysis (,pcf in 
STATA).47    
Dependent Variables 
 Citizenship and Immigration status. The CPS includes variables indicating 
whether the respondent is an immigrant, a naturalized immigrant, or if they were born in 
the United States (U.S. born).  Unfortunately, the SCBS does not include this detailed 
information.  The SCBS only includes if the respondent is a citizen or not, but does not 
include information on whether they are an immigrant.   
 English Language Ability.  The CPS only includes data on whether the person 
lives in a home in which Spanish is the only language spoken by adults.  Since the data 
include only adults, this should mean that, at least in the home, the respondent speaks 
only Spanish.  Since it is certainly the case that many respondents may be fluent English 
speakers but choose to speak only Spanish at home, this is not a perfect measure. 
Speaking English only in the home should be an adequate measure and should correlate 
highly with English ability.  The SCBS includes a variable indicating whether the person 
chose to take the survey in English or Spanish.  Since it is likely that respondents will 
choose to take the survey in the language in which they feel most comfortable, this 
variable is used to measure English language proficiency.  
 Socioeconomic Status.  Education and income are included as indicators of 
socioeconomic status.  Education is measured by the number of years of schooling 
                                                 
47 Eigenvalues 2.03, factor loadings: percent Latinos speaking no English in tract: .66; percent 
non-citizens: .91, percent Latino .89. Unfortunately, the SCBS does not include many important 
relevant variables available in the CPS.  For this reason, I replicated all of the models using both 
data sets when possible for validation purposes. The replications were consistently the same and 
did not produce any divergent results. 
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completed by the respondent.  Income is measured as the total household income in 
dollars. 
 Network Diversity. Social network diversity is measured 1 if the respondent 
indicated that they have at least one personal friend that is not Latino.  This variable is 
only included in the SCBS. 
Independent Variables 
 Age. Age is the age of the person at the time of the interview. Only those over the 
age of 18 are included.   
 Year of immigration. Immigrants who have been in the United States longer 
should be more likely to become citizens, and to have learned English.  Thus, the year 
that the respondent immigrated is included in the analysis.  This variable is only available 
in the CPS and is measured as the number of years the immigrant has been in the United 
States relative to her age.  
 Country of Origin.  A great amount of diversity exists in the Latino community.  
Puerto Ricans come to the United States as citizens and thus never face citizenship 
barriers.  Cubans have higher SES in general than other Latino immigrant groups and 
many came to the United States as political refugees. Mexicans are the largest immigrant 
group and generally come to the United States with very low education rates and for 
economic reasons (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003).  Finally, South American 
immigrants such as Brazilians and Chileans often immigrate to the United States with 
high levels of education and move to more integrated locations.  Thus, in these models, I 
control for differences in country of origin.  Dummy variables are included for Mexican, 
Puerto Rican, Central American, and “other Spanish” language country.  Cubans are 
excluded and serve as the comparison group.  
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 Church Attendance, Gender, and Married are all dichotomous variables.  Church 
attendees, women, and married respondents are each coded as one.  
 The distribution of all included variables is included in Appendix B.  In the 
following pages, I first present the results of my logistic and regression equations.  I then 
discuss the substantive implications of these findings.  Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of this research. 
Results 
Residential Context and Citizenship Attainment and English Language Ability 
Does residential segregation decrease naturalization rates and English skills?  To test 
these two questions, I run logistic regression models.  Because immigrants largely attain 
their education in their home country, and more educated immigrants are more likely to 
have the skills necessary for citizenship attainment in the model for naturalization, I 
include a control for education.  Controls are also included for language use, age, and 
year of immigration because English speakers, older immigrants, and those who have 
been in the country longer are also more likely to become citizens.  Being married has 
also been found to increase naturalization rates.  Finally, I include dummy variables for 
the country of origin of the immigrant, using Cubans as the comparison group.  Puerto 
Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they are citizens.  Since Latino immigrants 
may move to more segregated areas as a result of social network recruitment and because 
it helps them get established when they first arrive, I run analyses separately for U.S. 
born Latinos and Latino immigrants.  For the model for English use, I control for age, 
gender, year of immigration (for the immigrant model), marriage, and country of origin.  
Education is not included in the model for U.S. born Latinos because the directionality of 
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this variable is unclear.  While higher levels of education should increase English 
language ability, having better English skills is also critical to achieving an education in 
the United States. For U.S. born citizens, English skills are a common determinant of 
educational attainment.48  
Table 4.2 presents the results of the models for citizenship and English language 
ability. For each of the logistic models, I present both the logit coefficients and the 
change in predicted probability for a one-unit increase in the independent variable.  
Model A presents the results for naturalization rates among Latino immigrants.  
Controlling for all other factors, immigrants who live in residentially segregated 
metropolitan areas are less likely to naturalize.  For each one-unit increase in residential 
segregation of the immigrant’s metropolitan area, the likelihood of naturalizing decreases 
by 6 percentage points.  This evidence supports hypothesis one—Latino immigrants in 
residential areas are less likely to naturalize.   
Model B in Table 4.2 tests hypothesis two (English ability) for Latino immigrants.  
Again, a logistic regression model is used and predicted probabilities for a one-unit 
change in the independent variable are presented.  Even controlling for education, income 
and a host of other variables, segregation decreases the likelihood of speaking English for 
Latino immigrants.  For a one-unit increase in segregation, the likelihood that a Latino 
immigrant will speak English decreases by 22 percent. 
 
  
                                                 
48 I also ran the model controlling for education and it did not change the results. 
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N 4192   4771   3232  
Psuedo R2 .27   .09   .04  
Prob>Chi2 .00   .00   .00  
Source: Current Population Survey 
Notes: Sample includes all Latino over the age of 18.   
Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin. 
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As mentioned previously, many Latinos who do not have sufficient English skills 
were born in the United States.  Model C in Table 4.2 tests hypothesis two (English 
ability) on U.S. born Latinos.  U.S. born Latinos who live in segregated areas are less 
likely to speak English than their integrated counterparts.  For a one-unit increase in 
MSA segregation, the likelihood of speaking Spanish goes up by 5 percent.  It appears 
that when Latinos are isolated from English speaking communities, they are less likely to 
learn English or to have opportunities to practice their English skills. 
 
Residential Segregation and Socioeconomic Mobility 
 Table 4.3 presents the results for a test of hypothesis three (socioeconomic 
mobility).  I test this hypothesis using three dependent variables—the likelihood of being 
a high school drop out, overall educational achievement, and income.  Model D presents 
the effect of residential segregation and control variables on the likelihood of being a 
high school dropout.  This model is only run with U.S. born Latinos.  
 Latinos who live in residentially segregated cities are more likely to drop out of 
high school.  For a one-unit increase in residential segregation, the likelihood of not 
completing high school goes up by 6 percentage points.  Segregated Latinos are also 
more likely to end their educational career earlier on a continuous scale.  For a one-unit 
increase in segregation, Latino educational attainment decreases by .22.49 
 Model F shows the affect of segregation on income.  Even controlling for 
education and other relevant variables, Latinos living in residentially isolated locations 
make less money than their more integrated counterparts.  A one-unit increase in 
                                                 
49 The affect of segregation remains significant if I only include those ages 17-25 in the model.  I 
ran this test to check that the effect was not a product of people with low levels of education 
living together after they received their education.  
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segregation results in over a full unit decrease in income.  Immigrant Latinos (Model G) 
appear to suffer slightly less than their U.S. born counterparts as a result of segregation.  
However, they too make less in segregated environments.  The smaller coefficient is 
likely a product of the more constrained incomes of immigrant Latinos (Waldinger 2001). 
 So far, the evidence suggests that segregated housing patterns are having a 
detrimental effect on Latino individual outcomes.  The evidence indicates that if 
residential segregation continues on its current trajectory, Latinos may in fact become a 
new “underclass.”  However, part of the critical development of the underclass for 
African Americans was their social distance from whites.  Since whites and African 
Americans did not interact, whites viewed African Americans as unworthy “others” and 
African Americans lacked the access to critical information held only in white 
communities (such as job opportunities, etc) (Wilson 1996; Massey and Denton 1995; 
Carr & Kutty 2008).50  Social integration is critical to Latinos for the same reasons. 
                                                 
50 Of course this does raise a question of directionality.  Did whites not interact with African 
Americans because they viewed them negatively or did negative views drive whites to fear 
interaction with African Americans?  In my view it is most likely reciprocal.  While whites may 
not interact with minorities due to stereotypes, those stereotypes are exacerbated by a lack of 
interaction with minorities. 
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N 6387  3651 3191 4099 
R-
Square/Pseudo 
R-Square .09  .04 .18 .14 
F Prob>Chi2 .00  .00 .00 .00 
Source: Current Population Survey 
Notes: Sample includes all Latinos born in the United States over the age of 18.   
Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin. 
Cells are Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses for High 
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Residential Segregation and Social Network Diversity 
 Table 4.4 presents a test of Hypothesis four—social network diversity.  For this 
model, I turn to the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000.  In this model I 
include a control for church attendance because church attendance has been shown to 
constrain social networks for some immigrant groups (Foley and Hoge 2007).   The 
results show that Latinos of higher socioeconomic status, citizens, and English speakers 
are all more likely to have diverse social networks that include non-Latinos.  Controlling 
for all of these factors, living in a residentially segregated area greatly decreases the 
chances of having a diverse social network.  This model supports my theory that Latinos 
who live in residential isolation will have limited access to information that is not 
contained within their all-Latino social networks. In addition, this model supports the 
thesis that residential segregation increases geographic and social distance between 
groups. 
Substantive Implications 
 In order to investigate the substantive impact of segregation on the different 
variables of interest, I calculated predicted outcomes for each dependent variable.  The 
results are presented in Table 4.5.  For these calculations, I use Hanmer’s (2007) method 
for calculating predicted outcomes for each individual, setting all other variables at their 
actual values.  Following this method, I present the average predicted outcome for the 
sample, setting the segregation at three different values: low-segregation (minimum 
observed segregation value), mid segregation (half way point), and high segregation 
(maximum observed segregation value).  
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English Speaker .87* 
(.14) 
.17 



























N 1831  
Psuedo-Rsquare .15  
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 
Notes: Sample includes all Latinos born in the United States over 
the age of 18.   
Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin. 
Cells are Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in 
parentheses for High School Drop out model and OLS 
coefficients for Overall Education model. 
*p<.05 
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 Table 4.5 presents these results.  The first row presents how residential 
segregation affects the probability of becoming a U.S. citizen for Latino immigrants.  The 
average Latino in the data set has a 14% likelihood of naturalizing in a low segregation 
area.  However, as segregation increases, that rate declines significantly, dropping to 
below 10 percent in a high segregation area, a decrease of five percentage points.  While 
this may not seem like a large decrease in naturalization rates, we must consider the 
quantity of people a change of this magnitude would affect. According to the U.S. 
Census, today there are 21 million non-citizen immigrants currently residing in the 
United States, and the vast majority of non-citizen immigrants are Latino.  Given this 
number, a decrease of five percent is quite meaningful.  So, even small changes in the 
relative probability of naturalization have large consequences in terms of actual people. 
 The second and third rows present the likelihood of speaking only Spanish at 
home.   The predicted probability that an average native-born Latino will speak only 
Spanish in a low segregation area is only 2 percent, whereas in a high segregation area it 
increases to 7 percent. Again, considering the large population of Latinos born in the 
United States each year, even this low probability is significant.  Further, this measure 
only captures speaking only Spanish, so it does not capture the degree to which 
segregation may increase the probability of U.S. Born Latinos being a limited English 
speaker.    
 Not surprisingly, the effect of segregation on immigrants is much stronger.  
Latino immigrants have an average predicted probability of speaking only Spanish in low 
segregation areas of 27 percent, whereas in high segregation areas, the probability 
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increases to 50 percent.  In short, Latino immigrants are almost twice as likely to speak 
only Spanish if they live in a highly segregated area as if they live in a highly integrated 
area. 














27% 38% 50% 
Speaking Spanish 
Only  
(U.S. Born only) 
2% 5% 7% 
Dropping out  
 
18% 21% 25% 
Income  















Friendship Diversity 82% 75% 60% 
Civic Engagement 29% 22% 16% 
  
 The consequences of segregation on education and income are quite striking.  In 
general, the table shows that Latinos have relatively high drop out rates and low incomes 
across the board, but this situation is exacerbated by segregation.  In highly integrated 
areas, Latinos have just under a one in five chance of not completing high school.  In 
highly segregated areas, this ratio drops to a one in four chance of dropping out—a seven 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of dropping out.  In short, living in integrated 
areas does seem to increase the chances of at least making it out of high school.   
 The predicted U.S born Latino family income in a highly segregated area is 
between $20-24,000, whereas in integrated areas, the average is almost $10,000 more.  
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The average predicted income for an immigrant family in an integrated area is $20-
24,000 but in a segregated area that figure decreases to $15-19,000.  In effect, segregation 
appears to lead to Latino families being much more likely to live below the poverty line. 
 The implications of segregation on the friendship diversity and civic engagement 
of Latinos is strikingly large.  Latinos have an 82 percent chance of having at least one 
friend who is not Latino in low segregation areas.  In highly segregated areas, that 
number decreases to 60 percent.  While still greater than a fifty-fifty chance of having a 
non-Latino friend, segregation obviously impedes social network diversity for Latinos. 
Discussion 
 Previous research has shown that residential segregation constrains the 
socioeconomic mobility of African Americans (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1995).  
As a result of socioeconomic inequality and segregation, African Americans and whites 
had little meaningful interaction, resulting in social distance and unequal opportunity.  
Historically, other minorities in the United States, including Latinos and Asians, have 
been far less segregated than African Americans, but times have changed.  As of 2000, 
Latinos were on their way to becoming the most segregated minority in the United States 
(Timberlake and Iceland 2007). 
 As a result of an increase in Latino immigration, Latinos have become the largest 
minority in the United States.  As their numbers have grown, they have become more 
similar to African Americans with regard to their political status in the United States.  
Politicians have made Latino immigration a major element to their campaigns, framing 
the immigration debate in “us versus them” terms and using language that defines Latinos 
as “invaders” of the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003) who will depress 
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wages and take jobs from American citizens (Morris 1993).  Latinos now experience 
housing discrimination at a rate similar to African Americans (National Fair Housing 
Alliance 2003; Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2006).  As a result of many factors, Latinos now 
live in more concentrated environments than ever before and if the current trend 
continues, Latinos will surpass African Americans as the most segregated minority group 
in the United States within the next decade (Timberlake and Iceland 2007).  
 The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that increased segregation of the 
Latino American community is taking its toll.  Latinos immigrants who live in isolated 
areas are less likely to naturalize and both Latino immigrants and the U.S. born are less 
likely to learn English as a result of segregation.  By not becoming citizens, Latino 
immigrants are not able to take advantage of many basic rights U.S. citizens take for 
granted (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003).  In addition, they are unable to qualify for 
basic social services or receive compensation for lost wages, even when they pay income 
taxes (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003).  Importantly, beyond a few locales that have 
allowed immigrants to participate in local elections, non-citizens are formally locked out 
of the most fundamental elements of democracy—most importantly, voting.   Elected 
officials respond to active constituencies (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993).  When 
residential areas lack participatory groups, elected officials can more easily ignore the 
needs of Latino residents and divert resources to more demanding communities. 
 This chapter has also shown that Latino socioeconomic mobility is being 
constrained by segregation.  Latinos living in segregated communities are more likely to 
drop out of high school, end their educational careers earlier, and make less money.  
Unfortunately, these are the very tools that contribute to the making of the underclass.  
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As Waldinger and Feliciano (2004, 395) ask ,“if less skilled immigrants make up a 
working poor, locked into low wage jobs, and therefore confined to inner cities and their 
failing school systems, can we expect that their U.S.-born-and-raised children will find 
progress?”  
 Without policies that integrate schools, if not neighborhoods, segregated Latino 
children will be confined to schools without resources and with more challenged 
students.  Impoverished segregated schools not only have to educate children but also 
confront the symptoms of poverty—lack of health care, nutrition, high mobility rates, and 
frequent absence.  School segregation not only denies these children resources but also 
the access to “social networks that can help them escape poverty by linking to the world 
of economic and social success” (McKoy and Vincent 2008, 129).  Diverse economic and 
racial social networks bring role models, information, and social capital not available in 
other isolated schools (Briggs 1998; Cattell 2001).   
 The final finding of this paper is pessimistic as to the future of integrated social 
networks.  Latinos living in isolated areas are much less likely to report having a non-
Latino friend.  Segregation constrains social connections and social connections continue 
to have meaningful implications for information distribution (McPhereson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook 2001).  As segregation increases in the United States, people’s knowledge 
about other groups will decline because they will lack quality interaction with people 
unlike themselves.  Unfortunately, social distance often accompanies misunderstanding 
and the escalation of nega tive stereotypes (Welch et al. 1999).  Moreover, without access 
to information held by non-Latinos, Latino political participation may continue to lag 
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behind other racial groups.  In order to increase participation, interaction with groups that 
advocate participation may be critical to their political future. 
 This chapter also contributes to the literature on contextual effects and racial 
segregation.  Since the publication of Massey and Denton’s American Apartheid (1993), 
segregation has primarily been considered a problem only for African Americans.  As 
Massey and Denton note, “No other group in the contemporary United States comes close 
to this level of isolation within urban society.” The process of Latino socioeconomic 
integration is often considered to mirror the integration and assimilation process of 
European immigrants.  Scholars have begun to question the applicability of the classic 
assimilation model instead proposing models of “segmented assimilation” (South et al. 
2005) or “downward assimilation” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).  These alternative models 
portray the children of Latino immigrants as declining from the modest starting position 
of their parents into a “new rainbow underclass…at the bottom of society” (Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001: 45).  While no model of immigrant acculturation is sufficient, 
understanding how context constrains the choices and opportunities available to 
immigrants and their children is critical to our understanding of the future of the Latino 
population.   
 Finally, the experience of segregation and isolation among African Americans 
proves not to be unique.  Latinos also suffer when they are separated from the majority 
group.  If Latinos are less likely to participate when they are residentially removed from 
society, than whole areas of the country will be made up of residents who lack political 
voice.  Moreover as the population of non-voters in the United States proliferates, 
democracy will be at risk.   
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 Using the findings presented above, in the next chapter, I investigate how 
segregation affects political participation both directly and indirectly through 
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Chapter 5: Latino Segregation and Political Participation 
 Citizens express their political preferences by voting in local, state and national 
elections, and engaging in numerous other political acts, like emailing or calling their 
elected officials, working for candidates who inspire them, and going to meetings to 
discuss community issues.  It is through activities such as these that elected officials 
gauge the preferences of their constituents and are alerted to community problems in 
need of redress.  Representational inequality festers when different groups express their 
political voices at different rates and at different decibels.  As can be seen in Figure 5.1, 
almost 60 percent of Latinos reported participating in no political activities in 2000 (non- 
voting) compared to about 40 percent of whites and African Americans and far fewer 
Latinos register to vote or actually turn out to the polls once they are registered than other 
groups.  As a result, Latino political voices remain relatively muted.  They participate in 
all political activities at levels far below that of either African Americans or whites and as 
a result, despite recent gains, Latinos remain under-represented in government 
institutions (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005; NALEO 2007).   
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Figure 5.1 Political Participation by Race and Ethnicity 
 
Source: Citizen Participation Survey 2000 and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 
 
 Representation can translate into real benefits for minority populations, whether 
through the allocation of civil service jobs, city contracts, or the psychological, 
representational, and educational benefits that come from descriptive representation 
(Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gay 2002; 
Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Mansbridge 1999).  For these reasons the 
historical participation gap between Latinos and other Americans has important 
implications for all levels of the policy making process as well as the social mobility of 
the Latino population.  Previous studies have investigated various reasons for Latino non-
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participation, including their aggregate lower socioeconomic status (Buehler 1977; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980); cultural characteristics, including English- language 
acquisition, recent immigration, and continuing attachment to homelands (Calvo and 
Rosenstone 1989; Jones-Correa 2006; Lien 1994; MacManus and Cassel 1988; Uhlaner, 
Cain, and Kiewiet 1989); and finally their social institutions and factors associated with 
mobilization  (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Skerry 1993; Wong 2006), but none that 
I know of have attempted to create a causal path that takes into account the relationship 
between each of these variables and the location in which Latinos live.  
 Building on the findings of the previous two chapters, in this chapter, I explore 
the direct and indirect effects of Latino residential context and political participation.  I 
argue that residential segregation inhibits political participation because it constrains 
socioeconomic mobility and isolates Latinos from diverse discussion networks and 
civically active communities.  Thus, residential segregation indirectly decreases 
participation by constraining socioeconomic mobility and social integration.  This thesis 
directly challenges previous research positing that segregation benefits the development 
of political participation (see esp., Campbell 2006; Putnam 2007) (but also see, Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999)—
research that downplays the importance of socioeconomic mobility and social integration 
and relies on the supposition that all homogenous contexts foster political and civic 
participation as a social norm.   
Here, I present a theoretical model of the role of residential segregation in Latino 
civic engagement, interest in political affairs, and political participation.  My findings 
indicate that Latino segregation directly decreases civic engagement and indirectly 
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decreases political participation by constraining socioeconomic mobility, social network 
diversity, civic engagement, and political interest.  These are the channels through which 
residential segregation decreases civic and political participation in the Latino 
community.  By constraining life choices, social networks, and the development of civic 
engagement, Latinos are denied political information and do not develop the interest in 
politics that is necessary to stimulate meaningful political participation. 
As I showed in the last two chapters, Latinos in segregated neighborhoods have 
fewer opportunities to attain the skills necessary for civic and political participation, such 
as those gained through socioeconomic mobility, and through diverse friendship 
networks.   Latino immigrants, more than any other group, may rely on “weak ties” (or 
ties to networks of people with a longer history in the United States) such as those 
attained through religious, voluntary, and employment related civic institutions.  Also, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, a significant proportion of the population in concentrated 
immigrant neighborhoods is legally barred from voting and participating in politics 
through institutionalized means and may fear participation or feel they are not allowed to 
participate in other matters which involve government institutions (i.e., writing elected 
officials, protesting, etc.).  This perceived inability to participate should further decrease 
political discussion, political knowledge and the potential for mobilization.   
In this chapter I investigate civic engagement as well as political engagement 
because, civic institutions are helpful for increasing political knowledge, interest, and the 
motivation to participate in political affairs.  Civic activities cultivate the discussion of 
community relevant issues and how they are affected by political decisions and 
government policies.  Being in these settings makes the connection between the actions 
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of politicians and government agencies and community outcomes easier to understand.  
In short, civic activity, while not political per se, should increase political knowledge and 
interest and therefore participation.  Moreover, civic activities increase both of the key 
factors associated with political participation: motivation and capacity (Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1993, 3).  Since political activity is voluntary in the U.S., all 
citizens must want to participate (i.e., motivation) and have the skills necessary to 
participate (i.e., capacity). 
Figure 5.2 shows the theoretical path and makes clear that the majority of the 
effect of residential segregation on political participation should work indirectly via 
socioeconomic factors, social networks, political knowledge and interest, and civic 
engagement.  The first few stages in the model were shown in the previous two chapters.  
Latinos in segregated contexts are more likely to have lower SES and more constrained 
social networks.  Here I look at the final stages in the model: civic engagement, political 
interest, and finally political participation and incorporate a structural equation model. 
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Data, Methods, and Measurement 
 The data for this chapter are derived from two sources.   First and foremost, I 
employ restricted data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 
(SCBS).  The Saguaro Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University compiled this data set in 2000.  It includes a national survey of 3,000 people 
and an additional 42,000 respondents in 42 “communities” inside the United States.  The 
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enabling the researcher to link the individual respondents to the characteristics of their 
neighborhood as provided by the U.S. Census.  For this chapter, because it is possible to 
do so, I maximize this information and use information generated from census tracts.  
While not a perfect indicator of neighborhoods, census tracts are usually a relatively good 
proxy for neighborhoods because they normally follow visible features, and often 
governmental unit boundaries and other non-visible features. 
 Following methodology used by Walker (2008), Brehm and Rahn (1997), 
Scheufele, et al. (2006), Asher (1988) and others, a structural equation model (SEM) 
using the statistical program EQS (Byrne 2006) was developed to test a theoretical model 
of Latino political participation.  Structural equation modeling was chosen because it 
allows the researcher to see both direct and indirect effects of variables of interest.  The 
heavy reliance on single equation, unidirectional OLS and MLE regression techniques 
have obscured the relative importance of context and other variables whose effects are 
masked by the inclusion of such potent indicators as political interest and civic 
engagement.  By using a SEM approach, I am able to parcel out how residential context 
restrains the development of these key mediating factors and thereby indirectly affect the 
likelihood of participation.  
 The relationships of the variables are portrayed graphically in Figure 5.2.  Each 
arrow in Figure 5.2 represents an empirically tested hypothesis.  As depicted the model 
contains eight endogenous variables—socioeconomic status, citizenship, English 
language ability, church attendance, friendship diversity, civic engagement, political 
interest, and finally political participation.  The dichotomous nature of some of the 
dependent variables violates the assumptions of MLE and OLS regression used in many 
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SEMs.  EQS allows the ana lyst to notify the program as to which variables are 
categorical and take into account the non- linear distribution, which could otherwise 
produce biased estimates (Finney and DiStefano 2006, but also see Byrne 2006, Chapter 
5). 
 
Measurement and Coding of Variables 
Residential Context 
Generated from the census, I include a “Latino Isolation” measure to estimate the 
extent to which Latinos are isolated into segregated neighborhoods and lack exposure to 
other communities.  The measure is a factor score of three tract- level variables: percent 
Latino living in the census tract, percent of the Latino population in that tract that speaks 
no English, and the percent of the tract that is not a citizen (alpha .7), as was employed in 
the previous chapter.51  This factor captures not only the extent to which the individual 
lives in a largely Latino area but the extent to which they are isolated among Spanish 
speakers and non-citizens (factors that should decrease the extent to which outside 
institutions attempt to mobilize the neighborhood).  Latino Isolation was created using 
principal components analysis (,pcf in STATA).52   I also include a dummy variable for if 
the neighborhood is located in the southern United States defined as the states of the 
confederacy. 
 
Individual variables and Socioeconomic Status 
 
                                                 
51 Each of these variables were included in the model separately, however, they are highly 
correlated and measure one theoretical concept.  
52 Eigenvalues 2.03, factor loadings: percent Latinos speaking no English in tract: .66; percent 
non-citizens: .91, percent Latino .89. 
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 I include five individual measures: citizenship status, English language ability, 
income, and education and age.53  Unfortunately the SCBS 2000 does not include any 
variable indicating if the Latino respondent is an immigrant.  Thus, I can only control for 
if the respondent is a citizen.  Citizen is coded 1 if the individual is a United States 
citizen.  English language ability is measured by if they took the survey in Spanish or in 
English.  This variable is coded 1 if they took the survey in English.  While this measure 
is not a perfect indicator of how well the individual understands and is capable of 
speaking English, it at least should capture which language they feel more comfortable 
speaking.  In any case, both the citizenship and the language variables used in this 
chapter should be seen as conservative tests of the theory given both should have 
increased measurement error, which should decrease the size of the coefficient and the 
potential for statistical significance.  Originally, nation of origin was included in the 
models.  The SCBS only has indicators for Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, and “other.”  
However, when they were included in the model, they were consistently insignificant, 
and given the limitations of the categories, they were dropped from the model. 
 Socioeconomic status is a factor score of two variables: education and income.  It 
was generated using principal components analysis.54  
 
Social Network Diversity and Civic Engagement  
 
                                                 
53 Because the Latino population in the United States is younger than the total population, it has a 
skewed distribution. To account for this, I employ the natural log of the age variable. 
54 Education is measured as the number of years of formal education the respondent received.  It 
ranges from less than a high school education to graduate degree.  Income is measured as the 
respondent’s answer to their household income and ranges from under $20,000 to over $100,000.  
Eigenvalue: 1.42, factor loadings: income: .84; education: .84. 
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 To account for the potential effects of social network diversity, I include a 
variable that is measured 1 if the respondent indicated that they have at least one personal 
friend that is not Latino.  Church attendance is measured as 1 if the individual attends 
church and 0 otherwise.  The variable to measure civic engagement is a composite score 
of the number of non-political groups and events the person participated in.   
 
Political Interest and Participation 
 
 Political Interest is measured as the respondents answer to the question: “How 
interested are you in politics and national affairs? Are you very interested, somewhat 
interested, only slightly interested, or not at all interested?” 
 Political Participation is measured in three ways: voter registration, voting, and 
non-voting political activity.  Voter Registration is coded as 1 if the individual indicated 
they were registered to vote.  Models using this variable are run only on individuals who 
also indicated that they were citizens.  Voting is coded 1 if the individual indicated that 
they voted in the 1996 presidential election.  Models using this variable are only run on 
individuals who are citizens and registered to vote.  Finally, political participation is 
measured as an index to 7 questions regarding non-electoral political activity including 
signing a petition, attending political meetings or rallies, joining in any demonstrations, 
protests, boycotts, or marches, involvement in local reform efforts, membership in 
political groups, ethnic, nationality, or civil rights groups, or labor unions.55 A full 
explanation of each variable is available in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
55 This variable is the “Protest” variable provided in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000. 
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Methodology 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the nature of the SEM to be estimated.  Following past 
efforts at developing causal models of participation, I separate my variables into six 
“causal stages.”  In the first stage are the residential characteristics of the neighborhood, 
as measured by the Latino isolation factor and the southern state dummy variable.  Age is 
also included in the first stage as a control variable.  In the second stage are 
sociodemographic characteristics that are exogenous to social network diversity and civic 
and political participation.  This includes socioeconomic status as well as citizenship and 
English language ability. The next two stages posit a causal ordering between various 
types of social and civic integration.  Occupying the third stage is church attendance.   
The fourth stage is social network diversity.  The fifth stage contains non-political civic 
engagement.  The sixth stage is interest in political affairs and the seventh stage, or 
outcome, is political participation.   
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Although the figure includes causal arrows only from one stage to the stage 
immediately following it, I allow the variables in each causal stage to have direct and 
indirect effects on the variables in all of the subsequent stages, as in Figure 4.2.  Based on 
(1) Residential Characteristics and Controls 
(Residential segregation, southern residency, age) 
(2) Socioeconomic Fortunes 
(Citizenship, English Language, Socioeconomic Status) 
 
(3) Church Attendance 
(Attends Church) 
 
(4) Social Network Diversity 
(Non-Latino friends) 
 
(5) Civic Engagement 
(Civic Engagement Factor Score) 
 
(6) Political Awareness 
(Political Interest) 
 
(7) Political Participation 
(Political participation factor, Voting, Voter 
Registration) 
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these estimates, I compute the direct, indirect, and total effects of the various indicators 
on political participation and display those effects in Tables 5.1-5.3.   
 
Results 
What drives Latino participation?  Table 5.1 presents the direct effects of all the 
variables included in the SEM.  By looking at this model we can see that Latinos who are 
citizens, have higher SES, are civically engaged, and who are interested in politics are 
more likely to participate in political affairs. Also, Latinos living in the South and older 
Latinos are much less likely to participate.  As expected, the largest effects on 
participation are derived from civic engagement and political awareness.  Like other 
racial groups, Latinos are most likely to be recruited to participate in political activities 
and to develop an interest in politics when they are active in non-political civic activities 
(Walker 2008).  The effect of this variable is considerable.  For a one-unit increase in 
civic activity, Latino political participation increases by .283, when holding all other 
variables at their means.  Likewise, Latinos who have an interest in politics are much 
more likely to participate.  A one-unit increase in political interest results in a .218 
increase in political activity, holding all other variables constant.  Given the large direct 
impact of these two factors on political participation, how Latinos gain political interest 
and become involved in civic activities is critical to understand.  
However, by including all variables in a single model without specifying the 
structural nature of the variables, this model overlooks the potential impact that 
contextual and individual characteristics have via their affect on the factors that appear 
the most relevant—SES, civic engagement, and political interest.  By relying solely on 
 
 164  
the direct effects, we can not investigate the relationship between the contextual variables 
and the dependent variables of interest and how segregation constrains the causes of 
participation.  Thus, the model is misspecified.  The theory in this paper lies out that the 
variables included in Table 5.1 are related in a causal path.  Thus, all the indicators in the 
model should affect participation indirectly.   
Table 5.1 Direct Effects of All Variables on Political Participation 
   
 Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Political Interest .218** .023 
Civic Engagement .283** .012 
Friendship Diversity -.028 .043 
Church Attendance .045 .046 
SES .078** .031 
Citizenship .091 .051 
English  .088 .050 
South -.274** .051 
Age (logged) -.170** .062 
Residential Isolation .002 .014 
N 1903  
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS.  The entries are unstandardized 
coefficients and standard errors.   
Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not 
substantively different. 
**Significant p<.05 
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 
 
Table 5.2 presents the structural equation model for political participation.  The 
models are presented in the order in which they appear in the specified path.  First 
isolation, south, and age are used to predict, SES, citizenship, and English language 
ability.  Next, each of these variables is included in a model predicting church attendance, 
then church attendance is added to the model to predict friendship diversity and so forth 
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until all the variables are included in the model for participation.  The variables in each 
model include their direct, indirect, and total effects for the endogenous variable. 
How does residential segregation affect the political participation rates of Latinos 
in the United States? In order to understand this question, we must understand the affect 
of residential segregation on the critical factors associated with participation.   
As shown in the previous chapter, residential isolation drastically decreases 
Latino socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English language acquisition.  Controlling 
for age and southern residency, a one unit increase in residential isolation, results in a .03 
decrease in socioeconomic status, a decrease of .8 in the likelihood of knowing English, 
and a .07 decrease in the likelihood of becoming a citizen.  Looking at church attendance, 
the model shows that Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are more likely to attend 
church, although the impact of segregation on church attendance is largely indirect via 
the negative affect segregation has on individual socioeconomic status, citizenship, and 
English ability.  As Model 4 shows, higher socioeconomic status Latinos are less likely to 
attend church, as are citizens and those who speak English well.  Since residential 
segregation decreases these factors, it has a robustly positive indirect effect on church 
attendance. 
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Table 5.2 Structural Equation Model of Latino Political Participation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 SES Citizenship English Church Attendance Friendship Diversity 
 Direct Direct Direct Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Church 
Attendance  





  -.09** 
(.01) 





  -.13** 
(.02) 





  -.10** 
(.03) 











.031 -.090** -.01 
(.03) 
.036** -.045 





















.030** .034** -.02** 
(.007) 
-.034** -.050** 
N 1907         
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS.  The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.  
Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.   
**Significant p<.05 
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 
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Table 5.2b Structural Equation Model of Latino Political Participation (Continued) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Civic Engagement Political Interest Political Participation 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Political 
Interest 





   .07** 
(.009) 







 .568** .19** 
(.03) 







-.020 -1.05** -.16** 
(.05) 





.144** .834** .22** 
(.027) 





.188** .504** .10 
(.05) 





.212** .688** .03 
(.06) 





-.088 -.058 .03 
(.06) 
-.019 .007 -.27** 
(.05) 
.038 -.312** 
Age (logged) .30 
(.16) 
.245** .544** .29** 
(.06) 







-.213** -.294** .02 
(.015) 
-.075** -.056** .002 
(.014) 
-.116** -.114** 
N 1907         
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS.  The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.  
Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different. 
**Significant p<.05 
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 
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As hypothesized, and as shown in the previous chapter, despite technological 
innovations and the relative ease of modern transportation, Latinos living in isolated 
neighborhoods are also less likely to have diverse friendship networks (Model 5).  In 
addition to the direct effect of isolation on social network diversity, residential isolation 
also indirectly constrains friendship diversity because higher SES individuals, citizens 
and English speakers are all more likely to have diverse social networks.   
Model 6 in Table 5.2b shows the impact of residential segregation on civic 
engagement.  Civic engagement is critical to the vitality of neighborhoods.  When 
citizens are involved in non-political community activities, social capital grows and 
neighborhoods are safer.  Further, individuals within engaged neighborhoods are 
healthier, happier, and less at risk for economic hardship (Putnam 2000).  These data 
suggest that residential isolation will have a negative effect on the vitality of Latino 
neighborhoods.  Residential isolation directly decreases civic engagement.  Controlling 
for all other factors, a Latino living in an isolated neighborhood is less likely to 
participate in civic affairs.  The indirect affect of isolation is extremely large.  By 
constraining socioeconomic mobility, citizenship, English language acquisition and 
friendship diversity, segregation further decreases civic engagement.  The total effect of a 
one-unit increase in segregation is a decrease of .294 in civic activity. 
Being interested in politics is the foundation for political participation.  
Individuals who are interested in politics tend to follow the news more and discuss 
politics more, which increases both their knowledge about political affairs and their 
ability to use heuristics and to understand political information (Neuman 1986; 
Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura 2006).  The effect of residential segregation is entirely 
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indirect.  Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are less likely to be interested in 
politics, but it is because they have low levels of friendship diversity, SES, citizenship, 
and English proficiency—all of which are lower in segregated neighborhoods.  
Friendship diversity appears to be very important to the development of political interest.  
Latinos who have diverse social networks are much more likely to be interested in 
political affairs.  This gives support to the idea that isolated Latino social networks lack 
access to political information.  Latinos with access to bridging social ties—social 
contacts that “bridge” to social networks otherwise inaccessible—are able to access 
political information that their social networks otherwise lack.  Civic engagement is also 
critical to the development of political interest.  Latinos involved in civic activities are 
more likely to be involved in conversations about political affairs and to gain an 
understanding of the link between community concerns and politics (Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995). 
Model 8 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of each variable in the SEM 
model on political participation.  The direct effects are identical to those presented in 
Table 5.1.  When socioeconomic status, political interest, and civic engagement increase, 
so too does political participation.  Latinos who are engaged in non-political civic 
activities are likely to be recruited to participate in political affairs (Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995; Wong 2006).  The effect of friendship diversity is also critical, but its 
effect is indirect.  Since Latinos with more diverse social networks are more likely to be 
engaged in civic activities and to be interested in politics, they are more likely to 
participate in politics.  The same is true for residential isolation.  While segregation does 
not directly decrease political participation, by constraining the factors that are critical to 
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participation, segregation severely curtails the potential for participation in Latino 
neighborhoods.  Residential segregation denies Latinos the ability to learn about politics 
and to come into contact with politically active social networks.  Thus, instead of 
residential homogeneity increasing the civic norms associated with high levels of 
political participation (i.e., Putnam 2007; Campbell 2006); it denies them the ability to 
become active participants in the democratic process. 
Table 5.3 presents a summary view of how residential isolation affects all of the 
critical indicators in the path to participation.  Either indirectly or directly, segregation 
negatively affects socioeconomic mobility, and social and political incorporation.  
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Table 5.3 Effects of Isolation on Political Participation 
Direct effects of Isolation  Indirect Effects of 
Isolation 



































(.014)   -.116 ** -.114 ** 
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS.  The entries are unstandardized coefficients and 
standard errors.  
Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively 
different.   
**Significant p<.05 
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 
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Table 5.4. Structural Equation Model of Latino Voter Registration and Voting 
 Model 10 Model 11 
 Registration Voted 









































.005 .026 -.006 
(.04) 
-.005 .011 
Age (logged) .21** 
(.03) 







-.016** -.021** -.01 
(.01) 
-.027** -.038** 
N 1277   902   
Fit       
Note: Cell entries represent MLE estimates in EQS with Robust Standard Errors.  The 
entries are unstandardized coefficients. 
**Significant p<.05 
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 
 
Table 5.4 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of the SEM on voter 
registration and voting.  In model 9, the dependent variable is voter registration. This 
model includes only Latinos who are citizens.  The dependent variable in model 10 is 
voting in the 1996 election. This model includes only Latino citizens who are registered 
to vote.  The effects of residential segregation are consistent in these models as well and 
largely replicate the findings of Model 8.  Although largely indirectly, Latinos living in 
isolated areas are less likely to register to vote and to vote once they are registered.  
Voting is the most equal and accessible political act (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
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1995), thus voting is critical to the future of the Latino political voice.  Neighborhoods 
with high voter turnout receive more attention from elected officials and parties 
(Gershtenson 2003), as such there is a reciprocal relationship—neighborhoods that 
participate receive more attention, which increases their participation in the future.  Local 
and state elected officials, particularly in one party areas, bend at the will of “super 
voters.”  These elected officials hold the purse strings for critical public services 
important to the Latino community.  Without their ear, Latinos are unlikely to see 
funding for the policies they need most. 
Discussion  
Briefly, it is important to consider why the factors that residential segregation 
constrains are important for political participation.  Doing so paints a picture of the 
conditions of the Latino population in the United States.  As discussed in-depth in the 
previous chapter and as replicated here, immigrant Latinos in isolated areas are less likely 
to become citizens.  Citizenship’s effect on Latino participation is significant, but also 
only indirectly.  Citizens are more likely to have non-Latino friends, and to be involved 
in civic activities.  Citizenship also has an additional indirect effect on civic engagement, 
channeled primarily through social network diversity.  Since citizens are more likely to 
have diverse social networks, they are recruited more frequently into civic activities.  
Although there is no direct effect on political interest, citizenship does indirectly increase 
political interest via both network diversity and civic engagement. 
The consequences of English language proficiency are also important and almost 
identical to that of citizenship.  Latinos with proficient English skills are more likely to 
have non-Latino friends and to be involved in civic activities.  English skills also have a 
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critical indirect effect on civic activities.  Channeled through these factors, English 
increases the likelihood of being interested in politics and participating.  The fact that 
there is no direct effect of English skills on political interest indicates that Latinos, who 
do not have full access to English language news and discussion, do still develop an 
interest in politics.  This may be a result of the new investment in Spanish language 
media advertising (Ramos 2005), the extensive political coverage in the Spanish language 
news (television, radio, and print media) and the recent attacks on immigrants, which has 
shown to increase political awareness even among recent immigrants (Pantoja, Ramirez, 
and Segura 2001). 
Socioeconomic status remains critical to the development of all factors associated 
with political participation.  The total impact of low SES is large and significant for every 
indicator of social and political involvement.  Latinos with low SES are less likely to 
have non-Latino friends, to be active in civic activities, and to develop political interest.  
They are also less likely to participate in politics.  This finding presents a pessimistic 
vision of the future of Latino communities.  Socioeconomic segregation in the United 
States is rampant.  The rich and poor are almost as unlikely to live together as individuals 
of different races.  Local land ordinances, once designed to prevent racial minorities from 
purchasing or renting homes in towns, counties, and suburbs, left a legacy of class 
segregation that is unlikely to disappear in the future (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and 
Swanstrom 2001).  However, many lower SES white communities participate far more 
than their socioeconomic status would indicate.  Particularly rural towns with large 
amounts of political agreement appear to have a dedication to civic engagement and as a 
result political activity (Campbell 2006).   
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The situation for low SES Latino communities does not appear to be as bright.   
Latino communities with aggregately low SES are likely to experience a fair amount of 
poverty.  Latinos suffer from poverty rates similar to that of African Americans.  
According to the 2005 supplement to the Current Population Survey, about 22% of 
Latinos were living in poverty as of 2005, compared to 25% of African Americans and 
8.3% for non-Hispanic whites.  These numbers are likely to increase with the recent 
downturn in the economy.  Latinos are more likely to be employed in the construction 
industry than any other racial group (Kochhar 2006).  As new home construction has 
plummeted and home improvements have slowed due to a fluctuating economy, many 
Latinos have lost their employment or have become underemployed, working only 
incrementally.  Thus, low SES Latinos are likely to live among many impoverished 
people as it is and are likely to see increases in neighborhood poverty if the economy 
continues to flat line (or to further decline). Given the effect of SES on civic engagement 
poor Latino neighborhoods may begin to mirror the social disorganization historically 
seen in African American neighborhoods with concentrated poverty (Massey and Denton 
1993; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996).  Gang activity and crime thrive in poverty-ridden, 
densely-populated areas.  If neighborhoods are unable to bond together and fight off these 
threats and provide help and assistance to each other, collectively each individual is likely 
to suffer. 
Friendship diversity is also critical for cross-cultural understanding.  Diverse 
social networks not only provide for the spread of information, but also help groups 
understand each other and feel less threatened by the presence of “others” (Dixon and 
Rosenbaum 2004; Mutz 2006).  So, on the one hand, segregation decreases access to 
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information about job advancements, innovations, and other information not present in 
Latino communities, it also leads to the development of misunderstandings and 
stereotypes held by the white community. 
The evidence presented in this paper regarding Latino church attendance is 
troubling.  Churches have long been an incubator of community and political activity.  
The role of religion and the church in American politics is critical to understanding 
American political behavior.  But while the church has been an active mobilizing force 
for African American communities, the research presented herein suggests that the 
churches Latinos attend further isolate them from the broader community—fostering 
strong bonding (within group) ties, but prohibiting bridging (between group) ties. When 
Latinos are active in church communities, they appear to be simply less likely to 
participate in non-church political activities and to come into contact with diverse social 
networks (Foley and Hoge 2007).  
 
Conclusion 
The total effects of segregation on the cumulative elements presented in this 
chapter—socioeconomic mobility, friendship diversity, civic engagement, and political 
interest—present a pessimistic view of the future vitality of Latino political participation.  
The statistical analysis presented in this paper is based on data from eight years ago.  
Since that time, segregation has been on the rise (Timberlake and Iceland 2008), and the 
poverty level within Latino communities has increased due to higher unemployment and 
a souring economy (Torrens 2008).  This chapter has shown that the more isolated 
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Latinos are from non-Latinos, the less likely they are to be civically engaged, to be 
interested in political affairs, and to participate in politics.   
This disinterest and non-participation has the potential to have further negative 
effects on Latino communities as federal, state, and local elected officials write them off 
as unnecessary electoral constituencies.  Unfortunately, as poverty in Latino communities 
increases, Latino neighborhoods will need significant investment from policy makers if 
they are to escape the social unrest that typifies so many high poverty neighborhoods. 
Latino neighborhoods will require significant investment in their schools and 
social services if they are to escape poverty.  This support is likely to be dampened the 
more isolated they are from the rest of the community.  Since local and state governments 
operate under significant financial constraints, communities and groups compete for 
services and money for pet projects (Kaufmann 2004; Judd and Swanstrom 2005).  In 
these competitions, the loudest voices tend to win (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  
Environmentally hazardous chemical plants are placed in minority communities, 
particularly immigrant communities (Hunter 2000), because of NIMBY rejections by 
politically engaged white neighborhoods (Hamilton 1995).  New schools and community 
facilities are built in already advantaged neighborhoods because they were organized and 
are rewarded for their support of local officials who wish to avoid political backlash by 
placing coveted new projects in neighborhoods without a critical electoral constituency. 56 
                                                 
56 In one interview that I conducted, a community activist noted that even though the community 
had finally elected a Latino county councilman that the Latino area of town would not get the 
new health center that was planned for the district.  Instead, she argued it would be placed in the 
African American side of town because that was where all the voters were, despite where the 
most sensible place would be to place it given the population the center would serve.  
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Latinos living in isolated conditions are also likely to become disaffected with 
government and lack reasons to participate.  As Melissa Michelson (2003a; 2003b) finds, 
the longer Latinos live in the United States, the far more cynical and disaffected they 
become.   If they are isolated into poor, Spanish speaking communities, this effect is 
likely to be far greater.   As Latinos suffer from neglect from government institutions, 
they may be even less likely to participate because they feel that the government is not 
representative of them, does not care about them, and will not respond to their needs.   
The increase in anti- immigrant/anti-Latino ordinances at the local level is also 
troubling for the future of the Latino community.  Ordinances that target, Latino (or 
potential Latino) homeowners such as maximum occupancy legislation—particularly 
outlawing extended families from living within the same house—and the Latino public, 
such as, English only laws, and attempts to deputize local government officials—and 
sometimes local residents themselves—to become immigration enforcement agents, only 
serve to isolate the Latino community further.  Moreover, recent evidence suggests that 
Latinos are considerably more likely to face housing discrimination by private agents.  
Recent statistics suggest that Latinos face discrimination in 4 out of 5 visits to a rental 
agent (National Fair Housing Alliance 2003), and that Latinos are more than twice as 
likely as whites to be given a subprime, high cost loan—making Latinos more likely to 
face foreclosure and to lose what may be their only investment. 
As segregation increases in the Latino community, it is likely that any relative 
increase in the socioeconomic status of second and third generation Latinos will be 
inhibited and as a result the potential voice of the Latino community will be muted. 
Without significant investments in enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, increased 
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coverage and funding of the Community Reinvestment Act, and state and local policies 
that increase opportunities for minorities to live in diverse environments, the future of 
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Chapter 6:  If They Won’t Do It, We Will: Punitive State Responses 
to Latino Immigration 
  
The previous chapters show that Latinos in the United States, both foreign and 
U.S. born, face arduous hurdles to civic and political participation in U.S. political 
institutions.  Political participation is fundamental to representation in the United States, 
since it is through participation that the polis elects representatives who understand 
community needs and concerns.  The under-representation of minorities and the poor is 
likely to be far greater in state and local elections (see Hajnal 2005; Herring and Forbes 
1994; Vanderleeuw and Engstrom 1987; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002; Vanderleeuw and 
Sowers 2007).57  Minorities have higher rates of voter roll-off—a situation that 
Vanderleeuw and Engstrom (1987) argue makes African Americans and Latinos “doubly 
underrepresented.”  “Not only may the potential voters within such a group turn out to 
vote at a lower rate than those in other groups, but those who do turn out may also 
participate in many of the different elections at a lesser rate” (Vanderleew and Engstrom 
1987, 1091).  Further, given the low media coverage and salience of state and local 
elections, skills that lower the costs of participation are even more important for down-
ballot elections (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993). 
 The implications of voter under-representation and unequal “political voice” at 
the state level are ever more critical in an era of state legislative activism.  State 
                                                 
57 While descriptive representation has been shown to increase co-ethnic turnout in Mayoral races 
(Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barretto 2007; Gay 2001), no research that I know of has investigated if 
mobilization is affected by co-ethnic candidates for state legislature.  Given the low-salience of 
these races, however, it is unlikely that it would have as great an impact as mayoral 
empowerment does, but certainly this is a worthy area of study. 
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legislatures are increasingly taking an active role in areas previously considered to be 
solely under federal jurisdiction, including immigration policy.   
 When Congress failed to pass immigration reform in 2006, the number of states 
introducing anti- immigrant legislation rapidly expanded (NCSL 2007).   As I will 
explain, many of these measures threaten to increase racial profiling, especially against 
Latinos, and could be pernicious to the socioeconomic and physical mobility of the 
Latino community.  In this chapter, I build on the findings of the previous chapters—that 
Latinos face great hurdles to political participation as a result of both low socioeconomic 
status and residential concentration—and examine the policy consequences of muted 
political voice at the state legislative level.  Here, I investigate the relationship between 
demographic and political factors and the introduction and passage of immigration bills 
that increase discrimination against Latinos in employment and law enforcement—what I 
call “punitive” immigration bills.   
 About two-thirds of U.S. states introduced punitive immigration bills in 2007 but 
only a few states implemented their legislation.  Studying the punitive immigration 
reform movement in the American states may provide a glimpse of (1) what legislation 
we should see in states over the next few years if Congress continues to delay 
immigration reform; (2) what accounts for differences in state responses to immigration; 
and (3) the importance of Latino political partic ipation in state politics.  In this chapter I 
ask: what are the political and demographic correlates of punitive immigration reform?  
 In the following pages, I give a brief history of federal immigration policy and 
summarize state and local responses to congressional inaction on immigration reform.  
To explain the politics of immigration at the state level, I introduce four competing 
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theories to explain the different approaches to immigration: the group threat approach, 
the fiscal stress perspective, the ideological polarization model, and the ethnic 
empowerment framework.  Finally, I present preliminary findings using data on bill 
introduction and passage in 2007 and discuss the implications of the results for the utility 
of these models, then conclude by examining some promising directions for future 
research.  
The preliminary data suggest that states that introduce and pass punitive 
immigration bills are, on several measures, significantly different from states that do not.  
Most significantly, introduction and passage states have much higher Latino immigration 
rates than states that do not enact legislation.  Further, states without bill introductions 
spend more on health and education than those who pursue a punitive agenda.  The 
preliminary evidence provides substantial support for a group threat model.  
Federal Responses to Immigration and the Changing Demographics of the U.S. 
  
The federal government has shirked its responsibility to adequately legislate 
immigration matters.  Since the 1990s, it has become clear that the immigration system is 
broken.  According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services), the size of the undocumented population grew by 
over 350,000 people a year in the early 1990s.58  Congress reacted to this wave of 
undocumented immigration by reforming immigration law in 1996.  However, the 
reforms failed to produce any meaningful decrease in the rate of undocumented entrances 
                                                 
58 Calculating the undocumented population is quite difficult.  The most respected way to 
calculate this population appears to be Warrant and Passel’s so-called “residential” method, 
which has been used for several decades.  For a discussion of how these numbers are calculated 
see Passell (2002). 
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to the U.S. and may have actually boosted it by failing to address the demand for 
immigrant labor (Massey, Durant, and Malone 2003).  From 1996 to 1999, the 
undocumented population grew on average by about 500,000 people per year, consisting 
primarily of immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras 
(Migration Policy Institute 2003).  The impact of this growth was felt in both traditional 
immigrant gateways and in places unequipped to deal with such a sizeable increase.  
Arkansas, Tennessee, and South Carolina, each of which had an undocumented 
population under 10,000 in 1990, experienced an explosion in their undocumented 
immigration rates.  These states each had immigration rates of over 400 percent in the 
late 1990s (Migration Policy Institute 2003).59  By 2006, over 12 percent of the United 
States population was foreign born (the highest percentage since 1930) and new cities 
and towns across the nation became “emerging immigrant gateways” (Singer, Hardwick, 
Brettell and Cisneros 2008).60   
In response, Congress again took up immigration reform in 2006.  A bipartisan 
bill introduced by Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ) 
sought to create pathways to citizenship for the undocumented population, overhaul the 
immigration system, and create an “impact aid” program that would provide grants to 
states to compensate for the costs of providing health care and education to new 
                                                 
59 Immigration rate is the multiplier of the number of foreign-born residents between two time 
periods.  In effect, it is the rate of growth for the immigrant population.  See Migration Policy 
Institute (2003). 
60 Cornelius (1995) posits that the increased expenditures on border patrol have done nothing to 
decrease border crossings but instead have limited the return of Mexican and other Latino 
immigrants who had planned on only staying for a limited period (also see Massey et al. 2002).  
In addition, he notes, the continued need for low cost labor perpetuates the demand for illegal 
immigrants, where US National policy only addresses the supply (Cornelius 2005, 777).  In 
effect, he argues, our immigration policies are symbolic, not substantive (789). 
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immigrants.  However, the bill failed and as a result, state and local governments have 
begun to take matters into their own hands (NCSL 2007).61   
 
States and Locales Respond 
 State governments have a history of legislating immigration.  Throughout the 18th 
and early 19th centuries, immigration policy was primarily determined by individual 
states until the Supreme Court ruled that immigration policy should be uniform and under 
federal jurisdiction (Hutchinson 1981; Tichenor 2002).  Even though the courts consider 
immigration policy to be the exclusive territory of the federal government, states and 
locales must provide services to immigrants and their families that help them survive in 
the United States.  The “most careful and objective studies of [immigration] conclude 
that, while immigrants (illegal and legal) represent a net fiscal gain to the federal 
government, they are often a net burden to affected states and a definite fiscal negative to 
local governments” (Skerry 1995, 77).  In fact, state and local governments bear the 
greatest fiscal responsibility in regards to immigration (particularly low-income 
immigrants), primarily through the cost of educating children and providing services in a 
second language (Fix and Passel 1994; Furuseth and Smith 2007, 13).62   Whether or not 
immigrants, including the undocumented, generate an economic stimulus or drain on 
                                                 
61 In its report “Federal Gridlock on Immigration Reform Leads States to Action” (NCSL 2007), 
NCSL pinpoints federal inaction on immigration as the sole reason for the vast activity of states 
in this policy arena. 
62 As of 2000, there were about 1.6 million undocumented immigrant children in the United 
States. Another 3 million children with undocumented parents are U.S. citizens because they were 
born here (Passel, Capps, and Fix 2004).  These children are primarily concentrated, like their 
parents, in ten states: California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Arizona, 
Georgia and North Carolina.  
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resources for local governments is still a matter of debate.63  However, immigration 
opponents have emphasized the fiscal stress produced by immigration, particularly the 
undocumented variety, and in recent years this argument has carried more weight than 
claims that immigrants produce a net fiscal benefit.   
 Nevertheless, state responses have been mixed, perhaps because it remains 
unclear whether immigrants help or hurt state economies.  In some areas, new immigrants 
are met with open arms, as they bring life and economic stimulus to towns that were 
declining and losing out to places with larger low-wage labor forces (Grey and Woodrick 
2005).  Some states pass legislation to make life without papers easier.  In other places, 
where immigrants are not so welcome, communities attempt to keep new immigrant 
groups out by passing local ordinances that make life for non-English speakers (and the 
often poor) more difficult.  For example, in reaction to the increasing presence of Latino 
immigrants, in 2006, the Cherokee County, Georgia Board of Commissioners 
unanimously passed a local law that penalizes property owners for renting housing to 
undocumented immigrants and requires all business transactions to take place in 
English. 64  Likewise, other suburban counties in Georgia facing high rates of immigration 
implemented local housing ordinances setting caps on how many people can occupy a 
single family home, and increasing the amount of “sleeping space per person” required 
(Odem 2008, 124-127).  There has been significant local policy activity around 
immigration which appears to be filtering up to state legislatures in a manner consistent 
                                                 
63 One can easily produce a list of cites from scholarly journals that attributes economic 
stagnation or declining wages to immigration, just as one can produce a list of cites debunking 
such statistics (For example see, Borjas 2001; Simon 1999; Edmonston and Smith 1998).  
64 In 1999 a single Georgia township passed a similar ordinance including an English-only 
provision.  In a strange twist of fate, the first person prosecuted under this law was a Spanish-
language Christian minister who posted signs in Spanish for the services at his Spanish language 
congregation (Olivias 2007).  
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with what we know about policy diffusion (see for example the review of this literature 
included in Berry and Berry1994).65 
 By the time the 2006 mid-term elections were held, state and local governments 
had passed over 70 separate pieces of legislation targeting undocumented immigrants 
(Newton 2008, 174).  In 2006, almost 600 immigration related bills were introduced in 
state legislatures and 84 enacted.  In 2007, that number had nearly tripled, to 1,562 bills 
introduced and 240 laws enacted (NCSL 2008).  Much of this legislation reflected policy 
tools debated in Congress in the 1990s and again in the 2000s, such as employer 
penalties, expansion of police powers to states and local police, and denying social 
services and education to the children of undocumented workers, regardless of whether 
the children themselves are citizens.66  Law enforcement (187 bills in 27 states) and 
employment (364 bills in 46 states) legislation were by far the most common forms of 
immigration-related legislation introduced in 2007, followed by education and 
healthcare.67  Table 1 in Appendix C provides an exhaustive list of the types of policies—
some negative, others positive—relating to immigration introduced in the U.S. states in 
2007.   
                                                 
65 For more discussion of local anti-immigrant policies and their causes, see Singer, Wilson and 
DeRenzis 2009). 
66  That said, much of the legislation introduced in state governments pertained to integrating 
immigrants or to clarifying how to judge immigrant employment credentials. 
67 Many of these bills expanded the rights of immigrants and combat discrimination against 
immigrants.  One hundred and seventy eight bills were introduced that created some sort of 
penalty for businesses who employ undocumented workers.  These bills increased civil penalties 
or revoked business licenses (32 states), established criminal penalties (13 states) or denied state 
contracts (35 states) for businesses found to have employed undocumented immigrants.  Only 
three states introduced bills to create, fund or extend adult English language education, despite 
the common complaint that new immigrants are not learning English fast enough.  Finally, 
several states introduced other anti-immigrant bills such as denying medical coverage or 
education to undocumented immigrants and their children, and disallowing the use of adult 
education funds for educating immigrants, to name a few. 
 
 187  
While most of the immigration legislation introduced in 2007 pertained solely to 
foreign-born immigrants, some of the legislation had potentially negative consequences 
for U.S.-born Latinos as well.  That said, the anti- immigrant movement has been so 
obviously directed toward Latino immigrants that some scholars consider anti- immigrant 
rhetoric to be “code for anti-Latino” (Smith and Furuseth 2006, 13; also see Newton 
2008; Short and Magana 2002).  From Operation Wetback in the 1950s to modern raids 
targeting illegal immigrants for deportation, police and immigration enforcement officers 
have rounded up, harassed, demoralized, and interrogated U.S. and foreign-born Latinos 
alike, on the basis of distinguishing features such as brown skin and Spanish-accented 
English (Garcia 1980; Romero 2006; Newton 2008).  Immigration officials and others 
justify stereotypes and racial profiling procedures because illegal immigrants are just 
that—illegal (see Aguirre 2004 for a good review of how police officers have justified 
racial profiling of Latinos in court).  As Short and Magaña (2002, 703) note: “this is the 
Mexican American dilemma: Sharing a phenotype (Latino) with a stigmatized other 
(illegal Mexican immigrants) renders one susceptible to prejudice and discrimination.” 
 Use of racial profiling and its harmful effects has been well catalogued in legal 
and police studies and has been highlighted in news coverage (see Aguirre 2004; Romero 
2000; 2006; Romero and Serag 2004; Johnson 2001).  Two sources of state anti-
immigrant policy that are particularly likely to have negative consequences for Latinos 
more broadly are laws that punish employers for hiring undocumented workers and those 
that instruct law enforcement officers to act as immigration officials.   
First, if employers hold negative stereotypes of Latinos as illegal immigrants, and 
state governments increase the costs associated with employing undocumented workers, 
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Latinos of all immigration statuses may struggle to find employment or face 
discrimination in the hiring process (Bansak 2005).68  Second, if states direct law 
enforcement to act as immigration officers, Latinos may be more likely to experience 
racial profiling and as a result be subject to more traffic stops and interrogative policing 
that disrupts their daily lives and decreases congeniality between Latino communities and 
their local government institutions (see Romero 2006; Aguirre Jr. 2004).  Latinos already 
are stopped and searched at higher rates than whites (Aguirre Jr. 2004, 929; Schafer et al. 
2006).69  Adding immigration enforcement to the list of duties assigned to local law 
enforcement can only serve to add to this problem and increase the rate at which Latinos 
are punished more harshly than whites merely for their ethnicity (Wiseman, Headen, and 
Parker 2009; Romero 2006). 
 To summarize, the conundrum of legislating immigration from the statehouse is 
that many policy tools available to state lawmakers to dissuade illegal immigration stand 
to increase discrimination against Latinos regardless of where they were born or how 
they arrived on U.S. soil.  I categorize these bills as “punitive immigration laws” because 
they increase the penalties for individuals who are stereotyped as illegal immigrants—
mainly Latinos.   
                                                 
68 Scholars have noted that employer sanctions imposed by the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act resulted in lower wages for Latino non-agricultural workers (Bansak and Raphael 
1998; Bansak 2005).  (IRCA sanctions were not imposed at that time for agricultural workers).  
And, in fact, this concern was figured prominently in the 1986 immigration debates in Congress.  
Lisa Newton found that one of the recurring themes in the congressional debate regarding the 
introduction of employer sanctions was the victimization of non-white groups that would result.  
Members expressed grave concerns that employer sanctions would unduly affect Latino job 
seekers (see discussion in Newton 2008, 80-85), and recent research suggests that they were not 
incorrect in their arguments.   
69 Recent studies suggest that the over-representation of Latinos in the U.S. prison system is a 
result of racial profiling of Latinos (NCLR 2004). 
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Despite the fact that the introduction of immigration related bills was widespread, 
not all states introduced the same type of legislation.  Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of 
states that introduced and passed punitive immigration related law enforcement and 
employment laws in 2007.  It demonstrates that while the introduction of these bills is 
widespread, not all states had punitive immigration bills introduced and fairly few 
actually passed punitive bills into law.   






 Most of the literature pertaining to immigration reform in the U.S. states has 
focused on the legality of these laws, if they are preemptive, and whether the states have 
constitutional authority over immigration (see for example, Olivas 2007; Skerry 1995; 
Speasmaker ND; Booth 2006; McKanders 2007; Manheim 1995), but there has been little 
No Bills Introduced          Bill(s) Introduced           Bill(s) Passed 
 
 
*neither Alaska nor Hawaii had bill introductions 
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effort to understand why state legislatures pursue anti- immigrant agendas.  Having 
established that these specific bills are of interest to the Latino population and explained 
how they became popular policy tools, I now review the different theoretical approaches 
that have been used to explain immigration attitudes and federal immigration policies in 
the past and, based on this review, develop a theoretical approach to understanding state 
immigration policies.   
 
Explaining State Approaches to Immigration: Economic Drain, Group Threat, 
Empowerment, or Ideological Division? 
Group Threat 
 Several scholars argue that immigration reform debates in Congress during the 
1980s and 1990s were reactionary in nature and focused on unwanted types of 
immigrants and their impact on American culture and the economy.   Massey, Durand, 
and Malone (2003) argue that congressional and state leaders use Latino immigrants in 
particular as scapegoats for economic problems and portray them as negative influences 
on U.S. culture for political gain, while at the same time attempting to maintain a steady 
flow of cheap labor available for the agricultural sector.  Likewise, Lisa Newton’s (2008) 
study of immigration reform found that Congressmen quite often made verbal attacks on 
Latino immigrants during debates over immigration reform.  These scholars posit that 
punitive immigration reform often is driven by a perceived threat from the increasing 
presence of Latinos in American society—an argument that largely mirrors group threat 
theories based on the punitive policies that came about as a reaction to the presence of, 
and increases within, local black populations.  
 
 191  
 Group threat theories hold that sizable minority populations increase white 
hostility (Allport 1954; Williams 1947; Blalock 1967).  Summarizing the research on the 
causal chain of reactions to local minority populations, Taylor (1998, 513) finds three 
primary arguments for how the minority population influences intergroup relations: “(1) 
minority visibility worsens white attitudes; (2) these negative attitudes fuel 
discrimination; and (3) discrimination aggravates intergroup inequality.”  Two factors 
have largely been used to explain these findings: racism and economic and/or social 
competition.  While not completely distinct, these factors lead to two different ways of 
interpreting group threat hypotheses. 
In the first, racism leads whites in particular to punish, diminish, or subjugate 
populations with darker skin—historically, African Americans.  Alternatively, social 
order theories suggest that minorities will be tolerated to an extent as long as they do not 
appear to pose a threat to the white population.  Blalock (1958) and Burr et al. (1991) 
argue that hostility arises when a minority group poses an economic threat, while others 
assert that threat responses develop when minorities challenge the existing political or 
status hierarchy (Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994).  Group 
threat has been used extensively to explain state English-only initiatives (Tatalovich 
1995; Branton et al. 2007; Hood III and Morris 1997; Hood III and Morris 1998; Hood 
III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hood III and Morris 2000; Morris 1993; Tolbert and Hero 
1996; Tolbert and Hero 2001; Tolbert and Hero 2003; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Valenty 
and Sylvia 2004).70  This research suggests that punitive immigration policies may be 
                                                 
70 On the federal level investigations of immigration control have focused on ideology (Gimpel 
and Edwards 1998) and target populations (Trichenor 2002; Newton 2008). 
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particularly likely in states that have large, growing, or politically active Latino 
populations.71  
Drawing on both the group threat and Congressional immigration reform 
literature, one could surmise that state legislatures and state institutions respond to an 
increasing presence of Latinos in a negative fashion (also see Key 1949, Giles and 
Buckner 1993; Longoria 1996; Glaser 1994; Hajnal 2001; and Kaufmann 2002).  Just as 
the industrialized north of the 1940s and 1950s reacted to African American migration 
from the South by instituting racial covenants and undertaking widespread programs to 
isolate and subjugate African Americans (Sugrue 1995), states and locales today are 
reacting to the growing presence of Latino immigrants by introducing and passing 
punitive bills aimed at curbing Latino immigration.  This leads to the first set of 
hypotheses:  
H1: Latino Threat Hypothesis: As the size of the Latino population increases the chances 
of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase. 
H2: Latino Immigration Threat Hypothesis: As the Latino immigration rate increases the 
chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase. 
  
 However, group threat does not require the presence of a Latino, or even dark-
skinned population.  In the early 1900s nativism erupted over threat from German, Polish, 
Asian and Jewish migration, as well as migration from Southern Europe (Tatalovich 
1995; Tichenor 2002). 72  Thus, threat response could be a reaction to immigrants and 
                                                 
71 Interestingly, Hood and Morris (1997) speculate that the large group size and segregation of 
Latinos lead whites to view Latinos negatively. 
72 Of course, it is important to note that many of these European immigrants at the time were 
considered “Black” for all intents and purposes. 
 
 193  
rapid immigration rates in general, not just to Latino immigrants.73  And thus I offer two 
additional threat hypotheses: 
H3: Immigration Threat Hypothesis: Regardless of nationality, as the immigration rate 
increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will 
increase. 
H4: Immigrant Threat Hypothesis: Regardless of nationality, as the size of the  foreign-
born population increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive 
immigration bills will increase. 
 
Economic Drain 
Group threat may be symbolic or it may be a product of the perceived economic 
threat posed by a new or growing minority population.  Immigrants may instigate a threat 
response in tough economic times in particular.  If the local population is having a hard 
time securing work, then newcomers who also need jobs are unlikely to be met with open 
arms.  Immigrants often are blamed for “taking jobs from Americans.”  Common to the 
federal- level debate over immigration reform is the mantra that immigrants, particularly 
undocumented immigrants, undermine wages in certain sectors and take jobs that 
otherwise would go to native-born Americans (Newton 2008), and public opinion toward 
immigration has been found to reflect concerns about the national economy and about 
taxes (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Wilson 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; 
Oliver and Mendelberg 2001; Lee and Ottati 2002; Lee Ottati and Hussain 2001).  When 
unemployment is high, immigration may be more salient and may be seen as having 
negative consequences for native-born workers.  Thus, when competition for jobs 
                                                 
73 Unfortunately, I cannot separate out too many groups.  There is ample evidence to suggest that 
Asian immigration may in fact decrease anti-immigrant sentiment.  However, the distribution of 
Asians in the United States does not vary enough from state to state to enable a test of this 
hypothesis across states.  For more research on the subject of Asians and their effect on white 
attitudes toward immigration, I would point readers to the various works by Hood III and Morris 
(1997; 1998) and Taylor (1998). 
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intensifies, state legislatures should be more likely to react by trying to increase 
immigration control and particularly to increase penalties for hiring illegal immigrants 
over U.S. citizens. 
H5: Job Scarcity Hypothesis: As unemployment rates increase, introduction and passage 
of punitive immigration bills will increase. 
 
 Immigrants, particularly those with lower incomes, come with other financial 
costs to communities.  As noted earlier, perhaps the most common complaint generated 
from state and local governments is that immigrants are a drain on often scarce resources 
such as education, health, and other social services.  While few whites may see 
immigrants as a threat to their jobs, they still may see them as a threat to the quality of the 
services they enjoy, and government officials are left with the politically unpleasant job 
of finding the money to pay for public goods.  Thus, it may be that anti- immigrant 
legislation is more likely in states experiencing an imbalance between tax revenue and 
expenditures on social services.  That said, states with large minority populations have 
historically spent less on social services than homogeneously white states (Preuhs 2007, 
Hero and Preuhs 2007; Schram, Soss and Fording 2003), thus what constitutes a 
“burden” to places with a history of minimally funding social services may be drastically 
different than in places that devote more resources to these programs.  
H6: Fiscal Stress Hypothesis: As the proportion of tax dollars spent on public services 
increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration reform bills will increase. 
 
Ideological Divisions  
 Immigration may not be solely a racial or economic issue.  James Gimpel and 
James Edwards (1998) argue that the immigration debate in Congress in the 1990s 
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centered on ideological divisions over redistribution, and that as partisanship has become 
stronger and more reflective of ideology, attitudes toward immigration likewise have 
become more partisan in nature. 
To the extent that immigration is seen as a partisan issue, liberal states also may 
be less likely to introduce or pass punitive immigration legislation because, quite often, 
such bills are seen as constraining civil rights, which may be less palatable to politicians 
courting minority voters.  Democratic coalitions are often made up of minority groups 
who may be less tolerant of legislation that could increase discrimination or racial 
profiling.  Finally, Latinos are an emerging sector of the Democratic Party coalition; 
Democrats may therefore be mindful of the potential backlash for attacking Latino 
immigrants.74  Two more hypotheses address the impact of political factors on 
immigration legislation. 
H7: Party Control Hypothesis: As the percentage of the legislature that is Democratic 
increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will decrease. 
H8: Ideology Hypothesis: As the percentage of the state that is liberal increases, 
introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will decrease. 
 
Empowerment  
Empowerment through descriptive representation can be critical to minority 
groups.  For example, several scholars have noted that African Americans, women, and 
Latinos have different policy interests than their white male counterparts (Whitby 1989; 
Hutchings 1998; Whitby and Krause 2001; Saint-Germain 1990; Thomas 1991; Branton 
2002).  Although substantive representation is not dependent upon having elected 
officials who “look like” the minority population, having a legislature that mirrors the 
                                                 
74 For example, Donovan (2007, 274) argues that there was a “blowback” against the Republican 
Party in California after the passage of Proposition 187.  
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characteristics of the population is considered beneficial on many fronts (see Haynie 
1999; Cannon 1999; Swers 2002; Rouse 2008; Branton 2006; Fraga 2006). 
 The presence of Latino legislators could offset the introduction and passage of 
anti- immigrant legislation.  Even if Latinos do not hold enough seats to make up a 
sizeable voting bloc, the presence of a few Latino legislators may play an educating or 
socializing role for the other legislators, decreasing the support in the chamber for 
legislation unpalatable to the Latino delegation.  However, consistent with power theory, 
group threat is triggered when the social order is challenged in one of three ways: 
economically, socially, or politically.  Accordingly, when groups begin to challenge the 
social order by gaining political power, the majority group will react in a threatened 
manner and attempt to subjugate the challenging group (Giles and Hertz 1994), thereby 
leading to a “backlash” of policies aimed at the minority community.  Unfortunately, if 
the introduction of these bills is a reaction purely to the size of the Latino population, as 
the threat hypothesis would suggest, then Latino presence in the state legislature will not 
only fail to offset the introduction of these bills, it will appear to increase the likelihood 
of introduction because of the high correlation between Latino population size and Latino 
empowerment (see for example Haider-Markel 2007).75 
H8: Legislative Empowerment Hypothesis: As the Latino proportion of the legislature 
increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration reform will decrease. 
                                                 
75 A correctly specified model of empowerment would take into account the two-stage (or causal) 
nature of the data.  When population size results in empowerment, the direct effect of population 
on bill introduction may be positive while the indirect effect of population through empowerment 
on introduction may be negative.  Unfortunately, I cannot sort this out with the data available at 
this time. 
 
 197  
Data and Methods 
Selecting State Legislation 
 The data for this paper are derived from the Migration Policy Institute’s 2007, 
“State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation.”  The data set 
includes all immigration related bills and resolutions introduced in state legislatures.  It 
was completed as a joint project of the Migration Policy Institute and New York 
University’s School of Law. 76 
 For the purposes of this project, I limited my search to bills pertaining to 
employment and law enforcement, which produced a list of 551 bills—364 regarded 
employment, 187 regarded law enforcement.77  I then went through each bill to check that 
it was correctly coded.  Bills were scrutinized to make sure that they did in fact have the 
potential to increase racial profiling or discrimination of Latinos in either the employment 
or law enforcement sector by extending police powers, by increasing or establishing 
penalties for employing illegal immigrants, or by requiring enrollment in an employment 
eligibility verification program. 78  After checking every bill, a total of 216 bills were 
                                                 
76 Information about the methodology used to find and evaluate each piece of legislation is 
available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2007methodology.pdf.   
77 While certain other laws could have been included, such as those requirements of proof of 
citizenship for public services, education, and voting, none were so clear cut in their likelihood of 
increasing discrimination to the entire Latino community as the two that I choose to evaluate.  
However, it would be interesting to extend this study to at least include bills that restrict public 
services to citizens, since it could mean that individuals suspected of being immigrants would 
receive cooler treatment by government agencies. 
78 I did not include bills that established a state law against human trafficking.  Although these 
laws have been used to prosecute legal relatives and friends driving vehicles with undocumented 
immigrants in their cars (Aguirre Jr. 2008, 934-935), they are also policy tools used to create state 
violations for those involved in human trafficking for the sex trade, forced labor, and other illegal 
activities. Thus, they are not always aimed at deterring illegal immigration or particularly bad for 
Latinos.  In addition, I did not include laws that denied bail to defendants who were illegal 
immigrants. E-verify bills were included because the system has known to produce many more 
false rejections for Latinos and African Americans than for Anglos.  In addition, The Department 
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included in the data set.  Of those, 146 pertained to employment and 70 to law 
enforcement.  Ten separate bills were enacted into law.  The remaining bills were voted 
down, expired, or had no legislative action. 79  As seen in Table 6.1, seven employment 
bills and 4 law enforcement bills passed that met my requirements.  One bill covered both 
employment and law enforcement.  In this case, the bill was counted individually for the 
separate totals for employment and law enforcement but only once for the total count. 
 The majority of the bills regarding employment punished (in some way) 
employers for hiring undocumented workers, or required employers to enroll in the 
Federal Work Authorization Program (e-verify) or other verification program.  Each of 
these categories was included because they could potentially increase the barriers to 
employment for a person who the employer suspects of being an illegal immigrant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Homeland Security has testified that increasing the use of e-verify will create enormous 
backlogs and that minorities are more likely to be flagged as “nonconfirmations” and require 
more information.  If employers cannot wait for verification they might decide to hire people who 
do not fit an immigrant stereotype. (See the testimony before Congress of Inspector General of 
the Department of Justice, available at: 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=564) 
79 Expired legislation was categorized as failed.  Pending legislation was categorized as failed 
legislation because after 2 years time the legislation never received a vote.  While it is possible 
that these bills could come up for a vote sometime in the future, to this date they have not passed.  
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Alabama 8 0 0 0 8 0 Montana 2 0 1 0 3 0 
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 6 1 4 1 10 2 Nevada 2 1 0 0 2 1 
Arkansas 1 1 0 0 1 1 
New 
Hampshire 1 0 0 0 1 0 
California 4 0 1 0 5 0 New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 3 1 1 0 4 1 New Mexico 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Connecticut 2 0 0 0 2 0 New York 3 0 3 0 6 0 
Delaware 1 0 0 0 1 0 
North 
Carolina 7 0 6 0 13 0 
Florida 3 0 4 0 7 0 North Dakota 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Georgia 0 0 1 0 1 0 Ohio  1 0 1 0 2 0 
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oklahoma 12 1 6 1 14 1 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oregon 4 0 4 0 8 0 
Illinois 4 0 0 0 4 0 Pennsylvania 4 0 1 0 5 0 
Indiana 3 0 2 0 5 0 Rhode Island 8 0 1 0 9 0 
Iowa 4 0 0 0 4 0 
South 
Carolina 8 0 6 0 10 0 
Kansas 3 0 0 0 3 0 South Dakota 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Kentucky 5 0 1 0 6 0 Tennessee 19 1 10 1 26 2 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 Texas 5 1 10 1 15 2 
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 Utah 3 0 1 0 4 0 
Maryland 0 0 0 0 0 0 Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachusetts 4 0 0 0 4 0 Virginia 6 0 6 0 12 0 
Michigan 2 0 1 0 3 0 Washington 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 West Virginia 6 2 0 0 6 1 
Mississippi 6 0 3 0 9 0 Wisconsin  1 0 0 0 1 0 
Missouri 6 0 3 0 9 0 Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       Total 146 7 70 4 205 10 
Source: State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation, 2007.  Migration Policy Institute  
 
 The majority of the law enforcement related bills included in the data set directed 
state police and attorneys general and allowed local law enforcement to enter into an 
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agreement with the ICE under the 287(g) program of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).80  Other legislation was included that directed 
law enforcement to inquire into the citizenship of an individual if they suspected the 
individual was in violation of immigration law.  For example, an Oregon bill called for 
law enforcement agencies to “apprehend a person…based upon probable cause that the 
person is in violation of federal immigration laws.”81 
 Figure 6.2 shows the number of bills introduced and passed for each state. 
Tennessee had by far the most introductions with a total of 26 bills introduced in 2007.  
Twelve states did not introduce any of this legislation and only 8 states passed legislation 
into law.  
                                                 
80 ICE runs a program called “ICE ACCESS” which “provides local law enforcement agencies an 
opportunity to team with ICE” on immigration enforcement (see: 
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm). The “agreements” that local and state law 
enforcement enter into with ICE fall under the 287g program of the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).  According to ICE’s website, there are 
currently 63 state and county law enforcement agencies with existing agreements and over 840 
law enforcement officers have been trained and certified under the 287(g) program to act as 
immigration officials.  
81 http://landru.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measures/hb3500.dir/hb3553.intro.html 
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Source: State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation, 2007.  
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Dependent Variables 
Institutional variation between state legislatures, such as professionalism, length 
of the legislative session, and introduction caps, may influence the number of 
immigration bills introduced and passed in each state.82  Thus, I chose not to treat the 
dependent variable as a count variable (number of bills introduced).  Instead, I present 
analyses using two different dependent variables.  For the first analysis, the dependent 
variables for both introduction and passage are dichotomous variables.  Introduction is 
coded as one if the state introduced at least one punitive immigration bill and passage is 
coded as one if the state passed at least one of these bills.  The passage model only 
includes states that had at least one introduction. 
   The third dependent variable is the proportion of all bills that were punitive 
immigration bills.  This variable is computed by dividing the total number of punitive 
immigration bills by the total number of bills introduced for each state.  This should 
control for interstate institutional variation by eliminating the differences between states 
that have lower bill introduction rates across the board because of institutional constraints 
and states with very large bill introduction rates.   The last dependent variable uses the 
proportion of all bills passed that were punitive immigration bills.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
As independent variables, I include several state level variables including the 
percent foreign-born, the immigration rate, the percent of the population that is Latino, 
                                                 
82 While normally, one would control for these factors, the data are not up to the task.  The small 
number of states make it impossible to control for each of these factors.  In addition, the ideal 
model would probably be a Heckman selection model, or another model equipped to deal with 
data of this nature, but the small n prohibits this type of analysis. 
 
 203  
the Latino immigration rate, and an alternative Latino immigration measure—Latino 
population increase—which captures the increase in the share of the population made up 
of Latinos between 2000 and 2007. 
 A number of economic and political variables are also relevant.  My economic 
measures include the unemployment rate, and two variables to measure the strain on state 
and local services.  The first (Fiscal Strain) is the proportion of the per capita tax rate that 
is spent on education and healthcare.  The second (Education and Health) is the per capita 
expenditures on education and healthcare.83  Political characteristics include the percent 
of the legislature that is Democratic, the percent of the population that is liberal, and the 
percent of the legislature that is Latino.    
 Finally, I also include a variable to measure the percentage of the state that is 
cropland because farmers often rely on migrant workers and have historically lobbied the 
government for more relaxed immigration laws and procedures (Massey and Durant 
2002; Newton 2008).84  A full explanation of each variable, including the source of the 
variable, and each variable’s mean, range, and standard deviation are included in 
Appendix B.  
                                                 
83  I chose not to use the traditional measure of economic strain—either tax capacity or fiscal need 
(see Berry and Fording 1997; Rogers, Jr. and Tedin 2006; Tannenwald 1999) because I wanted to 
focus on the policy areas in which critics claim that immigrants are using the most resources.  
Later versions of this paper will need to address tax capacity, fiscal need, as well as fiscal comfort 
(Tannenwald 1999). 
84 In immigration debates in congress, farmers were often quite adamant in their opposition to 
immigration reform that would punish employers or increase the difficulty of hiring workers in 
times when crops needed to be picked immediately (Newton 2008).  In addition, recent evidence 
has suggested that farm communities may be more accepting of immigration (Gimpel and Lay 
2008).  I also looked at the percentage of the state employed in agriculture, but it was also not 
significant. 
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 Methods 
 I employ several methodological techniques to sort through the correlates of 
punitive immigration policy.  I first present the differences between states in which at 
least one bill was introduced and states with no introductions, then states in which at least 
one bill was implemented compared to states with introductions but no enactments.  
Because these variables are binary, logistic or probit analysis would be the most logical 
technique to use.  Unfortunately, these modeling techniques are inappropriate for sample 
sizes under 100 (Long 1997, 53-4).  Because this chapter’s data is preliminary and is 
limited to a single year, the sample sizes are only 50 (for introduction analysis) and 38 
(for passage analysis).  Thus, it is not possible to produce reliable statistics when 
controlling for multiple variables.  Instead, I present comparison of means tests for 
introduction and non- introduction states (and passage and non-passage states).  Using this 
form of analysis helps to begin the process of understanding the dynamics at work in 
states in which punitive immigration legislation is introduced and passed.  By beginning 
this process, I hope to set up some testable hypotheses for future research.  
 In the next section, the dependent variable measures the proportion of all bills that 
were punitive immigration bills. Because this measure is linear, I am able to present 
multivariate analysis, albeit limited given the small number of observations.  I first 
present correlation coefficients for the independent variables to find which variables 
correspond with introduction and passage.  Then, using these findings, I present OLS 
regression results.  
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Results 
 Table 6.2 presents t-test comparison of means for the political and demographic 
variables between states with at least one bill introduced (Column 1) and states with no 
introductions and states that had at least one bill enacted compared to states in which 
none of these bills were signed into law (Column 2).  Figure 6.3 shows this information 
graphically for easy reference.    
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States  Difference Significant 
Foreign Born 8.2 8.35 -0.14  8.1 9.28 -1.17  
Immigration 
Rate 20.63 29.73 -9.1 ** 27.84 36.80 -8.95 ** 
Latino 
Population 0.06 0.1 -0.04  0.09 0.16 -0.07 * 
Latino 
Immigration 
Rate 1.34 1.38 -0.03  1.38 1.39 -0.007  
Latino 
Population 
Increase .015 .02 .005 * .02 .03 -.01 ** 
Unemployment 
Rate 4.01 4.52 -0.51 * 4.51 4.58 -0.08  
Fiscal Stress .26 .24 .02 * .24 .23 .004  
Health and 
Education 2816.18 2385.75 430.42 ** 2458.10 2114.44 343.66 ** 
Liberalism 21.49 18.39 3.1 ** 18.46 18.16 0.297  
Proportion 
Democrat .56 .53 .03  .52 .56 .03  
% Latino 
Legislators 0.01 0.03 -0.02 * 0.03 0.05 0.02  
Crop Land 0.19 0.43 -0.24   0.47 0.24 0.22   
N 12 38   30 8   
Note: Cells are group means. 
Source: Data compiled by author from multiple sources. 
**p<.05  *p<.1  
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The Correlates of Bill Introduction 
Demographic and Political Factors 
 
 Are demographics different in states that introduce punitive immigration bills? 
States with rapid growth in their foreign-born populations are more likely to have 
punitive immigration bills introduced.  States with bill introductions have significantly 
higher immigration rates than those that do not, but the actual size of the foreign born 
population is not different.  There is a 9-point difference in immigration rates between the 
average immigration rate of states that have introductions and those that do not.  States 
that introduce punitive measures have a mean immigration rate of 29.73 compared with 
20.63 in non- introduction states.   This supports an immigration threat hypothesis.  While 
it appears that the current size of the foreign-born population is irrelevant, the data 
suggest that when there is a rapid increase in immigration, legislators seek to control the 
flow.85   
There appears to be no difference in the size of the Latino population or the rate 
of Latino immigration between introduction and non- introduction states.  While states 
that have introductions do have larger Latino populations and higher Latino immigration 
rates, the differences are not statistically significant.  It is likely that the relationship 
between these two variables is either a) conditional or b) non- linear.   
To test for this conjecture, I investigate the relationship between the change in the 
share of the popula tion that is Latino and the likelihood of bill introduction.  Immigration 
rates often are very large because the state has very few Latinos at time point 1.  So if the 
                                                 
85 A larger analysis able to employ multiple regression models would be more appropriate to 
analyze the relationship between these two variables. 
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number of Latinos doubles, the immigration rate of Latinos from time 1 to time 2 will be 
100 even though the actual increase in the number of Latinos may be relatively small.  
Latino Population Increase captures both the immigration rate and the size of the Latino 
population.  States that had punitive immigration bills introduced had larger growth in the 
share of the population that was Latino.  States with bill introductions had a mean change 
in the Latino share of the population of 2 percentage points and states that did not saw an 
average increase of 1.5 percentage points. (For example, a state that had a 2 percent 
increase in the population would be a state that went from 5 percent Latino to 7 percent 
Latino).  Thus, while the immigration rate of Latinos was not different for introduction 
and non- introduction states, when that rate translated into a substantially larger presence 
of Latinos in the population, the state was more likely to have at least one bill introduced.    
The percentage of the legislature that is Latino is significantly larger in bill-
introduction states.  This relationship is could be spurious due to the large correlation 
between Latino population size and Latino empowerment or could be reflective of an 
ideological divergence between the Latino electorate and Latino elected officials.  To sort 
out the relationship between population, representation, and bill introduction/passage 
would require a two-stage or multi- level model. Unfortunately, this preliminary data 
analysis is not a large enough sample to allow us to model this relationship using a multi-
level method 
The proportion of the legislature that is Democratic is not statistically significant; 
however, the proportion of the population that is liberal is negatively correlated with 
introduction. It appears that more liberal populations are less interested in this type of 
legislation. 
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Economic Factors 
 
States with bill introductions have significantly higher unemployment rates, 
indicating that punitive immigration legislation could be a reaction to a perceived 
economic threat from a new population.  If states have high unemployment and new 
populations, legislators may feel the need to attempt to limit the number of jobs that are 
farmed out to non-U.S. workers within U.S. borders.  However, the fiscal stress 
hypothesis receives little support.  In fact, introduction states spent less on education and 
health care per person and had less of their per capita tax rate devoted to social services 
than states that had no introductions.  While these numbers may appear counterintuitive, 
in fact, they are not.  States that have a history of devoting fewer resources to social 
spending may perceive increased demand for services as more threatening than states that 
have historically devoted significant resources to providing social services.86  A 
consumer-voter approach would suggest that state legislators have an incentive to keep 
their tax rates low in order to attract high income migrants to their state and to limit 
redistributive spending (see Dye 1990; Peterson 1981; Preuhs 1999).  And in fact, states 
with introductions did have significantly lower per capita tax rates than non- introduction 
states (not shown).  However, this finding is consistent with Preuhs (2007) and Hero and 
Pruehs (2007) who find that state investment in social spending negatively correlates with 
Latino population size.  So, although arguments against immigration often center on the 
                                                 
86 Data from the Mexican Migration Project indicates that undocumented immigrants rarely use 
public services.  Massey (2005) finds that while three-quarters of undocumented Mexicans paid 
U.S. taxes, only ten percent used public schools and five per cent or less reported using AFDC, 
unemployment benefits, food stamps or other government benefits.  Further, the cost to local 
governments of educating and aiding new immigrants is more costly in areas such as the rust belt 
where new immigrant populations are coupled with native population decline.  Whereas 
immigrants in the south, where the majority of these bills were introduced and passed, were 
accompanied with a steady stream of in-migration from native-born migrants (Furuseth and Smith 
2006, 13) which increase the tax base. 
 
 210  
amount of social services immigrants consume (particularly undocumented 
immigrants),87 it seems more important to legislators if these immigrants are competing 
for jobs.88 
The Correlates of Punitive Immigration Bill Passage  
The second analysis in Table 2 presents differences of means for states that 
passed punitive immigration bills compared to states in which a bill was introduced but 
not enacted.  Passage states have higher immigration rates, larger Latino populations and 
larger increases in the size of their Latino population.  There is no difference between the 
unemployment rates, or the proportion of the tax rate consumed by health and education 
expenditures, in states that implemented their bills and those that did not.  Again, states 
that did not pass this type of legislation actually spent more on social services than states 
that implemented their legislation.  States that did not implement their punitive bills spent 
over 300 dollars more per capita on education and health care than states that 
implemented these bills.  There are no other statistically significant differences between 
states that passed the legislation and those that did not.  State legislatures that have the 
political will to move these bills from introduction to vote and to garner enough votes to 
pass them into law appear to be responding to the influx of new minorities into their 
communities.  If a punitive bill is introduced, Latinos appear to find few friends in the 
legislature even within the Democratic Party, or among their co-ethnic representatives.  I 
will investigate this relationship further in the next chapter. 
                                                 
87 For example Proposition 187 in California and Proposition 200 and 300 in Arizona. 
88 Now, it may be that when Latinos take up more social services the type of legislation 
legislators pursue is different.  For example , as was shown in Table 1, several states introduced 
bills banning education and health care access for undocumented immigrants and their children. I 
expect to look at this relationship in the future. 
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States with larger Latino populations, higher immigration rates, and larger 
increases in the percentage of the state that is Latino appear to be more likely to move 
their bills from introduction to passage.  These findings give significant support to group 
threat perspective.  
The Correlates of Legislative Attention to Punitive Immigration Reform  
Since lone legislators may introduce a piece of punitive immigration legislation, 
the dependent variable of interest for the next section is the proportion of all the bills 
introduced in the 2007 legislative session that were punitive employment or law 
enforcement immigration legislation.  Table 6.3 shows the correlation between the 
independent variables and the proportion of the legislative agenda devoted to punitive 
immigration proposals.  I find that the rate of bill introduction is positively correlated 
with the overall immigration rate, the Latino immigration rate89 and, again, negatively 
correlated with expenditures on education and health care and the proportion of 
Democrats in the state legislature.   
                                                 
89 Immigration rate and Latino immigration rate are statistically correlated at .32. 
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Table 6.3 Correlations and Regression Analysis for the Proportion of a State 
















Foreign Born -.17 .12   


















Rate .10 -.01   
Fiscal Stress -.13 -.25   
Health and 






Democrat -.27** .19 
-.158 
(.332)  




Legislators -.07 .06   
Crop Land .16 -.16   





R-Square   .34 .27 
N   50 38 
Note: Cells are correlation coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Data compiled by author from multiple sources. 
^Variable scaled 0 to 1 to ease presentation. 
*p<.1**p<.05 
 
The results of the regression analysis indicate that only spending on health and 
education is significant when controlling for the Latino population, but again, the 
relationship is in the wrong direction for a fiscal stress hypothesis.  The more the state 
spends on social services, the less of the legislative agenda is devoted to punitive 
immigration bills.  These results indicate that the historical and present ideological 
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disposition of the state may matter more than the difference captured by either the 
ideology or party measures.  In general more liberal states tend to spend more of their tax 
dollars on education and social services.  Thus, ideology may be working indirectly 
through social spending. 90  This argument would be consistent with Gimpel and Edwards 
(1999, 297) who posit that, “immigration has been translated into a redistribution issue.”  
If state- level legislative partisanship is not as strong as in Congress, a better measure as to 
the ideological leanings of the state government may in fact be their expenditures on 
social services.  States with fewer members predisposed to spend significant sums on 
social services may also be more likely to feel a negative impact from increased demand 
for those services. 
The second column of Table 6.3 shows the correlations for the proportion of all 
bills passed that were punitive immigration bills and the explanatory variables.  If a state 
sees a punitive immigration bill introduced, the party make-up of the legislature is not 
correlated to passage rates.  The sole correlates of passage for states in which at least one 
bill was introduced are the immigration rate, the size of the Latino population, the extent 
to which the share of the population that is Latino has increased, and the amount of 
money spent on social services.  The correlations give substantial support to the Latino 
threat hypothesis.  The correlations suggest that states with larger Latino populations and 
states in which the Latino population is rapidly increasing are more likely to both 
introduce and pass more punitive immigration legislation that has the potential to increase 
racial profiling and discrimination of Latinos—citizens or not. 
                                                 
90 In fact, simple correlation coefficients suggest this is the case.  Spending on health and 
education is highly correlated with both ideology (.39) and the percentage of the legislature that is 
Democratic (.36). 
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The results of the regression analysis suggests that, controlling for other factors, 
when the Latino population begins to take up a larger share of the population, 
substantially more punitive bills are enacted.  Health and education spending, 
immigration rate, and Latino population size do not reach statistical significance.  
Discussion 
State legislatures are responding to the failure of Congress to produce 
immigration reform.  I began this chapter with one simple research question: What 
demographic and political factors increase the chances of states introducing and passing 
punitive immigration legislation?  I offered several testable hypotheses to explain 
variation between states including group threat, (social, economic, or political), economic 
strain, Latino political empowerment, and ideology.   
I find evidence that demographic factors increase the chances of punitive 
immigration bills being introduced and passed into law, supporting a group threat 
approach to understanding the politics of immigration at the state level.  It appears that 
legislatures are more likely to introduce and pass punitive immigration reforms when the 
Latino population, in specific, is growing.  I also find evidence of ideological 
influences—more liberal states are less likely to pursue such legislation even though 
ideology does not appear to constrain passage rates.   
The preliminary evidence provides only partial support for an economic threat 
hypothesis.  States with introductions did have higher unemployment than those without, 
but the unemployment rate was unrelated to passage and the fiscal stress measure was 
higher in states with no introductions, as was the actual level of social spending per 
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person.  The largest and most consistent correlate to introduction and passage was the 
rate at which the Latino population was increasing.   
In the end, very few states passed these bills.  The low passage rate of these bills 
can be explained by any number of reasons.  These punitive immigration bills often walk 
a fine line between attempting to police immigration and deter future immigrants, and 
infringement on human and constitutional rights.  Many legislators are also aware of the 
potential this type of legislation posses for increasing racial profiling and racism in 
employment and police inquiries.  Finally, immigration regulations have long faced 
problems surmounting objections from powerful lobbies such as strong business lobbies 
that fear their members will be fined for unknowingly employing an undocumented 
worker, and the agricultural industry that has claimed that checking worker eligibility 
will lead to wasted crops and income losses (Newton 2008). 
The evidence also suggests that punitive immigration legislation is primarily a 
symbolic gesture meant to send a message to immigrants and anti- immigrant 
constituencies and possibly also to Congress.  Legislators can grandstand on the problems 
of immigration from “undesirable” countries even though they recognize that state 
government has little power to regulate most of the incentives for illegal immigration.  
States lack the ability to give undocumented workers a path to citizenship, to effectively 
police immigration, or to change the process or procedures regulating immigration.  They 
are left with few policy tools to deter immigration at their disposal; and even fewer that 
do not increase the potential for constitutional violation or discrimination in housing, 
employment and law enforcement.  
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Policy entrepreneurs in the states also face the need to define immigrants and 
immigrant employers as negative target populations while not offending important voting 
blocks.  Legislators have many tools at their disposal for defining immigrants as 
undeserving criminals, but other target groups, particularly employers, are defined as 
good, deserving, and already overburdened by government regulation.  As Lisa Newton 
notes, without a negative social construction of the target population, “it is difficult for 
legislators, even policy implementers, to defend policing, fines, jail time, and other 
coercive policy tools associated with curbing criminal behavior.  Even when they operate 
in overt violation of established laws, employers do not bear the stigma of criminality 
that marks the illegal immigrant” (Newton 166).   
Increasing employment penalties and expanding police powers seem to be 
particularly popular bills to introduce but these policies often face strong opposition that 
block their progress through the legislative system.  Attacking businesses (a positively 
associated target population) and increasing the duties of already overworked and 
underpaid police (another positive target population) may present barriers to passing 
legislation aimed at restricting and punishing immigrants (a negative target population).  
Apparently, in only a few states are the opposition weak enough and the anti- immigrant 
sentiment strong enough for this legislation to succeed.91  But anti- immigrant/anti-Latino 
sentiment does appear to be highest in states with rapidly increasing Latino populations. 
                                                 
91 But it is also important to note that when workplace ICE raids take place, many people in the 
community can become quite upset, particularly if they do not blame immigrants for immigration 
problems.  After a particularly large raid of an Iowa meet packing plant in early 2008 that arrested 
hundreds of undocumented workers, there was a community outcry that the ICE was targeting the 
wrong subjects—workers and not employers.  There was also concern because of the effect on the 
workers children, many of who were left behind when their parents were detained.  One 
newspaper article noted that, “Half of the school system's 600 students were absent Tuesday [the 
day following the raid], including 90 percent of Hispanic children, because their parents were 
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Further, in regard to expanding police powers to include immigration duties, 
while many locales and a few states have signed up to be part of the INS’s 287(g) 
program, state legislators may be hesitant to increase the potential for lawsuits to their 
police departments, or they may believe that it is up to the local jurisdiction or the local 
police department to decide if this type of training is warranted in their community 
instead of mandating it from above or charging state police with immigration powers.92  
That said, dozens of 287(g) agreements are in the process of approval (Archibold 2009). 
States are finding ways to legislate immigration and immigrants within their 
borders.  If Congress does not tackle comprehensive immigration reform soon, in the end, 
we may see a race to the bottom in state-sponsored immigration regulation.  As some 
states pass punitive immigration laws, other states will have additional incentive to pass 
similar restrictions—if state legislators believe that by not passing these castigatory 
measures they will be a “magnet” for undocumented workers.  There is some evidence 
that this is already happening.  One Latino elected official from Maryland commented to 
me that their undocumented Latino population boomed after Virginia counties passed 
strict anti- immigrant laws and started working with the INS to identify and deport illegal 
immigrants.  As a result, he felt a push to deter more immigrants from his district as well, 
                                                                                                                                                 
arrested or in hiding.”  The school administrator then complained, "They don't go after 
employers. They don't put CEOs in jail" (Hsu 2008). 
92 The ACLU and the Immigration and Human Rights Policy Clinic recently released a report 
cataloguing the human rights and civil liberties abuses of police officers trained under the 287(g) 
program.  Most notably racial profiling, discrimination, and a disregard for equal protection were 
among the most outstanding issues with the implementation.  In addition, they note, “Wrongful 
immigration determination is yet another legal concern that arises from the implementation of § 
287(g) MOAs. Because immigration law is a complicated, ever-evolving, and specialized area of 
law and law enforcement, state and local officers often lack the necessary expertise 
notwithstanding the § 287(g) training that they undergo. Consequently, American citizens and 
lawful permanent residents as well as undocumented immigrants who have legal claims to lawful 
status become vulnerable to wrongful detention and even wrongful deportation. Proven, 
documented cases of both have already occurred” (Weissman, Headen, and Parker 2009; 6-8). 
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despite his ties to the immigrant community.  Research on the diffusion of these policies 
over time (in terms of passage) will be an important future research endeavor. 
On the other hand, the proliferation of sanctuary cities—cities that have an 
official “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy toward the citizenship status of their residents—and 
even sanctuary states, indicates that many locales view their immigrant populations, even 
their undocumented immigrant populations, as a net benefit to their economies and their 
culture.  As reported in a recent article on Salon.com, “A comprehensive list of sanctuary 
cities would have to include a huge swath of urban America.  It would include the four 
biggest cities in the United States, [and] the majority of the 25 biggest cities” 
(Koppelman 2007).  According to a Congressional Research Service Report, there are 
currently 2 states with sanctuary laws in place and over 30 cities and counties with 
sanctuary policies (Seghetti, Vina and Ester 2006).93  Ten states introduced bills to 
prohibit sanctuary cities in 2007 (AZ, IN, KS, KY, MI, MS, NY, OK, TX, and VA), but 
by the end of 2007 only one, Oklahoma, had passed the legislation and that was part of an 
omnibus immigration bill. 
Most of these urban locations are the places receiving the most Latino 
immigrants.  Perhaps exposure to immigrants and associated minority groups (e.g., 
Latinos and Asians) increases awareness, understanding, and compassion among the non-
                                                 
93 Alaska and Oregon, both of which are overwhelmingly white and neither state’s immigrant 
population is primarily Latino, but Oregon’s does allow local police to help INS officials gather 
information on individuals arrested for criminal offenses. Both of which are overwhelmingly 
white and neither state’s immigrant population is primarily Latino.  Cities and counties with 
sanctuary policies include Anchorage, AK, Fairbanks, AK, Chandler, AZ, Fresno, CA, Los 
Angeles, CA, San Diego, CA, San Francisco, CA, Sonoma County, CA, Evanston, IL, Cicero, IL, 
Cambridge, MA, Orleans, MA, Portland, ME, Baltimore, MD, Takoma Park, MD, Ann Arbor, 
MI, Detroit, MI, Minneapolis, MN, Durham, NC, Albuquerque, NM, Aztec, NM, Rio Arriba, 
County, NM, Santa Fe, NM, New York, NY, Ashland, OR, Gaston, OR, Marion County, OR, 
Austin, TX, Houston, TX, Katy, TX, Seattle, WA, and Madison, WI. 
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immigrant population and policy elites.  The “contact hypothesis” would suggest as much 
(see McClain et al. 2006).94  Thus, if cities with more immigrants are more likely to pass 
or enforce sanctuary policies, then it is likely that greater contact and integration should 
increase tolerance for Latinos.  However, it is important to note that contact with illegal 
immigrants has consistently been shown to decrease support for immigration and 
undermine positive views of immigrants and Latinos, including among Latino citizens, in 
several studies (de la Garza et al. 1991; Hood et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000).95 
Finally, this chapter calls into question the effect of state legislative empowerment 
in circumventing legislation that has the potential to increase ethnicity based profiling 
and discrimination against Latinos in the workforce.  I found no evidence that Latino 
empowerment decreases the chances of introduction or passage of these bills.  Because 
the data available are so limited and the correlation of Latino empowerment to Latino 
population is so high, I investigate this relationship further in the next chapter, where I 
look at the voting behavior of legislators on punitive immigration bills.  I expect to 
extend this analysis to also include other punitive immigration bills such as those denying 
health care and education to undocumented immigrants, and those outlawing sanctuary 
policies. 
                                                 
94 Gimpel and Lay (2008) also find evidence that rural youth who have increased contact with 
Latino immigrants have much more positive views toward immigration and diversity, although 
limited. 
95 Of course, one cannot escape the fact that urban locations tend to be much more liberal than 
suburban and rural locations.  Thus, the difference between places designating themselves as 
immigrant “sanctuaries” and those enacting anti-immigrant policies may be more a product of 
ideology than this analysis can unearth. 
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Conclusion 
The rate of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills calls to 
attention the need for higher participation rates among Latinos—particularly those that 
will be harmed the most by the discriminatory nature of the legislation.  Unfortunately, 
right now the lowest participation rates are among those who would be the most harmed 
by these bills—Latinos who live in segregated barrios and who work in low-paid 
occupations.  Expanded sanctions against employers are likely to decrease the wages of 
Latino workers as employers pass the buck for expected fines and may also lead to 
increased discrimination in employment when employers fear losing government 
contracts and other penalties (Bansak 2005; Brownell 2006).  Increasing local and state 
police powers to conduct raids and enforce immigration policy also will only serve to 
isolate already segregated Latino communities further.  Raids and police enforcement that 
use the Latino phenotype as an indicator of unlawfulness decreases trust in Latino 
communities for the law and, in the words of Mary Romero, “results in deterring political 
participation, identifying urban space racially, classifying immigrants as deserving and 
undeserving by nationalities, and serves to drive a wedge dividing Latino neighborhoods 
on the basis of citizenship status” (Romero 2006, 447-448).  A greater understanding of 
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Chapter 7:  The Meaning of Empowerment: Descriptive Versus 
Substantive Representation on Punitive Immigration Legislation  
 
Residential segregation has made the political empowerment of Latinos and 
African Americans easier to achieve (Massey and Denton 1993) and these political 
victories have been critical to the political incorporation of both groups (Browning, 
Marshall, and Tabb 1986).  However, the substantive impact of political empowerment is 
less clear.  Studies of the legislative behavior of Latino elected officials have certainly 
shown an increased propensity to introduce and vote for legislation that benefits the 
Latino community, particularly in areas such as education, poverty, and anti-
discrimination measures (Bratton 2006).  This chapter extends the study of Latino 
legislative empowerment to investigate the behavior of Latino legislators on immigration 
bills that could lead to discrimination in the Latino community—legislation that could 
harm Latinos.  The previous chapter showed that punitive immigration policy was more 
common in states with large Latino populations and states in which Latinos held a larger 
proportion of the seats in the statehouse, but the correlation between population and 
representation is too high to draw conclusions about the distinct impact of empowerment 
on the passage of this legislation.  Thus, in this chapter, I explore the relationship in more 
depth by looking specifically at support and opposition for punitive immigration bills 
among Hispanic and non-Hispanic members of state general assemblies. 
Immigration policy is clearly one of the most hotly debated political issues in the 
United States.  While social scientists of various academic disciplines have certainly paid 
a great deal of attention to immigration and to the lives of American immigrants, 
surprisingly little research exists that investigates the nexus between ethnic empowerment 
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and immigration policy.  The dearth of research in this area is especially stark in state and 
local politics research.  Champions of the normative value of majority-minority districts 
(see for example Guineir 1994; McDonald 1992; Yatrakis 1981) would argue that when 
Latinos are represented in legislative bodies punitive immigration policies tha t increase 
the potential for discrimination should receive less support.  On the other hand, the 
isolation of Latinos into overwhelmingly majority Latino districts could prove to dilute 
their influence in the surrounding districts (Lublin 1999; Cameron, Epstein and Halloran 
1996; Cannon 1999) and their political incorporation and power could provoke a 
backlash from non-Latino legislators (Haider-Markel 2007; Lublin and Voss 2000; Yoder 
1991).  Given the prominence of such opposing theories, a lack of empirical investigation 
into this question at various units of analysis highlights the importance of this study.  
Likewise, the lack of federal action on immigration policy has forced state and local 
governments to take on immigration with increasing regularity and to respond to the 
passionate minority of Americans that demand legislation to combat illegal immigration 
by any means necessary.  An important piece of this puzzle that I address in this chapter 
is whether descriptive Latino representation provides an effective counterweight to the 
anti- immigrant forces at work in many American state capitals and where 
underrepresented Latinos can find substantive representation when Latino delegates are 
not present or sufficient. 
One would expect immigration policy to be an area of consensus between Latino 
legislators and the Latino population, given the salience of the issue to Latinos in the U.S.  
Latinos care more about immigration than whites or African Americans, are more 
sympathetic towards immigrants, and disapprove of many prominent public policies used 
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to decrease legal and illegal immigration (Lopez 2008).  While education and economic 
concerns often take center stage, immigration is by far a more important and salient 
political topic to non-Puerto Rican Hispanics than it is to other groups (see Bratton 2006; 
Leal 2000).  Over two thirds of Latinos living in the United States today are either 
foreign born or have at least one parent who is (Suro and Passel 2003)—a far greater 
connection to immigrants than any other U.S. ethnic group.  Thus, the impact of 
immigration laws is experienced most intensely by the Latino community.  While a body 
of literature exists on Latino public opinion toward immigration (de la Garza 1991; Hood, 
et al. 1997; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2006; Kehrberg and Butz 2006) and federal 
immigration reform (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Newton 2008), little work has been 
done on immigration legislation on the state level outside of California where 
immigration has taken center stage in several state ballot initiatives (but see Skerry 1995; 
Tatalovich 1995).  This is probably due to the relative silence of state legislatures on the 
immigration issue until the last few years, but the recent upsurge in state sponsored 
immigration legislation (NCSL 2008) opens the opportunity to evaluate the degree to 
which Latino state legislators are reflective of the Latino population in their voting on 
immigration issues.96 
In this chapter, I examine anti- illegal immigrant legislation that has the potential 
to increase discrimination against Latinos in the areas of law enforcement and 
employment.  Primarily, my evidence bears on the following research questions: (1) how 
                                                 
96 Another reason for the lack of scholarship is the difficulty of conducting research at the state 
level because of the barriers in identifying appropriate state legislation, the cumbersome nature of 
finding legislative votes on state laws, and the lack of available data on individual state legislators 
and their districts.  According to a PEW Hispanic Center Report, “Between 1989 and 1995 the 
number of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents assigned to enforcement of employer 
sanctions dropped by half as did the number of fines issued.” States may therefore feel some 
pressure to provide this disincentive at the state level. (Lowell and Suro 2002, 4) 
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controversial are punitive immigration bills? (2) What individual and demographic 
factors correlate with the voting behavior of legislators on these bills? (3) How do Latino 
legislators vote on punitive immigration bills? And, (4) when Latinos lack descriptive 
representation, in whom do they find substantive representation on anti- immigration 
issues?  In the first part of the analysis, I catalogue the votes of state legislatures and in 
particular, Latino legislators, on punitive immigration bills in the years 2006-2008.  
Following a discussion of general observations from the distribution of votes on these 
bills, I focus on votes taken in four states: Arizona, and Texas, which have large Latino 
delegations, and Montana and Georgia, both of which have very few Latino legislators.  
Using data on both the individual characteristics of the state legislators and characteristics 
of their districts, I find that opposition to these bills varies greatly by state.  In general, I 
find that non-Hispanic Democrats in states with smaller and newer Latino populations do 
a better job representing the interests of newer La tino immigrants than Latino 
representatives in Border States where immigration is a salient political issue. 
Latino empowerment does not appear to help stem the tide of anti- immigrant 
policy because many Latino elected officials appear to be divided on the benefits and 
consequences of these policy tools.  Consequentially, while most scholars view 
empowerment as one of the few saving graces of residential segregation, I argue that 
limited Latino representation is not the panacea for punitive immigration bills that one 
might expect.  Since descriptive representation is only effective when policy opinions are 
homogenous within the minority population, when elected officials and those they 
represent have shared life experiences, and finally, when the minority is  proportionally 
represented in the legislature (Mansbridge 1999), divisions within the Latino population 
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on immigration policy complicate the link between descriptive and substantive 
representation in matters of immigration. 
The implications of my findings highlight the importance of political participation 
among Latinos—particularly first generation immigrants and their children.  Despite their 
large numbers in many states, Latinos remain far underrepresented in state legislatures.  
If Latinos were more politically active and adequately mobilized, they would have a 
better chance of combating punitive legislation. 
Political Representation of Underrepresented Minorities 
 While the pernicious effects of residential segregation on socioeconomic mobility 
and interracial relations are well documented, segregation also enables minority groups to 
achieve political representation.  Descriptive representation of African Americans, 
Latinos, and women is seen as beneficial because female and minority elected officials 
pursue policy agendas that disproportionately benefit members of their minority group 
(Whitby 1989; Saint-Germain 1990; Hutchings 1998; Haynie 1999; Swers 2002; Bratton 
2006), enable intra-ethnic/racial coalition building (Canon 1999), and increase trust and 
participation in elections among minority voters (Gay 2002; 2001; Bobo and Gilliam 
1990; Barretto 2007).  However the extent to which descriptive representation should 
translate into meaningful policy successes for the Latino community is debatable.  While 
Latino school board empowerment has been shown to translate into increased 
representation of Latinos among school administrators and teachers, to have positive 
benefits for the educational achievement of Latino school children (Meier and Stewart 
1991; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989), and to result in increased funding for bilingual 
education (Leal and Hess 2000), it is unclear whether Latino representation in state 
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legislatures benefits Latinos in the electorate beyond agenda setting on pro-Latino issues 
(Branton 2006; Rouse 2008). 
 Jane Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation is critical to 
minority groups when the minority group is marked by four criteria: (1) mistrust of 
governing institutions; (2) uncrystallized interests; (3) historical subordination; and, (4) 
as a result, the institution suffers from low de facto legitimacy within the minority 
population.  In these situations, descriptive representation can increase: (1) 
communication both “vertically” (legislator to voters of the minority group) and 
“horizontally” (between legislators of the majority group and legislators representing the 
minority group); (2) substantive representation of the minority group; (3) attachment of 
the minority to the polity as a whole; and (4) the socia l meaning of democracy and the 
legitimacy of the governing institution among minorities. 
 Each of the factors Mansbridge identifies for justifying descriptive representation 
is relevant to Latinos.  Despite recent gains, Latinos remain decidedly underrepresented 
at all levels of government.  Historically, Latinos have been treated by many 
governments as second-class citizens—denied voting rights and locked into segregated 
housing and schools (Massey, Durant, and Malone 2002).  Moreover, many of the issues 
most important to Latinos do not neatly align with the two-party dichotomy (Rouse 2008; 
Bratton 2006).  Thus, given the historical subordination and underrepresentation of 
Latinos in state government and the low levels of trust and belief in governing institutions 
among Latino voters (Schildkraut 2005), representation may be particularly important for 
translating Latino voter interests into substantive policy outcomes (Bratton 2006). 97 
                                                 
97 While several scholars have found that Latinos have higher than average trust in the political 
system, recent evidence, such as that by Schildkraut (2005) and Michelson (2003) find that 
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 However, the link between descriptive and substantive representation is not 
automatic.  For example, legislators and the minority group must have “shared 
experiences” that lead to shared preferences on political issues (Mansbridge 1999, 629).  
Monolithic preferences ease the translation of descriptive representation into substantive 
representation.  Thus, it seems that to substantively represent all issue positions held by 
groups marked by diverse or internally conflicting opinions, a greater number of 
representatives and more ideologically diverse (and ideologically reflective ) 
representation is required (i.e., if a group is marked by, for example, economic 
heterogeneity, representation from elite members only is insufficient to provide 
substantive representation, even if they “look like” the population they appear to 
represent). 
 This qualification increases the complexity of Latino descriptive representation 
and expands the number of issue areas usually regarded as pertinent to Latinos.  To date 
scholars largely have judged the success of Latino representation in state government by 
evaluating bill introduction, agenda-setting, and legislative success on issues considered 
to be of “Latino interest” (Branton 2006; Fraga et al. 2006; Rouse 2008).   However, this 
research has focused primarily on issues that can be considered pro-Latino.  For example, 
Bratton (2006, 1137) argues that Latino interests include “such policies as education, 
healthcare, welfare, as well as policies that are explicitly designed to aid an immigrant or 
Latino population,” in addition to policies that “decrease discrimination against Latinos 
or alleviate the effects of discrimination” (1142).  The decision to focus on these issues is 
                                                                                                                                                 
assimilation is corrosive of political trust.  The longer Latino immigrants have lived in the U.S. 
the more likely they are to lack trust and feel disaffected from governing institutions.  In addition, 
second and third generation Latinos are much less trusting than Latino immigrants. 
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certainly justified, as all these issues are incredibly important both socially and politically 
to a majority of the Latino community (see Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Leal 2000).98    
Scholars investigating the benefits of Latino representation have looked for 
connections between empowerment and policies that benefit the Latino community in 
these issue areas (Leal and Hess 2000; Meier, Stewart, and England 1991; Bratton 2006; 
Rouse 2008; Fraga et al. 2006).99  However, I have found no work to date that focuses on 
Latino legislators’ voting on issues that are potentially harmful to Latinos within those 
areas of interest.  To what extent are Latino legislators both relevant for advancing 
policies beneficial to the Latino community and effective at defeating or mitigating 
proposals that harm the Latino community?  To fully understand the extent to which 
Latino descriptive representation translates into substantive representation and meets the 
criteria necessary for effective descriptive representation laid out by Mansbridge, we 
must understand this side of the coin as well.100 
Immigration is an issue that is more important to Latinos than any other group but 
no political party has taken ownership of the issue.  This general trend is particularly 
pronounced at the state level, where government responses to immigration are relatively 
new on the political agenda and is an area where one might expect the link between 
substantive and descriptive representation to be robust. 
 
                                                 
98 A National Association of Latino Elected Officials 2008 survey found that the four most 
important issues to the Latino electorate were the economy, the war, health care, and immigration 
(NALEO 2008, 4). 
99 In these studies, empowerment has been measured either as the percentage of the legislative 
body made up of Latinos, Latino membership on key legislative committees, and the number of 
Latinos in leadership positions within the legislature. 
100 For example, Donald Haider-Markel (2007) finds that descriptive representation is a two-sided 
coin.  Descriptive representation both increases the number of beneficial bills and punitive bills 
that target the minority group. 
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Immigration Attitudes among Latinos 
 Many initiatives that try to reduce illegal immigration in a particular state, to 
decrease the number of current illegal immigrants, or to dissuade immigrants from 
choosing the state as a potential destination, may lead to discrimination against native 
born and legal immigrant Latinos as well as the undocumented immigrants they are 
supposed to target.101  As a result, punitive immigration policies can be considered anti-
Latino in nature.102  Thus, looking at Latino legislator voting behavior on punitive 
immigration bills begins the discussion of whether descriptive representation is effective 
for countering anti-Latino initiatives. 
 Immigration regulation is one particularly relevant issue area to Latinos, but one 
where the Latino electorate and the Latino elite may not be of one mind.  In many ways 
Latinos are not a cohesive group.  Nationality, class, racial, and generational cleavages 
divide the Latino community and increase barriers to the development of group 
consciousness (Kaufmann 2003; DeGenova and Ramos-Zaya 2003; Stokes 2003; 
Marquez 2006).  For example, the first wave of Cubans came to the United States 
primarily through legal means and came with high education levels and sufficient 
financial resources, although, they were followed by "The Marielitos" who were not as 
welcome or as mobile (Suro 1999).  Regardless, once on American soil Cubans are 
considered legal refugees and are provided with resources to ease their integration (Portes 
and Rumbaut 2001).  Puerto Ricans are citizens by birth, whereas Mexicans and other 
Central Americans face long lines and a long wait to be eligible for citizenship.  
                                                 
101 I discuss this at length in Chapter 5. 
102 That said, many scholars argue that all anti-immigrant initiatives are in fact anti-Latino (see 
Smith and Furuseth 2007, 13) 
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Dominicans and other Caribbean Latinos also primarily enter the U.S. through legal 
means but often face hardships due to their darker skin tone (Massey and Denton 1993).  
As a result, “Latino interests” are difficult to define and may, in fact, be distinct—
depending on the country of origin for the Latino group, their skin tone, or their 
immigration status (Bratton 2006).  
 Moreover, generational status divides the Latino community into two solid 
groups—on the one hand, those whose families were annexed into the United States or 
who immigrated many generations ago, and on the other, those whose families or who 
themselves immigrated recently (Kehrberg and Butz 2006).  The gulf between legal and 
undocumented immigrants further exacerbates generational divisions (Suro 1999).  
Documented Latino immigrants and their children may have little empathy for those who 
bypassed the hurdles of legal immigration. 
 While few scholars find that attitudes toward immigration vary meaningfully by 
country of origin, acculturation does appear to influence attitudes across Latino 
subgroups.  De la Garza et al. (1991) show that among Mexicans, self- identification as a 
“Mexican” increases support for immigration.  These scholars advance a cultural affinity 
thesis: the more a person remains attached to his or her ethnic he ritage, the more positive 
he or she will feel toward new immigrants from Latin America and the more affinity he 
or she will feel toward Latinos remaining south of the boarder.  Hood et al. (1997) also 
demonstrate that Latinos who are more acculturated are less supportive of increased 
immigration.   
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 But both studies also argue that increased contact with illegal immigrants 
diminishes support for immigration. 103  It may be that native-born Latinos fear that their 
own status and acceptance within the majority population will decline with a rapid 
increase in illegal immigration to their area (see, for example, Garcia Bedolla 2005 for 
some discussion on this point).  Or, as Burns and Gimpel (2000) argue, Latinos may be 
more likely to call for decreased immigration because their economic positions make 
them “the most threatened by the increased competition for jobs, services, and housing 
caused by recent immigration” (221) (also see Camarota 1997; Waldinger 1997).   
 Despite these many divisions, opinions toward immigration in the Latino 
community are surprisingly uniform. According to the PEW Hispanic Center’s 2007 
National Survey of Latinos, over half of all Latinos feel that there are too few or the right 
amount of immigrants living in the United States and over eighty percent feel that illegal 
immigrants help the economy.  Their perspectives on immigration policies are also very 
cohesive.  Almost 86 percent of Latinos feel that local police should not take an active 
role in immigration control and 82 percent disapprove of workplace raids as a means for 
controlling immigration.  And in 2008, a PEW survey found that 70 percent of Latinos 
disapprove of criminal prosecution of employers who hire undocumented immigrants and 
a majority disapproves of requiring employers to check with the federal government to 
verify employment eligibility of new hires (Lopez 2008).  Although approval of such 
anti- immigrant programs is higher among citizens than non-citizens and among those 
whose families have been in the country longer, there is still a striking amount of 
                                                 
103 In fact, Hood et al. (1997) show that, holding other variables included in the model at their 
mean, Latinos who live in states in which 4 percent of the population is made up of illegal 
immigrants are more than twice as likely to favor reducing immigration rates as Latinos living in 
states with no illegal immigrants (642).  
 
 232  
agreement among Latinos of the desirability of these programs.  For example, according 
to the 2007 PEW Survey, 82 percent of Latino citizens disapprove of giving local police 
immigration powers (compared to 91 percent of non citizens).  Among citizens, 72 
percent of third generation Latino immigrants disapprove of this policy (compared to 87 
percent of first generation immigrant citizens).  Thus while there is certainly somewhat 
varying support depending on generational status, Latinos across subgroups are 
overwhelmingly unified in their attitudes about immigration. 104 
Latino Descriptive Representation and Immigration Policy 
Given widespread Latino support for immigration and opposition to punitive immigration 
policies, Latino legislators should oppose punitive immigration bills.  However, Latinos 
in government may not always be very representative of the Latino population in 
demographic terms.  Legislators are rarely reflective of the general public in terms of 
income, educational attainment, or other demographic factors (Mills 1956; Dye 1994) 
and Latino legislators are no different.  In fact, in their investigation of the Latino elite, 
Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998; 2006) found that Latino elites were more likely to have 
light skin and high-status social backgrounds and were more similar to European 
Americans than the Latino electorate (2006; 166).  Given this fact, Latinos in elected 
office who often do not hail from Latino immigrant communities may be more hostile 
toward the new Latino immigrants than the general Hispanic population, even while they 
maintain significant electoral safety representing homogeneously Latino districts made 
up largely of first and second generation Latino immigrants.  It is also important to note 
                                                 
104 Newton (2008) also finds that Latino representatives in Congress were adamant in their 
opposition to employment sanctions because of the potential for increased discrimination against 
Latinos in the workplace.  Thus, at least at the Congressional level, Latino elites also appear to 
disapprove of these policies. 
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that Latino legislators who represent largely Latino districts are likely be more aware of 
the burden placed on community services and the financial strain created by the presence 
of new immigrants in traditionally Latino enclaves.  As a result, Latino legislators may 
also feel compelled to curtail the flow of new immigrants regardless of the potential 
social costs to some Latinos in their districts. 
 So, how should we expect Latino legislators to vote on punitive immigration 
bills?  The discussion above leads to two contrary hypotheses.  On the one hand, 
increased Latino representation should decrease support for punitive immigration bills—
as Latinos should be less likely to vote in their favor.  However, given the potential bias 
of the Latino legislators to be drawn from the Latino elite, and not immigrant 
communities, and for Latino legislators to be particularly attuned to the costs of illegal 
immigration in their communities, Latino elected officials may be just as likely to vote in 
favor of punitive immigration controls as their white counterparts.  In this case, some 
Latino legislators should vote in favor of punitive immigration bills even though they 
represent largely Latino immigrant communities. 
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Nevada .04 .25 -.21 Arkansas .00 .05 -.05 
California  .15 .36 -.21 Wyoming .02 .07 -.05 
Texas .17 .36 -.19 Delaware .02 .06 -.05 
New Mexico .27 .44 -.18 Maryland .02 .06 -.05 
Arizona .12 .30 -.17 Indiana .01 .05 -.04 
Colorado .03 .20 -.17 Wisconsin .01 .05 -.04 
Florida .09 .21 -.12 Pennsylvania  .00 .04 -.04 
New Jersey .05 .16 -.11 Iowa .00 .04 -.04 
Utah .01 .12 -.11 South Carolina .01 .04 -.03 
Illinois .05 .15 -.10 Louisiana .00 .03 -.03 
New York .06 .16 -.10 Michigan .01 .04 -.03 
Rhode Island .02 .11 -.09 Minnesota .01 .04 -.03 
Oregon .01 .11 -.09 Tennessee .01 .03 -.03 
Idaho .01 .10 -.09 Alabama .00 .03 -.03 
Connecticut .03 .12 -.08 Ohio .00 .02 -.02 
Hawaii .00 .08 -.08 South Dakota .00 .02 -.02 
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Washington .01 .09 -.08 Kentucky .00 .02 -.02 
Nebraska  .00 .08 -.08 Montana .01 .03 -.02 
Oklahoma .00 .07 -.07 New Hampshire .00 .03 -.02 
Massachusetts .02 .09 -.07 Mississippi .00 .02 -.02 
Georgia  .01 .08 -.06 Missouri .01 .03 -.02 
North Carolina .01 .07 -.06 North Dakota .00 .02 -.02 
Kansas .02 .09 -.06 Vermont .00 .01 -.01 
Virginia  .01 .07 -.06 Maine .00 .01 -.01 
Alaska .00 .06 -.06 West Virginia  .00 .01 -.01 
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Non-Hispanic Representation on Immigration Policy 
 Latinos remain vastly underrepresented in state legislatures.  Table 7.1 shows the 
difference between the population make up and the percent of the state legislature made 
up of Latinos.  Latinos are particularly underrepresented in the states in which they are 
the largest proportion of the population.  For example, in Nevada, only four percent of the 
state legislature is Latino although Latinos make up about a quarter of the population.  
Likewise, in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, where the Latino populations 
are not only large but have lived for many generations, they are also greatly 
underrepresented.  There is a twenty percentage point gap between the Latino population 
and the make up of the state legislature in California, the difference between population 
and legislative diversity are almost equally imbalanced in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, 
and Colorado.  In states that have newer Latino populations, representation is almost non-
existent, particularly in new destinations in the South, such as North Carolina (1 
legislator), Tennessee (1 legislator), and Georgia (3 legislators).  Sixteen states have no 
Latino representatives at all, including Oklahoma which last year passed the most 
comprehensive anti- immigrant bill in the nation. This is a natural consequence of 
immigration; incorporation takes time.  But meanwhile, who represents Latino interests? 
 Substantive representation is not contingent upon descriptive representation.  
Many scholars and political commentators consider liberal Democrats substantive 
representatives of minority communities (Swain 1993; Lublin 1997a; 1997b; 2000).  The 
electoral connection (Mayhew 1975) increases the likelihood that representatives of all 
sorts will represent the interests of the affected group even if the member does not have 
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an interest in the legislation themselves—as long as they perceive that their reelection is 
contingent upon the group’s vote (Mansbridge 1999, 635; Lublin 1997).  Thus, 
Democrats who represent districts with substantial Latino voting blocks may be cautious 
of casting supportive voices toward legislation with negative consequences for Latino 
communities.  African American legisla tors may also be adverse to this legislation.  
African American legislators have led the fight in Congress and state legislators in 
combating discrimination in employment, law enforcement, and other areas.  Given their 
own historical experience with discrimination, Black legislators may be ideologically 
opposed to legislation that potentially increases discrimination against any minority 
group, even if it is not their own (Bratton 2006).  That said, African Americans are also 
among the most likely to be competing for jobs and the spoils of government with new 
immigrant populations (Burns and Gimpel 1999; Kaufmann 2003; Citrin et al. 1997), 
which may increase their support for punitive immigration policies.  Of course, Latino 
and African American legislators often vote together and participate in bi- or tri- racial 
caucuses even if no “rainbow coalition” exists in their districts. 
Data and Methods 
Latino Legislative Voting Behavior 
 Using the Migration Policy Institute’s “State Response to Immigration” data set 
for 2007 and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) list of state laws 
relating to immigration and immigrants for 2006, 2007, and 2008, I created a list of all 
the punitive immigration reform laws for the three years that sought to increase penalties 
for employers for employing illegal immigrants or that gave or expanded immigration 
enforcement powers to local and state police (see Chapter Five ).  Unfortunately because 
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the NCSL list only includes bills enacted into law, in years 2006 and 2008, I can only 
include bills that were enacted into law.  I am working on compiling a list of all 
legislation for 2005 through 2008.  While it is unfortunate to be unable to include more 
analysis of voting behavior on failed votes, very few bills receive an unfavorable vote in 
state legislatures.  In general, when a bill is going to fail on the floor, it is never called for 
a vote.  So if the bill receives a negative vote in committee, it will never receive a full 
vote.  In addition, if the bill is sufficiently controversial that the leadership expects a 
negative vote, they will often allow bills to expire instead of spending time debating an 
ultimately doomed bill.  The Migration Policy Institute’s data set includes bills that 
expired and bills that failed in addition to those passed.  Using this data set to track down 
failed bills confirms this position.  Bills in only two states actually faced a floor vote and 
failed (Virginia and Montana), all others marked as failed in the MPI data set either 
received an unfavorable motion out of committee or never got an up or down vote in at 
least one chamber (after having passed out of a single chamber). 
Once the list of laws for each year was complete, using state legislative websites, 
I tracked the votes for each of the bills that received a recorded vote.  Since it is 
impossible to disaggregate voice votes, only recorded votes were included.  I also used 
the state legislatures websites for the four states included in the case study to search for 
immigration bills introduced in 2006 and 2008.  Using this approach, I was able to 
include more votes for the case study states than for the analysis of the entire sample.   
Using the 2006, 2007, and 2008 Directories of Latino Elected Officials available 
from the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund, I 
identified the voting behavior of Latino state legislators on each of these bills and 
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recorded whether they voted in favor or against the measure.  Using The Almanac of 
State Legislative Elections (Lilley III et al. 2007), I include data on the legislative district 
attributes of Latino legislator’s districts.  In addition, I include individual level data for 
the state legislators including the gender, race, ethnicity, and political party affiliation of 
the legislators attained from the state legislature websites.  Individual legislator data for 
Arizona and Texas was also acquired from Kathleen Bratton’s state legislative data.  
Given the very small number of these bills and relatively small number of legislators in 
state governments, I only present descriptive data.  Description and sources of the data 
are available in Appendix B. 
Results 
Latino Legislators and Punitive Immigration Legislation 
 How controversial are punitive immigration bills?  Unfortunately, this question is 
almost impossible to answer because most states do not keep transcripts of committee 
debates or archive written or oral testimony submitted for bill hearings.  However, the 
limited information we can gather from floor votes indicates that ease of passage varies 
by state.  Table 7.2 presents a list of all the punitive immigration laws that came out of 
state legislatures in 2006 and 2008 and all the bills that either passed or failed in 2007.  
The results indicate that there is a lack of consensus among legislators as to the 
desirability of these state immigration controls.  In three states—Pennsylvania, Colorado, 
Nevada, and Virginia—at least one bill received unanimous votes in both chambers.  
Despite the presence of a few Latino legislators in both Colorado (5) and Nevada (3) and 
a single Latino legislator in both Virginia and Pennsylvania, not one legislator stood in 
opposition to these bills.  In most other states, these bills received little opposition, 
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although in almost every state a minority of legislators openly opposed these bills.  While 
the opposition was small, and unable to defeat the legislation, it is meaningful that voices 
of dissent were present in most states.  In only a few states was the opposition strong 
enough to defeat the bills; most bills that failed were bills that received a favorable vote 
in one chamber but failed to receive a vote in the other before the legislative session 
concluded.  Montana was the only state in which several bills were actually voted down.  
AS Table 7.2 shows, These bills garnered the most opposition in the final vote in 
Montana, Arizona, and Georgia. 
 How do Latino legislators vote on punitive immigration bills?  Table 7.2 also 
includes how many Latino legislators voted in support (and in opposition) to each these 
bills.  Again, there seems to be a lack of consensus between Latino elected officials as to 
the worth of these policy tools.  Many voted in favor of this legislation while others 
opposed it.  The little evidence available indicates that the Latino policy elite may in fact 
be inclined to vote in favor of bills that penalize undocumented immigrants and 
potentially increase discrimination.  Taking all of the punitive bills as a whole, more 
Latino legislators voted in favor of these policy tools than voted in opposition.  That said, 
it appears that the more Latinos are in the legislature, the more diversity there is in the 
Latino caucus.  To examine this relationship closer, I examine the votes taken in Texas 
and Arizona. 
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2007-2008 








2006 Arizona HB 2577 Y:49 
N:31 
Established fines for 
businesses who employ 
illegal aliens and provided 
money to train law 
enforcement in immigration 
procedures, and deny 
education benefits to 
immigrants 


















Establishes fine for 
employing unauthorized 
aliens. 





  HB 1001 Senate:  
Y: 33 N: 2 
House:  
Y: 63 N: 0 
Verification of legal status of 












  HB 1343 Senate:  
Y: 35 N: 0 
House:  
Y: 60 N: 3 
 
Prohibits state agencies from 
contracting with businesses 
that employ unauthorized 
immigrants 
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued) 
2006 Georgia  SB 529 House:  
Y: 119 N: 49 
Senate:  
Y: 20 N: 33 
Requires public employers to 
participation in federal work 
authorization program, 
authorizes the state to negotiate 
a memorandum of 
understanding for 287(g) 










2006 Louisiana SB 753 House:  
Y: 91 N: 5 
Senate:  
Y: 26 N: 9 
Establishes fine for employing 
unauthorized aliens. 
0    
2006 Pennsylvania  HB 2319 Unanimous 
in both 
Houses 
Prohibits use of illegal 
immigrants on state projects, 
provides for remedies for those 
found guilty of doing so. 
1 1a (1 
House) 
  
2006 Tennessee HB 111 House:  
Y: 81 N: 10 
Senate:  
Y: 29 N: 0 
Prohibits state agencies from 
contracting with businesses that 
employ illegal immigrants 
1 1   




Establishes penalties for hiring 
illegal immigrants. 
17 7 (4 
House) 








  SB 1265 Y:53 
N:31 
Establishes probable cause for 
denying bail if the person is 
suspected of being in the 
country illegally. 




     (4 
Senate) 
0  
2007 Arkansas HB 1024 Y: 117 
N: 8 
Prohibits state agencies from 
contracting with businesses that 
employ unauthorized 
immigrants. 
0    
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued) 
2007 Colorado HB 1073 unanimous Prohibits state agencies from 
contracting with businesses that 
employ unauthorized 
immigrants. 
5 5 (3 
House) 




2007 Montana SB 346 
*failed 
Senate:  
Y: 33 N: 17 
House:  
Y: 14 N: 86 
Prohibits state agencies from 
contracting with businesses that 
employ unauthorized 
immigrants. (Legislation failed) 
1 1 (1 
House) 
0 0 





Y:94 N: 5 
Creates a penalty of $300 for 
employing an illegal immigrant. 
 1 0 0 





Y: 25 N: 25 
Gives authority to police 
officers to stop an individual if 
the police officer has a 
“reasonable suspicion” that the 
individual has violated federal 
immigration law. 
 0 0 0 
2007 Nevada AB 383 Unanimous Establishes penalties for hir ing 
illegal immigrants. 
2 2 (2 
House) 
0 0 
2007 Oklahoma HB 1804 Y: 126 
N: 19 
Prohibiting state contracts with 
contractors who employ 
unauthorized immigrants and 
directs the Attorney General to 
enter into a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the 
State of Oklahoma and the 
United States Department of 
Justice or the United States 
Department of Homeland 
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued) 
2007 Tennessee SB 1604 Y:125 
N:1 
Directs Tennessee to enter into a 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between the State of Oklahoma and 
the United States Department of 
Justice or the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 
as provided by Section 1357(g) 
1 1 0 0 
  HB 729 Y:31 
N:1d 
Establishes penalties for hiring 
illegal immigrants. 
 1 0 0 
2007 Texas HB 1196 Y:166 
N:4 
Requires a business that submits an 
application to receive a public 
subsidy to include in the application 
a statement certifying that the 
business, or a branch, division, or 
department of the business, does not 
and will not knowingly employ an 
unauthorized worker. 











  HB 13 Y: 138 
N: 3e 
Authorizes subdivisions to enter 
into 287(g) agreements. 
    
2007 Virginia  HB 2926 
*failed—no 





Expands the powers of state and 
local law enforcement officials to 
include immigration powers 
conferred upon the law enforcement 
agency by agreement with the US 







SB 70 Y:94 
N:5 
Establishes penalties for hiring 
illegal immigrants. 
0b    
2008 Arizona HB 2745 Y: 63 
N: 20 
Increases and expands employer 
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued) 
2008 Colorado SB 193 House:  
Y: 58 N: 7 
Senate:  
Y: 34 N: 0 
Prohibiting state contracts with 
contractors who employ illegal 








2008 Georgia  SB 350 House:  
Y: 99 N: 68 
Senate:  
Y: 38 N: 8 
Requires police to determine the 
nationality of persons driving 










2008 Missouri HB 2058 House:  
Y: 135 N: 12 
Senate:  
Y: 30 N: 4 
Prohibits the use of tax credits by 
businesses that employ 





  HB 1549 House:  
Y: 124 N: 16 
Senate:  
Y: 27 N: 7 
Requires state highway patrol to 
be trained in accordance with 
immigration law (287(g)); 
requires public contractors to 
verify eligibility of employees 
and denies company further 
contracts for 3 years for violation 






2008 Mississippi SB 2988 Senate:  
Y: 52 N: 0 
House:  
Y: 112 N: 8 
Prohibiting state contracts with 
contractors who employ illegal 
aliens, sets up program to 




   
2008 North 
Carolina 
HB 2436 Senate:  
Y: 32 N: 14 
House:  
Y: 97 N: 20 
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Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued) 
2008 South 
Carolina 
HB 4400 House:  
Y:89 N: 23 
Senate: voice 
vote 
Prohibits state contracts with 
contractors who employ unauthorized 
immigrants and establishes a penalty 
of felony conviction and up to 5 years 
in prison for employers who hire 
unauthorized immigrants.  Requires a 
Memorandum of Understanding with 
DHS or DOJ to train law enforcement 






2008 Utah SB 81 House:  
Y: 56 N: 15 
Senate:  
Y: 24 N: 4 
Requires a Memorandum of 
Understanding with DHS for the 
enforcement of federal immigration 
law by state and local law 
enforcement personnel. Requires state 
contractors to use federal work 
authorization program 






2008 Virginia  HB 926 Unanimous in 
both houses 
Prohibits business entities from hiring 
illegal aliens.  Terminates corporate 
existence for violation 




  HB 1298 Senate:  
Y: 40 N: 0 
House:  
Y: 96 N: 3 
 
Prohibits contractors from knowingly 





a Voice vote unanimous. 
b The NALEO database does not list Jon Amores as a Latino elected official, but there is much speculation on the internet that claims he is.  He has 
long been known to be the critical opponent in the West Virginia House of Delegates that prevented English only legislation from being passed until 
a legislative maneuver was used to bypass his committee. Amores voted against SB 70.   
c Senator Apodaca is listed as both not voting and as having voted against but “Paired” 
 with Senator Hoyle who voted in favor of the bill.  
d Only senate vote found 
e House vote, Senate taken by voice, unanimous. 
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Case Studies: Texas and Arizona 
In Texas, despite the large number of Latino legislators, House Bills 13 and 1196 
were passed with overwhelming majorities.  Only three legislators, all Latino, voted 
against House Bill 13, a bill calling for local police to be trained and to act as 
immigration officers.  But on House Bill 1196, a bill to make public contractors legally 
attest to not employing undocumented workers, only one legislator (a non-Hispanic 
Democrat) voted in opposition—no Latino legislators objected.  Despite significant co-
ethnic representation in the Texas State House, Latinos, particularly non-citizens, in 
Texas appear to reap few rewards through legislative empowerment. 
Arizona had four punitive immigration bills during the 2006 through 2008 time 
span.  Arizona’s House Bill 2577 established fines for businesses that employ illegal 
immigrants and established a 287(g) agreement to train local police to enforce 
immigration policy.  For this bi- faceted bill, the entire Latino delegation voted in 
opposition.  Seventeen other legislators—primarily Democrats, but also a few 
Republicans—joined the Latino delegation in opposition.  A majority of the Latino 
delegation also voted in opposition to House Bill 1265—a broad and vague measure that 
established a policy of denying bail to people accused of a crime if there was “probable 
cause” to believe the person was in the country illegally—along with 16 other 
Democratic members of the legislature.  No Republicans voted in opposition.  Both of 
these bills appear to have united the Latino delegation in opposition. 
On the other hand, House Bill 2779, a bill creating penalties for employers found 
guilty of hiring undocumented workers, split the Latino delegation.  Of the 17 Latinos in 
the Arizona legislature, 7 voted in favor of the legislation and 9 voted in opposition (one 
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did not vote).  Again, the opposition included several other non-Hispanic Democrats and 
no Republicans voted in opposition.  The division in the Latino delegation repeated itself 
in 2008 with House Bill 2745, when the legislature again voted to increase employer 
penalties for hiring undocumented workers.  In this case, 11 Democrats and 1 Republican 
joined eight Latino legislators in opposition to the bill.   
It is important to note that all of the Latino legislators in Arizona are Democrats, 
so partisanship was not driving the divisions between them.  However there was also no 
uniform agreement among the Latino members.  It appears that immigration policy is a 
contentious issue within the Latino delegation despite the relative consensus among 
Latino constituents on this issue. 
 If ethnicity is not what unites legislators on these issues, what does?  Looking at 
the demographics and politics of legislative districts can elucidate some of the variation 
in voting behavior present between Latino delegates and delegates more generally.  In 
this section I seek to understand what demographic and political factors drive 
disagreement about how to regulate (or if to regulate) immigration between Latino 
legislators and legislators more generally.  Again, the Arizona case study illuminates the 
underlying differences between legislators who vote in favor and legislators who oppose 
these bills.  Using demographic information for Latino legislators, presented in Table 7.3, 
it appears that although there were no differences between legislators who voted for or 
against the bills in terms of the education levels or poverty levels of their districts, Latino 
legislators who voted in favor of these bills had significantly more whites and fewer 
Latinos in their districts.  For the three bills that divided the Latino delegation, Latinos  
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Individual Variables      District Demographics      





legislators Support 20.27** 23.94** 21.29** 24.26** 
  Oppose 96 43 84 56    Oppose 42.91 51.26 47.01 44.76 
               






Only Support - 47.01** 26.35** 46.95** 
  Oppose 11 0 0 2    Oppose 54.61 57.07 55.02 60.12 
               





legislators Support 68.41** 61.6** 67.32** 62.75** 
  Oppose 50 17 43 23    Oppose 41.28 34.34 36.4 36.34 
               






Only Support - 38.91** 58.95** 36.8** 
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Table 7.3  Arizona Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors (continued) 




















Individual Variables       District Demographics      





Legislators Support 10.19** 13.6** 11.21** 12.77** 
  Oppose 26 9 24 17    Oppose 20.59 20.44 21.04 21.58 
               






Only Support 21.52 20.68 14.7** 21.8 
  Oppose 100 56 88 67    Oppose - 20.56 21.35 21.58 
                              
N     80 82 84 83                 
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who supported the bills represented significantly fewer Latinos, and significantly more 
whites.  In addition, their districts had significantly higher incomes (not shown) than the 
Latinos who voted aga inst the bills.  Latino legislators who supported these bills also 
came from more politically competitive districts than the opposition, although only 
moderately so.  Latino delegates supporting HB 2779 on average won their last election 
with 73 percent of the vote, while the average electoral victory for Latino delegates who 
opposed the bill was 89 percent—both highly uncompetitive margins.  The same factors 
were significant among the non-Hispanic legislators.  The opposition had more Latinos in 
their district and fewer whites than supporters, and supporters represented much more 
wealthy districts.  The opposition, in short came from more uncompetitive districts where 
Latinos were the overwhelming majority and many more residents lived below the 
poverty line.  Whereas support for these bills came from areas in which few immigrants 
live and where immigrants are not using local resources, opposition came from the very 
places where the impact of immigration is greatest. 
The trends evident in Texas and Arizona indicate that Latino empowerment is not 
a magic panacea but instead the quality of representation derived from co-ethnic 
empowerment depends on the context in which the Latino representatives serve. While 
Latinos in Texas appear to have few friends in the legislature, Latinos in Arizona seem to 
be gaining empowerment through their co-ethnic representation, but also through white 
Democrats who represent districts with significant Latino voting blocks.  Residential 
segregation of Latinos appears to help their political prospects in Arizona but hurt them 
in Texas.  In Texas, legislators have political cover by representing largely uncompetitive 
Latino legislative districts.  In 2006 only twelve of the thirty-six Latinos (about one-third) 
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in the Texas legislature won their seats with under seventy-five percent of the vote.  
Legislators have little reason to fear repercussions for voting against the interests of their 
constituents when they win with such large margins.  The Texas state legislature is also 
part time and may garner little public scrutiny.  They meet for 140 days, once every two 
years.  How salient their actions are to the general public, particularly those with limited 
English skills and educations, is questionable.  Arizona also only meets for about 4 
months, but they meet every year and in addition have frequent special sessions to deal 
with legislation on an ongoing basis.  Potentially, the more professionalized legislature 
may enable constituents and interest groups to take a more active role in the governing 
process.  Unfortunately, this is just conjecture.  More research into the strength of 
immigrant and Latino organizations in these states is required to corroborate my 
hypothesis.   
The investigation into Arizona also led to some observations about the differences 
between Latino delegates’ behavior on employment versus law enforcement related bills.  
The limited evidence from Arizona indicates that Latino legislators may feel more leeway 
voting for employer sanctions than for increasing police powers.  It may be that the 
potential for abuse and discrimination is more easily equated with law enforcement.105  
But while Arizona legislators may be more attuned to the potential discriminatory effects 
of empowering police than of fining employers, outside of Arizona, it is important to 
note, there remains no across-the-board relationship between Latino representation and 
voting on bills to give immigration powers to local law enforcement.  In Utah, all three 
                                                 
105 In fact the some law enforcement in Arizona is well known for using racial profiling to 
identify illegal immigrants and to use immigration as publicity stunts. Sheriff Joe Arpaio of 
Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix and its sprawling suburbs, has marched immigrant 
prisoners through the streets in pink underwear, built tent cities to house illegal immigrants on 
public display, and is currently under investigation for civil rights abuses (see www.aclu.org). 
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Latino legislators voted against HB 81, which called for state police to be trained under 
the 287(g) program.  But in North Carolina, the vote for the 287(g) program split the 
Latino delegation and in Missouri and Tennessee the lone Latino legislators voted in 
favor of their 287(g) bills.  Latino legislators were also split in their decisions in Georgia, 
despite a strong block of opposition among primarily democratic lawmakers.  I will 
discuss the Georgia votes in more depth in the next section.  As discussed, in most states 
Latinos lack consequential representation; thus in the next section, I look at two states 
where these bills received significant opposition in order to discover where Latinos find 
representation when they are not discriptively empowered.  
Case Studies: Georgia and Montana 
 
Georgia and Montana are the two states in which, despite small levels of Latino 
empowerment, punitive immigration bills met the most opposition.  But from whom did 
this opposition come? 
Georgia has a high rate of both Latino immigration and illegal immigration.  It is 
considered a “new destination” for Latino immigrants and the Latino population has been 
increasing rapidly.  However, given the relative newness of the Latino population, they 
have yet to gain significant political empowerment.  
In Georgia, two distinctions between supporters and the opposition are evident.  
Overwhelmingly, Democrats and female legislators opposed these bills (see Table 7.4).  
Only twenty percent of the Democratic caucus supported House Bill 350 (requiring 
police to determine the nationality of persons driving without a license) and twenty-eight 
percent of the Democratic caucus supported Senate Bill 529 (punishing employers and 
establishing a 287(g) program). Women were also much less likely to vote for these bills.  
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Perhaps the most interesting factor of the opposition that arises in Georgia, however, is 
the racial make up of the opposition.  Overwhelmingly, Black legislators opposed these 
bills.  Only 2 Black legislators (about 5 percent) voted for SB 529 and only eight (about 
15 percent) voted for SB 350.  The Latino delegation was also split on these bills, but 
with only three members (2 Democrats and 1 Republican), it is difficult to make any 
significant conclusions from the findings.  On both bills the Republican voted in support 
and the Democrats present voted in opposition.  
Despite the fact that African Americans are the most likely groups to be in 
competition for jobs and resources with new Latino immigrants, Latinos find political 
bedfellows in Georgian black legislators.  It appears that not only do minority legislators 
share interests in increasing funds for education and preventing discrimination (Bratton 
2006), but they also bond together when minorities are targeted for punitive measures.   
Georgian Democrats (primarily African American Democrats) represent Latinos 
on these issues despite the fact that they represent fewer Latinos than their Republican 
counterparts.  As can be seen in Table 7.4, supporters of these bills had higher 
populations of Latinos in their districts than the opposition.  This is primarily due to the 
partisan nature of the votes.  White Republicans represent the vast majority of Latinos in 
the Georgia statehouse.  This finding is consistent with Lublin (1997) who posits that 
Republicans with large Latino constituencies tend to be more conservative.   
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Table 7.4 Georgia Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors 




(2006)    SB 350 SB 529 
Individual Variables    District Demographics    





legislators Support 7.77 7.69 
  Oppose 80 72   Oppose 6.46 6.69 
          





legislators Support 66.98** 66.89** 
  Oppose 7 0   Oppose 44.34 36.47 
          






Legislators Support 18.99** 14.89 
  Oppose 68 56   Oppose 13.51 17.86 
          
 Male Support 71 76      
  Oppose 29 24      
          
Race Black Support 15 5      
  Oppose 85 95      
          
 White Support 77 88      
  Oppose 23 12      
N   221 220      
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Republicans represent 60 percent of the districts in which Latinos make up over 
ten percent of the population.  Of these districts, only 3 Republican members voted 
against SB 350 and not one of them voted against SB 529, while 63 percent and 65 
percent of the Democrats who represent heavily Latino districts voted in opposition, 
respectively. Of districts in which Latinos make up over 15 percent of the population, not 
one Republican voted against either bill.  In short, Latinos appear to be gaining surrogate 
representation primarily in African American legislators outside of the districts in which 
they are the most populous.  
These findings highlight the importance of increased participation among Latinos 
in the political process.  In two-thirds of the Republican districts with over 10 percent 
Latino constituents, Republicans faced no opposition in the 2006 election cycle and only 
6 (about 18 percent) of them retained their seats while gaining less than sixty percent of 
the vote.  Of the 32 heavily Latino districts represented by Republicans, in 6 of them 
whites are the minority, and in 17, whites are under sixty percent of the population. 106  It 
is unlikely that these members, who vote overwhelmingly in favor of punitive policies, 
would hold their seats (or at least would be so dismissive of Latino interests) if the 
minorities they represent were fully enfranchised.   
Georgia has a history of grappling with racial divides.  As a “Winn Dixie” state 
and former part of the confederacy, the political parties have been at least partially 
shaped by racial divisions in the electorate.  As a result the African American delegates 
may be particularly attuned to racial undertones in debates and policies that exacerbate 
discrimination.  Thus, it is important to also look at a state in which racial divisions are 
                                                 
106 In districts in which the population is over 10 percent Latino and under 60 percent white, not 
one Republican legislator voted in opposition to these bills.  Democrats representing similarly 
composed districts were split but a majority voted in opposition. 
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not a strong dividing force.  Montana is, for this reason, an appropriate additional case 
study. 
Montana’s legislature is almost entirely white.  Not one African American is 
elected in Montana and there is only one Latino.  The minority representation presently 
comes from a few Native Americans and a single Asian representative.  Montana also has 
a very small Latino and immigrant population, and a small immigration rate compared to 
the rest of the country.  That said, in the course of a single year, three bills were 
introduced that fit my criteria and five more anti- immigrant bills were introduced.   
Montana is also a highly competitive state.  Over a third of the legislative seats in 
Montana were won in 2006 with less than 60 percent of the vote and only 16 percent 
faced no competition.  Montana is a traditionally Republican state but one in which the 
Democratic Party has retained significant strength and is able to fight for control of the 
statehouse (Lilley III et al., 210).  The votes on the three bills included in this analysis—
House Bill 185, creating penalties for employing illegal immigrants; Senate Bill 346, 
prohibiting contracts with businesses employing illega l immigrants; and Senate Bill 389, 
giving authority to police officers to stop individuals if they have reasonable suspicion 
that the person is an illegal immigrant—produce extremely different results.  House Bill 
185 (establishing financial penalties) was defeated with overwhelming majorities of both 
parties.  However, the vote on SB 389 was just about split down party lines.  Every single 
Republican voted in favor of allowing police officers to stop people for suspected 
immigration violations and only one Democrat joined the Republicans to vote in favor of 
this legislation.  Senate Bill 346, prohibiting state contracts, produced a much more 
nuanced vote.  About a third of both parties voted for the legislation.  On this vote, 
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women overwhelmingly opposed the bill. Only six of the 31 women in the legislature 
voted for the bill (two Republicans and three Democrats), the other 25 opposed it.  
Given the overwhelmingly homogeneity of Montana’s population, it is not 
surprising that a few district demographic variables produce statistically significant 
differences.  The only bill to produce meaningful differences was SB 389.  The districts 
of supportive legislators on this bill have significantly fewer Latinos, more whites, and 
fewer people living in poverty.  However, although the differences are statistically 
significant, the overall differences are extremely small and not substantively meaningful. 
The Montana case study suggests that when immigration is not a pressing political 
issue, more members of both parties are able to publicly vote against punitive 
immigration bills and that Democrats in particular vote against bills that reek of racial 
and ethnic discrimination.  Contrasting it with the votes in other states, where 
immigration is a more pressing political issue, suggests that when immigration is a 
politically salient issue, it breaks down the party and ethnic structure of the state 
legislature as legislators posture to look tough on immigration and pander to a loud and 
active minority of anti- immigrant cons tituents.107
                                                 
107 SB 346 in Montana was the only state and bill  in which there was significant variation and 
enough observations to run a multiple regression analysis.  I ran a regression analysis on Senate 
bill 346 including party, gender, urbanicity, Hispanic population, below poverty population, 
election margin in the last election and district white population as independent variables.  Party, 
Gender, Hispanic population, election margin, and white population were all highly significant.    
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Table 7.5  Montana Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors  
Bill Number   HB 185 SB 346 SB 389         HB 185 SB 346 SB 389 
Individual Variables      District Demographics     





legislators Support 2.06 2.76 2.37** 
  Oppose 98 66 96    Oppose 2.61 2.56 2.89 
             





legislators Support 83.8 89.61 92.26** 
  Oppose 92 70 0    Oppose 88.47 87.36 83.4 
             





Legislators Support 18.14 18.49 19.90** 
  Oppose 96 84 89    Oppose 21.63 21.39 17.39 
             
 Male Support 93 37 59        
  Oppose 7 63 41        
             
N   100 150 50        
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Discussion 
In this chapter, I investigated votes taken on punitive immigration bills in four 
states.  In Texas and Arizona Latinos are large portions of the electorate and have 
attained a significant number of co-ethnic representatives in state government.  As is the 
case with every state that houses a large Latino population, these are places where 
immigration is a politically pressing and salient topic.  My two other case studies, 
Georgia and Montana give insights into the political climate where Latinos are not 
empowered.  In Georgia, immigration is also a salient political issue and the number of 
Latinos in the state is quickly on the rise.  Latinos now make up a large portion of many 
legislative districts but they have not yet gained significant co-ethnic representation.  In 
Montana on the other hand, Latinos neither make up a large proportion of the state nor 
are they immigrating in large numbers.  In Montana, immigration has little reason to 
warrant significant legislative attention.  The diversity of these case studies illuminates 
the problems inherent to making blanket conclusions about where Latinos garner 
representation, both among co-ethnics and where they are not descriptively represented.  
The evidence suggests that the salience of immigration issues and the historical party and 
race relations of the state are critical to the level of representation that Latinos can expect 
on these issues.   
The Arizona and Texas case studies suggest that when immigration is an 
important political topic, empowerment is not a guarantee for substantive representation 
on punitive immigration policy.  It is important to note that in these states, a wider chasm 
in the Latino community may exist on immigration attitudes.  Faced with both the 
economic and social consequences of uncontrolled immigration, Latinos and non-
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Hispanics alike may be more split about what policy tools are justified.   Both Texas and 
Arizona have large illegal immigrant populations and loud anti- immigrant interest 
groups.  Research has shown that Latino citizens who live around many illegal 
immigrants may have more negative views towards immigration (Hood et al. 1997).  
Thus, in these states where illegal immigration is rampant, the diversity of opinion in the 
Latino community may be greater.  Descriptive representation requires either monolithic 
opinion on policy issues or sufficient representation of the group to adequately represent 
the diversity of opinions the group holds (Mansbridge 1999).  In neither Texas nor 
Arizona are these qualifications met.  In both states the number of Latino legislators is far 
smaller than the proportion of the electorate they represent.  In Texas, where Latinos 
make up 17 percent of the legislature (and 36 percent of the population), few legislators 
stood in opposition to punitive immigration bills.  However, in Arizona, where Latinos 
hold 12 percent of the legislative seats (and make up 30 percent of the population), many 
co-ethnic legislators led the opposition but the Latino delegation resisted as a unified 
block only rarely.  The diversity of opinion evident in Arizona is most likely warranted 
given the salience of the issue in the state, but the under-representation of Latinos in the 
legislature dilutes their admittedly diverse voices.  While the presence of descriptive 
representatives, regardless of their numerical strength, should provide the insights and 
perspectives that deliberative institutions miss when they have no ethnic minorities 
represented, in actuality, “disadvantaged groups often need the full representation that 
proportionality allows in order to achieve several goals: deliberative synergy, critical 
mass, dispersion of influence, and a range of views within the group” (Mansbridge 1999, 
636). 
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 The case studies of Arizona and Texas speak to the consequences of segregation 
and the safe seats segregation produces.  The final and potentially most harmful cost of 
descriptive representation lies in the safety descriptive representatives garner in their 
elections (Masnbridge 1999, Brace et al. 1995; Swain 1993; Guinier 1994; Thernstrom 
1987; Canon 1999). “The descriptive characteristics of a representative can lull voters 
into thinking that their substantive interests are being represented even when this is not 
the case” (Mansbridge 1999, 640).108  One of the problems derives from a lack of 
accountability. Out of the 36 Latino representatives in Texas, only 11 were elected with 
less than 70 percent of the vote in 2006.  It is hard to think there is much accountability 
when legislators enjoy such large electoral victories (but see Gay 2007).109 
The Georgia and Montana cases demonstrate that when immigration is not as 
salient, representation takes different forms.  In Georgia, which has a history of racial 
intolerance and has some of the most draconian city and county anti- immigrant laws in 
the country, Latinos are a newer population and have not gained significant 
representation.  But in this state, Latinos find surrogate representation not in the members 
who represent the districts in which the most Latinos live but in African American 
Democrats who often have relatively few Latino constituents.  In states with large 
African American delegations, Latinos may find more political bedfellows willing to 
combat punitive immigration legislation than in states with smaller black populations.  
                                                 
108 Carol Swain (1993) found evidence of this in her formative work on Black representatives in 
Congress 
109 Moreover, Brace et al. (1995) argue that the electoral security of these districts decreases 
turnout because uncompetitive districts discourages participation and reduces the incentives for 
candidates and parties to mobilize voters.  However, Barreto et al. (2004) find that for Latinos, 
living in a majority minority district increases Latino turnout. 
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Finally, in Montana, we see that when immigration is not a salient topic or an 
important issue, few legislators have the incentive to vote for punitive immigration 
reform, but when they do, a partisan divide emerges.  Republicans back proposals to give 
police extensive immigration enforcement powers while Democrats oppose such 
measures. 
Conclusion 
In Robert Dahl’s (1961) classic Who Governs?, he argues that local policy 
making is done through pluralistic means—where passionate minorities on both sides of 
the issue fight for their side, sometimes winning and sometimes losing.  But Dahl noted 
that minorities and the poor were absent in these discussions.  When political issues 
affect the wealthy and the poor equally, the socioeconomic bias against political 
participation is not likely to be as important as when the proposed policy (1) 
overwhelmingly affects a group that does not participate and (2) is simultaneously 
demanded by extremely active constituents.  This appears to be the case with punitive 
immigration policies in states with immigration problems.  The passionate minority of 
anti- immigrant activists is loud and demands recognition, while the constituencies these 
bills punish are silent and absent from debate.  Low levels of political participation, both 
at the polls and in more time-consuming democratic processes, disenfranchise the Latino 
population in state and local governance.  In this instance unequal participation is 
certainly translating into unequal representation and the passage of punitive policies that 
harm their communities.  As a result, Latinos are losing on these bills even when they are 
somewhat politically empowered through co-ethnic representation. 
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 Latinos are a large and politically important constituency in American politics.  
Over the next few decades, Latinos will become the largest minority group in the United 
States.  Immigration policy and the rights accorded to immigrants are policy areas that 
are particularly meaningful and consequential to the majority of the Latino population.  If 
the African American experience is at all illustrative, then the party that solidifies itself 
on the right side of the immigration issue in the eyes of Latinos should be able to count 
on crystallizing enduring support by this increasingly vital electoral demographic group. 
 However, few legislators appear to be taking a long-term view of the electoral 
consequences of their actions.  In President George W. Bush’s last address to the media 
before leaving office, he warned his Republican colleagues that taking draconian 
positions on immigration was a fatal error that could cost the party control of the 
government in the long run. "We should be open-minded about big issues like 
immigration reform, because if we're viewed as anti-somebody—in other words, if the 
party is viewed as anti- immigrant—then another fellow may say, 'Well, if they're against 
the immigrant, they may be against me.' We've got to be a party for a better future" 
(Ruttenberg 2009).  President Bush’s words are true for both parties on the state level and 
are even more pertinent to the legitimacy of American democracy in years to come.  If 
Latinos feel disenfranchised and oppressed by the system and if neither party stands up 
for their positions, it is likely that this new group of potential voters will continue to be 
disaffected from the system, have little faith in governing institutions, develop low levels 
of political efficacy, and lack an attachment to the polity as a whole.   
 As it stands, Latinos lack sufficient substantive representation on these punitive 
measures.  The low levels of political participation in the Latino community have made 
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their policy positions unrecognized in policy debates. In order to combat punitive 
immigration legislation, Latinos must participate at a rate analogous to the anti- immigrant 
activists.  The implications of this paper are quite depressing.  A vicious cycle could be 
on its way in which Latinos are not participating, so draconian legislation is implemented 
that harms their community.  In turn these harms disenfranchise the community and 
produce even lower levels of political participation.  Fortunately, in the U.S., minorities, 
including Latinos have a history of activism in response to oppression.  When Latinos 
were attacked in California, they responded with increased naturalization rates and in turn 
higher political participation rates (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001).  This response is 
certainly the best-case scenario. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
  
 We can say with certainty that the future trajectory of Latino civic participation 
will have substantial consequences for the American political system and the U.S. 
economy.  Latinos are the nation’s largest and fastest growing minority group, and they 
are the majority in many cities and towns.  In addition, new immigration patterns have 
brought Latinos into communities that were, until recently, racially homogeneous.  Thus, 
Latino population growth will affect not only traditional gateway destinations such as 
New York and California but new destinations such as Tennessee, North Carolina, 
Washington, and the Dakotas as well. 
 For most of the nation’s history, white voters held the power in American cities 
and states, and in national electoral contests.  This power already has begun to wane.  
According to Census estimates, within the next few decades, the United States will 
become a majority-minority nation and Latinos will be the dominant minority group, 
having long superseded the numerical power of African Americans.  If current population 
trends continue, even without additional immigration from Latin America, someday 
Latinos are likely to outnumber whites. 
Unfortunately, academic research has not kept pace with population trends.  We 
have only begun to fully appreciate the barriers to socioeconomic mobility and political 
participation for Latino immigrants and their families, or how Latinos fare in the policy 
making process.  This dearth of knowledge leaves policy makers without quality research 
to guide policy development, and scholarly and popular accounts of Latino political 
interests focus almost exclusively on immigration reform, overlooking the broader 
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political interests of the Latino community, such as education, housing availability, 
neighborhood revitalization, and language access.110 
 Certainly, immigration reform is more important to Latinos than any other group, 
especially as it pertains to country quotas, family reunification, and the precarious fate of 
undocumented immigrants.  However, immigration reform is largely a smoke screen for 
the more significant problems Latino Americans face today.  The almost exclusive focus 
on immigration by Latino advocacy groups limits the potential for both inter-ethnic 
mobilization and sustained political action by Latino Americans if immigration reform is 
achieved.  As the chapters of this dissertation have made clear, the interests of Latino 
Americans go well beyond a singular focus on federal immigration policy.  If segregation 
of the Latino community is allowed to expand, it is likely that any relative increase in the 
socioeconomic status of future generations in the Latino community will be inhibited 
and, as a result, the potential voice of the Latino community will be muted.  Without 
major investments in and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, additional coverage by 
and funding for the Community Reinvestment Act, and state and local policies that 
increase opportunities for minorities to live in diverse environments and boost their 
educational attainment, the future of Latino political power is bleak. 
 Residential segregation appears to keep Latinos out of sight and out of the minds 
of elected officials and political parties.  In this dissertation, I have argued that Latinos 
                                                 
110 This phenomenon is perhaps most common in the popular press.  For example, when President 
Barack Obama announced that he would be undertaking comprehensive immigration reform, a 
New York Times article stated that in his campaign, Obama promised "that comprehensive 
immigration legislation, including a plan to make legal status possible for an estimated 12 million 
illegal immigrants, would be a priority in his first year in office.  Latino voters turned out strongly 
for Mr. Obama in the election" (Preston 2009).  This statement implies that the main reason 
Latinos voted for the Democratic candidate was because of his stance on immigration, despite the 
fact that in most recent Pew surveys, education and the economy were the most important issues 
to Latino voters. 
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would benefit greatly by living in more integrated settings.  Thus, housing and other 
policies designed to integrate Hispanics into mixed-race and mixed- income housing in 
mixed- income and mixed-race political jurisdictions are the most pertinent policies this 
dissertation addresses.  However, policies focusing on education and immigration, as well 
as those aimed at increasing and expanding civic and political participation, also are 
critical to overcoming the damage to Latino socioeconomic and political integration 
created by residential segregation and failing schools.  In this concluding chapter, I 
review my findings and discuss how segregation creates an invisible Latino electorate.  I 
then suggest several policy proposals for overcoming these problems.   
What We Learned 
 
At its core, democracy rests on citizens participating in the political process.  
However, even recent, rosy pictures of the state of participation in the United States, 
including voting and other political acts, point to the uneven distribution of participation 
across class, racial, and ethnic lines (National Conference on Citizenship 2006).  As 
Hanjal and Trounstine (2005, 515) note, “The skewed nature of the vote raises real 
concerns about how well the interests of different groups are served in democracy.”  
Most studies of the factors that influence political participation look primarily at 
whites and, through the use of statistical controls, wash away the effects of racial group 
dynamics (Leighley 2001).  This omission has severe consequences for the explanatory 
power of contemporary theories of political behavior.  In this dissertation, I have 
attempted to add to our understanding of Latino political behavior and how Latino 
political behavior affects representation.  I have argued and presented qualitative and 
quantitative evidence that segregation results in political and social isolation for Latinos 
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in the United States.  Segregation and social isolation constrain socioeconomic mobility, 
limit access to political information, and decrease political efficacy and motivation.  As a 
result of low political participation by the Latino community and residential segregation 
on the local, state, and regional levels, Latino Americans suffer politically.  The 
intersection of their residential segregation and their lack of political power creates a 
situation in which local communities and elected officials react sharply with punitive and 
discriminatory legislative actions at least partly because they have no understanding of 
the interests and needs of these communities.   
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I showed that the Latino community suffers from 
residential segregation.  Segregation creates neighborhoods in which political 
participation is unlikely and at times even discouraged.  Residents live under the radar in 
an attempt to keep the authorities at bay.  Fear and distrust are rampant, and residents 
often accept very poor living and employment conditions.  The fact that residential 
segregation is highly correlated with concentrated poverty constrains the socioeconomic 
mobility of the Latino community.  Schools in segregated poor areas are not only more 
challenged by social factors (such as parents with low education levels who cannot help 
with homework, students working full time jobs outside of school, higher malnutrition 
rates and health problems, more student turnover, and a higher concentration of English 
learners), but because of the heavy reliance of many school systems on local funding 
sources, these schools tend to have fewer financial resources.  In concentrated 
neighborhoods, Latinos are less likely to graduate from high school or go on to higher 
education if they do receive their diplomas.  Even when taking education into account, in 
segregated environments, both U.S.-born Latinos and Latino immigrants earn lower 
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incomes than Latinos in more integrated neighborhoods.  Although segregated Latino 
neighborhoods usually have a comparatively higher number of employed adults than 
segregated African American neighborhoods (Wilson 1996), segregation still takes its toll 
on the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino community.  The educational and economic 
opportunities available in concentrated Latino communities are simply far fewer than in 
integrated neighborhoods. 
The socioeconomic stagnation created by segregation has real political 
consequences.  In these chapters I discuss how residential segregation leads to low 
political and civic participation.  One thing is clear: the higher an individual’s 
socioeconomic status, the more likely she is to participate in the political process.  
Education and highly skilled occupations decrease the costs associated with political 
participation and make civic and political engagement more likely.  As I show in Chapter 
5, by constraining socioeconomic mobility, segregation indirectly suppresses Latino 
political participation.  However, cons istent with social network theory and Wilson’s 
work on concentrated poverty, segregation directly reduces civic engagement in the 
Latino community.  Latinos in segregated communities are less likely to have friendship 
networks that include non-Latinos.  Diverse friendship networks may be particularly 
important to the Latino community, since political discussion and involvement among 
Latinos is so low.  Segregation also greatly diminishes community-building civic 
engagement.   
The low civic participation in Latino communities should cause concern for two 
reasons.  First, people gain skills necessary for political participation through civic 
activities, and civic associations facilitate political discussion (Verba, Schlozman, and 
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Brady 1995).  Second, communities are stronger and more stable when community 
members are more engaged civically (Putnam 2000).  Because of low civic engagement, 
poverty-ridden Latino neighborhoods may begin to mirror the social disorganization 
historically seen in African-American neighborhoods with concentrated poverty (Massey 
and Denton 1993; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996).  If this is true, substantial investment from 
state, local, and federal government agencies will be required to help Latino 
neighborhoods.  Unfortunately, the low civic and political participation rates in 
segregated communities make that investment unlikely.  Because local and state 
governments operate under significant financial constraints, communities and groups 
compete for services and money for pet projects (Kaufmann 2004; Judd and Swanstrom 
2005).  In these competitions, the loudest voices tend to win (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995).  As the first part of this dissertation showed, Latino neighborhoods are 
unlikely to have the loudest voices. 
Chapters 6 and 7 turned our attention to how the low decibel level of the Latino 
political voice affects state policymaking.  In these chapters, I looked at the political, 
demographic, and economic factors associated with the introduction and passage of anti-
immigrant policies in the areas of law enforcement and employment.  The correlations 
suggested that state legislatures, including those with significant numbers of Latino 
representatives, may perceive new Latino immigrant populations as a threat when 
immigration results in Latinos comprising a greater proportion of a state’s population.  
Although Latinos find political representation in some co-ethnic representatives, the link 
between co-ethnic representation and substantive representation in this policy area is 
weak.  The segregation of Latinos into concentrated Latino legislative districts dilutes 
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their political power and removes them from the electoral considerations of state 
legislatures.  These chapters show that to gain more substantive representation, Latinos 
must take a more active role in the democratic process, hold elected officials accountable, 
and have power in more legislative races. 
Out of Sight and Out of Mind: Lessons from Concentrated Latino Communities 
 In their recent book Better Together (2003), Robert Putnam and Lewis Feldstein 
report the experience of teachers at Palmer Elementary School in Pharr, Texas.  They 
recount how teachers and administrators at Palmer began working with a coalition of 
church and school groups to organize parents and residents to improve the school.  The 
story they tell is one of success in building social capital in communities without an 
organizing tradition and is a model for activists interested in how to engage segregated 
Latino communities.  What is most important here, though, is that despite the lengthy 
history of Latino immigrants in the Rio Grande Valley, it was not until the 1990s that the 
public schools began to reach out to parents and engage the community.  Until then, a 
chasm existed between the Latino residents and community and governmental 
institutions.  Moreover, the reaction those teachers reported during their initial attempts to 
engage the community exemplifies the problems residential segregation has for the 
Latino community.  As reported in the book, instead of asking parents to come to the 
school to discuss reform, teachers and administrators 
 …Made visits to students' homes, asking parents about their hopes and 
worries regarding the school and their children.  For many parents, it was 
their first real connection with the school, the first time anyone had 
bothered to ask their opinions.  For the teachers it was a first glimpse of 
their students' lives outside of school.  In Valley Interfaith and School 
Reform, author Dennis Shirley quotes school principal Salvador Flores: 
“When we first started doing our home visits, some of the teachers would 
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come back to the school crying when they saw the conditions that the 
children were living in.” (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 11-12) 
 
 There are two important take-away points from this story.  First, concentrated 
Latino neighborhoods often are excluded from community institutions even if their 
residents are not newcomers to the area.  Second, segregation separates people who 
control institutions and services from those who rely on the institutions.  It is instructive 
that the teachers had no experience with the living conditions of their students.  If 
teachers are unaware of the residential conditions and needs of the community they serve, 
how likely is it that elected officials conducting business in far-off county and statehouse 
buildings (or, more to the point, bureaucrats who implement policy) will have any 
experience with the community they claim to serve? 
 Integration brings people who lack resources into communities that possess 
institutions with longer histories of community engagement, socioeconomic 
opportunities, and better schools.  It also ensures that those who govern the area are 
consistently informed about the needs and problems facing everyone in their jurisdiction.  
In integrated settings, the problems facing one part of the community affect everyone.  In 
segregated settings, it is easy to be ignorant of social problems because they exist in both 
a literally and psychologically removed location—even if just a few blocks or miles 
away.  When social problems affect only one part of a society and not the rest, it is easier 
for politicians and the unaffected parts of the community to ignore the detrimental effects 
of those problems if the residents do not live in proximity to one another.  One need only 
look to the slow and ineffective reaction by federal, state, and local authorities to the 
crack cocaine crisis in the 1980s to see how severe problems facing society can be 
ignored when they mainly affect isolated, usually poor populations.  It is not until social 
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problems make their way into middle and upper class communities that they gain 
sufficient political attention to instigate change.  Segregation slows this process, whereas 
integration accelerates the pace at which political leaders become aware of (and 
accountable for) community problems. 
 The evidence from the cumulative chapters of this dissertation shows that Latinos 
are often hidden from the view of political decision makers.  Despite the attention Latinos 
garner from both anti- immigrant groups and politicians, on the one hand, and Latino 
interest groups and their allies, on the other, Latino concerns rarely produce more than 
blips on the political radar screen.  Efforts to meet their educational needs are constrained 
by the limited budgets of their local governments and the low tax base that characterizes 
impoverished communities.  Political leaders do not invest in their neighborhoods in 
ways that increase wages and bring upwardly-mobile job opportunities because they are 
out of view; they lack the political power necessary to compete with more engaged 
communities for government- issued resources such as job training centers, clinics, and 
school funding.  This situation is exacerbated by the fact that so many "illegals" live in 
Latino neighborhoods and it is politically risky to give public services to undocumented 
immigrants.  In addition, as discussed in Chapter 7, when Latinos are targeted on the state 
and local levels, their inactivity and lack of political power create a situation in which 
even some Latino elected officials are able to justify voting in favor of bills that are 
harmful to the Latino community because there are no consequences come election time. 
 The low political participation rates of Latino Americans hurt Latino 
neighborhoods and the progression of Latino interests.  To increase pressure on elected 
officials to institute substantive policy changes, Latino communities must increase their 
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engagement in the political process and use the ballot box and other participatory 
techniques to generate political power commensurate with their numbers.  Unfortunately, 
as this dissertation shows, segregation decreases the likelihood that Latinos will be 
civically and politically engaged.  Therefore, I conclude by discussing a few public 
policies that could, at least somewhat, alleviate these problems. 
  Socioeconomic Mobility  
 Socioeconomic status is the key to political participation and social equality.  
Residential segregation continues to hold socioeconomic mobility in the Latino 
community to a snail’s pace.  Thus, something must be done to rectify the state of the 
public schools and the economic opportunities available in segregated Latino areas.  If 
there is one thing that research tells us, it is that diluting poverty in schools increases 
student outcomes.  As Orfield and Lee (2005, 5) argue, “If skin color were not 
systematically linked to other forms of inequality, it would, of course, be of little 
significance for educational policy.  Unfortunately that is not and never has been the 
nature of our society.  Socioeconomic segregation is a stubborn, multidimensional and 
deeply important cause of educational inequality.”  Because the majority of Latino 
students in the U.S. are locked into segregated, majority Latino schools in which almost 
half of the student population is poor, whereas the average white student in the public 
schools attends a majority white school in which less than a quarter of the students are 
poor (Orfield and Lee 2005, 18), it is impossible to say that education for Latino students 
is “separate and equal.”  In addition, if we do not remedy the situation soon, economic 
differences between racial and ethnic groups will increase as a result of the cumulative 
advantages of white areas and cumulative disadvantages of minority areas.  Recent 
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Supreme Court decisions such as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District (2006) make desegregation efforts based on race unlikely.  Economic 
integration is thus a more appropriate policy tool and perhaps one that is more politically 
palatable (Wilson 1993, 204).  Race and ethnicity are in a way irrelevant; regardless of 
skin color, the simple fact is that living and going to school in an area suffering from 
concentrated poverty is detrimental to socioeconomic mobility and educational success 
for students of every race and ethnicity.  Thus, new policies promoting economic 
integration of the schools would perhaps be the most politically feasible and effective 
recourse. 
 Beginning in the early 1970s, school systems across the country used busing plans 
to integrate schools.  While busing is somewhat effective at bringing students who do not 
live together into the same school buildings, it often prevents parents from being engaged 
in the education of their children.  It is simply too great a barrier to attend PTA meetings 
and parent conferences when a child's school is far away.  Busing students to far-off 
destinations for school also does nothing to increase economic opportunities aft er 
graduation in the neighborhoods in which they live.  In addition, it is very difficult to 
overcome the fact that most upper- income parents can simply opt out of the public school 
system if their children would have to endure long bus rides to unsafe neighborhoods, 
making school integration virtually impossible.111   
 Land use policies are critical to reducing school segregation and concentrated 
poverty (Orfield and Lee 2005, 43).  Inclusionary zoning guarantees lower- income 
                                                 
111 Perhaps the greatest problem with busing plans is the way they play out in reality.  While the 
optimal goal is to have some upper-income students bused into poorer areas and poorer students 
bused to upper-income areas, the result usually is that only the poorer students are bused because 
the upper-income parents refuse to have their children sent to less desirable locations and are able 
to pay the price of private schools instead. 
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families opportunities to live in upper- income zip codes and increases the diversity of the 
public schools without politically (and legally) controversial school diversification plans.  
More economically integrated communities also would help equalize funding for local 
schools and other services.  However, it will take strong action on the part of the federal 
government to promote the use of inclusionary land use policies.  Congress, the 
President, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development should consider 
proposals to boost federal funding for redevelopment projects that include mixed- income 
housing and other incentives for local governments to pass and enforce inclusionary 
zoning laws.  For decades, the federal government has used its purse strings to encourage 
state and local governments to adopt policy changes such as those affecting speed limits 
and educational testing; it is time it does the same to increase residential integration. 
  Political Socialization 
 Political scientists have recognized for decades that the key to civic and political 
participation is found in socioeconomic status.  Therefore, policies that increase 
educational attainment and occupational opportunities for ethnic minorities should result 
in more equal political and civic participation.  However, Latino participation often lags 
despite socioeconomic achievements.  To ensure that democracy remains stable, states 
and the federal government should invest in large-scale projects that increase political 
knowledge and participation by immigrants, their children, and low-participation 
neighborhoods.  
 As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the residential segregation of Latinos makes 
political organizing easier, particularly for immigrant and Latino interest groups.  
Without geographic information systems or large databases of consumer trends and 
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household statistics, interest groups focusing on Latinos and immigrants can go door-to-
door in concentrated Latino areas without lists or targeted mobilization materials.  They 
can easily find meeting spaces that are accessible to everyone, with little concern about 
multicultural correctness or language barriers.  Ethnic homogeneity can facilitate bonding 
social capital; thus, mobilization by ethnic-oriented interest groups can be very effective.  
Unfortunately, these groups often lack resources.  They generally run on tight budgets 
and frequently find themselves with two (or ten) too few organizers to take on large-scale 
mobilizing campaigns.  When they are able to get a grant or large donation, they staff up 
for a single election, but mobilization is unsustainable under grant-based mobilization 
models.  This forces them to make tough choices about which elections to contest, with 
which issues to engage, and to what extent to focus on political organizing versus 
providing necessary social services. 
 At the same time that residential segregation makes mobilization easier for Latino 
and immigrant interest groups, it also allows political parties and more resource-rich 
interest groups to ignore Latino areas and focus on traditional high- turnout locations.  
Political parties and most interest groups maximize their resources by focusing get-out-
the-vote efforts on locations with a proven participation record.  When looking for 
donors, political parties and candidates return to the same people, social networks, 
industries, and neighborhoods that are sure to deliver contributions (Gimpel, Lee, and 
Pearson-Merkowitz 2008).  Come primary election time, candidates (including even 
those who benefit from Latino turnout) mobilize "super voters" using highly targeted 
voter records.  In the general election, parties, candidates, and interest groups focus on 
individuals and neighborhoods with historically high turnout rates (Gershenton 2003).  
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Mobilization is simply easier in high-turnout areas.  Rather than convincing people to 
vote, one simply must remind them when and where to vote. 
 Because they have the resources and know-how to perform sustained mobilization 
campaigns, extensive name recognition, and field offices in every state in the nation, the 
two major political parties are perhaps the most suitable organizations to take advantage 
of the concentration of Latinos.  Traditionally, this was a major role of the political 
party—to help socialize and recruit new immigrants into the political system, thereby 
stabilizing and expanding their base.  Today, political parties have lost track of their role 
in sustaining democracy in the face of large-scale immigration (Wong 2006).  As pointed 
out in Chapter 2, recruitment by political parties and interest groups is the most effective 
political mobilization technique available (Green and Gerber 2004).  Thus, some authors 
argue that a return to party-based individual, face-to-face mobilization could be very 
important to the future of Latino political incorporation (Wong 2006).  Unfortunately, 
however, the parties have little incentive to engage in this activity.  Political parties 
maximize resources because the battles they wage are short- lived.  The end goal is the 
next election, and for this reason they put all their resources towards winning that 
election through the most cost effective means possible—by mobilizing and convincing 
likely voters to cast ballots for their candidates.  
 We cannot leave the task of political incorporation to underfunded ethnicity-
specific organizations.  Democracy rests on political participation from all interested 
stakeholders, not just those who are able to guide themselves through the convoluted 
labyrinth that is our political system.  As stated by the APSA Committee on Civic 
Education and Engagement,  
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Government is legitimate only when the people as a whole participate in 
their own self- rule.  Insofar as important classes of citizens are 
considerably less active and influential than others—especially when 
participatory inequalities are a consequence of the design of the political 
system—then the reality of collective self-rule is doubtful, and the 
legitimacy of the political order is compromised (Macedo et al. 2005, 4). 
  
 It is time for a renewed push on the part of the federal, state, and local 
governments to engage all residents in all locations of the United States in the democratic 
process.  It is no longer acceptable to leave political mobilization solely to interested 
elites.  This system all too frequently has reproduced and exacerbated inequalities in 
participation.   
 Some scholars and commentators argue that schools should take the lead in 
socializing the next generation for political and civic engagement (see, for example, 
Campbell 2006).  Unfortunately, placing the onus for political socialization and instilling 
civic virtues on the school system is misguided.  Certainly schools, to the extent that they 
can, should encourage political and civic engagement.  However, schools, particularly in 
underprivileged areas, already are struggling to ensure that students can read and write at 
grade level.  Expecting schools to also instill a sense of civic duty in students with little 
exposure to political stimuli outside of school is not pragmatic.  Further, placing this 
responsibility on the schools is likely to exacerbate inequalities in participation.  Schools 
with sufficient resources, upper-middle class students, and few other challenges can 
afford to promote civic engagement.  On the other hand, schools that lack resources and 
struggle with attendance, language barriers, and lack of parental engagement surely will 
emphasize reading, writing, and arithmetic and neglect political and civic education. 112  A 
                                                 
112 See, for example, Judith Torney-Punta, Carolyn Barber, and Britt Wilkenfeld’s (2007) work 
on civic education in the schools.  They find that Latino students, particularly in high-Latino 
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mobilization strategy focused on adults (which consequently also socializes children) has 
more immediate prospects for equalizing participation.  Such an approach also releases 
the schools to focus on getting students to attain the basic skills needed for civic 
participation, such as sufficient organizational and communication skills, which already 
is part of their duties (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993).  The schools have a role to 
play in political socialization, primarily in teaching children the skills they need in all 
walks of life, but schools are not able to fill every hole or cure every malady left by other 
institutions and American culture. 
 Delegating political socialization to public schools and private interest groups 
results in a de facto political apartheid where some groups are systematically socialized 
and incorporated into the system and others are socialized out.  Extending citizenship and 
voting rights to the currently disenfranchised immigrant masses would end the official 
political apartheid we currently endure, where almost 10 percent of the workforce is 
legally denied the vote.  However, with no initiative to educate and socialize these new 
immigrants and their children about the political system and their role in it, political and 
social inequality is sure to continue, even if official voting rights are granted to currently 
disenfranchised immigrants. 
 Bill Bishop (2008) argues that America has undergone a "big sort."  Americans 
have avoided cultural and political controversy by moving into homogeneous 
neighborhoods in which there is little reason for conflict.  However, this transformation 
also came at a time of increasingly targeted political campaigns and underfunded and 
weak political parties.  Political parties now systematically cross off neighborhoods and 
                                                                                                                                                 
schools, have lower levels of civic knowledge and fewer prospects for future engagement than 
students in majority white schools. 
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zip codes from their mobilization lists, focusing on those that are "up for grabs" 
(competitive neighborhoods/states, etc.) while leaving behind locales that traditionally 
have supported the other party.  Instead of steadily building up a base of support in areas 
in which they are a minority, they retreat, leaving the majority party to reign supreme.  
When there is little political activity outside the walls of the schools, the job of engaging 
students in the political process can be insurmountable.  It is critical to increase political 
activity beyond the school walls if we expect citizens to be more engaged. 
 I propose a renewed effort on the part of the political parties to engage new 
immigrants and traditionally low-participation neighborhoods.  However, because 
political parties undoubtedly will continue to maximize their resources to win elections, it 
will take an outside infusion of capital (with strings attached) to motivate them to reach 
out to new groups in areas they have left behind for years or even decades.  Funding for 
political parties, particularly state and local party organizations, often is scarce, and 
frequently comes with the tacit condition that it be expended directly on elections.  Thus, 
it is difficult for political parties to justify undertaking the sustained mobilization 
campaigns necessary to engage new constituencies in areas with historically low 
participation.  Therefore, I suggest that the federal government take an active role in 
engaging new voters, particularly from underrepresented groups, by creating a grant or 
funding line for political parties to use for the sole purpose of mobilizing low-
participation locales. 
 The federal government currently funds two organizations to develop political 
parties overseas—the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican 
Institute.  A similar model could be followed within the borders of the U.S.  I propose 
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that the federal government institute a funding line for each political party (including 
smaller "third" parties) to be used solely for ongoing voter registration, recruitment, and 
mobilization efforts in neighborhoods that have historically low voter turnout and 
political participation.  Such a program would both increase political participation and 
help offset the growth in the number of uncompetitive jurisdictions. 
 The project could be overseen by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to 
ensure that the money is spent in the intended manner.  While sufficient oversight would 
be necessary, the parties are the most efficient means by which to increase political 
participation.  They have the know-how and the ability to be in every location that no 
other group possesses. 
Immigration Reform 
[E]verything today's immigrant-bashers say—that immigrants are 
insufficiently skilled, that they're too culturally alien, and, implied though 
rarely stated explicitly, that they're not white enough—was said a century 
ago about Italians, Poles and Jews.... [N]ow we're living in the second 
Gilded Age.  And as before, one of the things making antiworker, 
unequalizing policies politically possible is the fact that millions of the 
worst-paid workers in this country can't vote.  What progressives should 
care about, above all, is that immigration reform stop our drift into a new 
system of de facto apartheid. 
 --Paul Krugman (May 25, 2007) 
 Finally, one cannot write a dissertation about the barriers facing Latinos without 
addressing immigration reform.  Comprehensive immigration reform is necessary if for 
no other reason than to legitimize the millions of people living in the United States with 
no political rights.  As economist Paul Krugman states, very little progress can be made 
on social and economic policy beneficial to the poor when so many of them are 
systematically excluded from the political process.  Federal immigration reform also is 
necessary for several other reasons, including: 1) to stop the expansion of state 
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immigration policies that harm Latino immigrants, Latino citizens, and concentrated 
Latino neighborhoods and 2) to maintain consistent immigration policy across all 50 U.S. 
states.  Finally, comprehensive immigration reform legitimizing Latino immigrants is 
necessary to build both bonding and bridging social capital in Latino- immigrant 
neighborhoods and ensure that Latino residents have the power to engage the police and 
other institutions in taking care of their communities.  
 To facilitate the economic and political incorporation of a large swath of Latino 
Americans, comprehensive immigration reform must include both a pathway to 
citizenship for the millions of adult immigrants currently living in the United States as 
well as educational opportunities for undocumented children who came to the United 
States as infants or small children. 113  The Urban Institute estimates that about 65,000 
undocumented students who came here before they were 16 years old graduate from U.S. 
high schools each year in addition to the tens of thousands of undocumented children 
who fail to complete high school.  Denying tuition, grants, and loans to students who 
know little of their home country and desire a higher education creates a de facto 
educational apartheid.  It lowers standards and gives undocumented children few reasons 
to stay in school.  It is important to remind my readers how denying educational 
opportunities to so many Latino immigrants affects concentrated Latino neighborhoods.  
When so few people have the opportunity to go on to college, the bar for success is lower 
for all students in these areas (Orfield and Lee 2005).  Because Latino students share 
                                                 
113 The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act would facilitate 
access to college for immigrant students in the United States by restoring states’ rights to offer in-
state tuition to immigrant students residing in their state.  The bill also would provide a path to 
citizenship for immigrants who wish to pursue higher education but were brought to the U.S. as 
young children and lack documentation.  The DREAM Act has become an essential component 
of “comprehensive immigration reform” and is critical to ensuring that immigrants (and those 
who share their neighborhoods) have opportunities for socioeconomic mobility.   
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neighborhoods and social networks, policies that inhibit the educational advancement of 
undocumented immigrants have grave consequences for the U.S.-born as well. 
 Immigration reform proposals continue to place a high value on recruiting and 
establishing immigration opportunities for highly skilled professionals.  A consistent 
theme in immigration debates is the fact that the United States fails to produce enough 
engineers, scientists, doctors—just about everything except lawyers.  For these reasons, 
businesses and politicians call for increasing H1B visas to recruit and retain educated 
professionals from across the globe.  Yet the debate rarely turns to developing highly 
skilled individuals in the U.S.  Comprehensive immigration reform should address the 
fact that we are failing to educate and train people in the United States to perform highly 
skilled jobs.  Foreign-born Indians and Asians are not inherently smarter or culturally 
superior to Latino or Black Americans, as many immigration reformers suggest (see, for 
example, Richwine 2009); rather, colleges and universities have no incentive to enroll 
low income students who will need significant financial and sometimes academic 
assistance over foreign students who can pay their own way or whose home countries 
will pay the cost of their out-of-state tuition.   
 Comprehensive immigration reform should not only address the current 
legitimacy crisis but also prepare the U.S. to produce the best and brightest from within 
our own borders.  Companies that hire foreign workers should be required to establish 
scholarships for economically disadvantaged students in academic disciplines where 
foreign students currently are overrepresented, such as the hard sciences.  They could 
even be required to provide work-study opportunities for scholarship students similar to 
those offered under the federal Work-Study Program.  Such a policy would allow 
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employers to hire the employees they need today from abroad while helping to develop a 
highly skilled workforce for the future.  It simply makes more sense to let immigrants fill 
low-skilled jobs while helping the U.S.-born, or at least U.S.-raised, become upwardly 
mobile, instead of the other way around.  The current system sets a glass ceiling for U.S. 
students while providing the best educations to foreign-born elites and gives no 
incentives for companies or institutions of higher learning to invest in U.S.-born (or -
raised) students over cost- free immigrant students.  We live in a globalized marketplace 
in which transporting workers from one nation to another is increasingly easy.  Thus, 
businesses have little to no motivation to invest resources in training workers.  When the 
supply of trained workers is insufficient to meet demand, they can either move or import 
new workers.  The government must do something to increase incentives for companies 
to train potential employees. 
 In effect, immigration reform could tackle many of the issues facing the United 
States today through a single wide-reaching policy initiative.  It is not enough to increase 
H1B visas and provide a path to citizenship if we do not also provide a path for 
socioeconomic mobility for all U.S. residents and decrease the demand for highly skilled 
foreign workers.  The immigration reforms proposed by business elites favor the “cream 
of the crop” from other countries while leaving behind people raised within our borders.  
Instead of focusing on why so few American citizens are becoming engineers or 
encouraging companies to develop a home-grown workforce, all too frequently people 
look at the current state of affairs in the U.S. as eugenicist-style justification for 
immigration reform.  Maybe it is time for policy to focus on propelling our working poor 
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currently locked in urban and rural poverty to be the engineers, doctors, and computer 
programmers of the future. 
 Some policy makers might object to my suggestions because they will give 
impoverished immigrants even more incentives to find ways—legally or not—to enter 
the U.S. when their children are small.  I agree that this is likely the case.  As long as the 
United States is the land of opportunity and many people in Mexico and Latin America 
remain in abject poverty, immigrants will continue to come in droves, border fence or 
not.  As former Arizona governor and now Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano famously said, "You show me a 50-foot wall and I'll show you a 51-foot 
ladder."  However, it is important to note that we do not have massive immigration from 
Canada, even though that border is even more porous and larger than the one to the south.  
It makes little sense to sacrifice the well-being and economic opportunities of residents of 
the United States simply to reduce unwanted immigration.  If we wish to control illegal 
immigration, we should invest in Mexico and the other Central and South American 
countries so that the green grass grows on both sides of the fence.  Similarly, if we wish 
to reduce legal immigration, we must invest in individuals who currently reside within 
our borders to diminish the demand for foreign-born labor. 
 Immigrant integration has always been a process molded by public policies.  It is 
convenient to tell immigrant success stories as if they happen in a black box—immigrants 
come, they find jobs, and their children gain education and move up the socioeconomic 
ladder.  The black box story is one of elbow grease and motivation.  In reality though, 
such success stories are molded by the policies that make them possible.  The same 
immigrant story can be told in two ways:  Mateo came to America as an undocumented 
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immigrant.  He worked hard and his son is now a professor at a prestigious university.  
Or, Mateo came to America as an undocumented immigrant in the 1920s; he worked in a 
union shop that kept his wages stable and enabled him to work his way up to 
management.  During World War II he became a citizen as part of the GI Bill after 
enlisting in the Army.  His son attended good schools in an integrated community and 
attended college because of affirmative action policies aimed at increasing minority 
enrollment.114 
It is time policy makers and academics alike begin to address the policies that 





                                                 
114 This story is a version of one told by Professor Manuel Pastor Jr. of the University of Southern 
California at the Thinking Big, Thinking Forward conference on February 11, 2009, in 
Washington, DC.  The video of his speech is available at: http://thinkingbigconference.org/. 
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Appendix B. Measurement and Coding of Variables 
Table B.4.1 Measurement of Variables 
 




Factor Score of the 
percent immigrant, 
percent non-English 
Speakers, and percent 
Latino in the Census 
tract of the respondent 
-.87, 6.2 1.04 1.52 
Residential 
Isolation (MSA) 
Isolation index as 
computed by Massey 
and Denton (1988) and 
Iceland, Weinberg, and 






.007, .95 .55 .21 
Citizenship 
(CPS) 
Answered that their 
citizenship status was 
“Foreign Born, U.S. 
Citizen by 
Naturalization” 
0,1 .10 .29 
Citizenship 
(SCBS) 
Citizens =1 non citizens 
=0 





Only Spanish is spoken 
in the home. 





Chose to take the 
survey in English, not 
Spanish 
0,1 .71 .45 
Education (CPS) Highest level of 
education completed. 
Ranges from less than 
high school to doctoral 
degree. 
1,8 2.07 1.36 
Education 
(SCBS) 
Highest level of 
education completed. 
Ranges from less than 
high school to doctoral 
degree. 
1,7 2.8 1.75 
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Table B.5.1. Measurement of Variables for Social Capital Benchmark Survey.  Latino sample 
only. 
 




Factor Score of the percent 
immigrant, percent non-English 
Speakers, and percent Latino in 





Citizenship Citizens =1  
Non citizens =0 
0, 1 .70 .46 
English  Chose to take the survey in 
English, not Spanish.  
English=1, Spanish=0 
0, 1 .71 .45 







Has a personal friend that is 
white, African American or 
Asian=1.  No friends of other 
racial groups=0 
0, 1 .73 .44 
Age Age in years for those 18 and 
over. 
18, 93 36.98 13.91 
Political Interest Attends church=1, does not 
attend church=0 
0, 1 .49 .50 
Civic 
Engagement 
Composite score of the number 
of non-political groups and 
events the person participated 
in. 
0, 18 2.5 3.0 
Political 
Participation 







Registered to vote=1. Not 
registered=0.  Only used with 
citizens. 
0, 1 .75 .43 
Voted Voted in the 1996 election=1. 
Did not vote=0.  Only used with 
those who are registered to vote. 
0, 1 .68 .47 
Church 
Attendance 
1=attends church, 0= does not 
attend church. 
0, 1 .52 .49 
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 Table B.5.1  Coding and Distribution of Independent Variables 
Variable  Coding N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Unemployment 
Rate (2006) 
Percent Unemployed in 2006.  
Source: U.S. Labor Department 




Percent of the Legislature that is 
Latino 
Source: National Council of Latino 
Elected and Appointed Officials 




Percent of the Legislative seats held 
by Democrats 
Source: Congressional Quarterly  
49 0.54 0.14 0.25 0.87 
Liberalism Percent of the state that is “liberal” in 
2006. Source: Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver (1993). 




Rate of immigration to the state.  
Source: Migration Policy Institute 
50 27.54 13.36 -1.00 53.10 
Percent Foreign 
Born (2000) 
Percent of the people in the State that 
are foreign born. 
Source: Census Bureau 




Percent of the state’s population that 
is Latino.  Source: Census Bureau 





The increase in the percentage of the 
state that is Latino between 2000 and 
2007. Source: Census Bureau 





Immigration Rate of Latino 
immigrants 2000-2007. Source: 
Census Bureau  
50 1.37 0.18 1.05 1.69 
Cropland  Percentage of the state that is made up 
of cropland 





Number of dollars per capita spent on 
education and health care. Source: 
CQ’s State Rankings 2006 
50 2489.0 512.0 1577.1 4108.7 
Education and 
Health Care 
As Proportion of 
the Per Capita 
Tax Rate  
The percent of the per capita tax rate 
that is spent on education and health 
care. 
Source: CQ’s State Rankings 2006 
50 0.25 0.05 0.15 0.40 
 
 296  
Table B.6.1 
Variable Coding   
Individual Demographics   
Black 
Legislators 
Source: Compiled from Multiple sources 
including: List of Black Caucus members, 
pictures of representatives cross referenced 
with bibliographies, and Kate Bratton’s data on 
state legislatures through 2005 available at: 
http://www.lsu.edu/faculty/bratton/research.htm Black Non-Black 
Arizona  2 92 
Georgia  62 264 
Montana  0 150 
Latino 
Legislators 
Source: National Association of Latino Elected 
and Appointed Officials Hispanic Non-Hispanic 
Arizona  17 77 
Georgia  4 264 
Montana  1 149 
Female 
Legislators 
Source: Compiled by author using pictures of 
the elected officials. Female Male 
Arizona  32 62 
Georgia  54 264 
Montana  112 38 
    
Party 
Source: Compiled by author using state 
legislature websites Democrats Republicans 
Arizona  43 51 
Georgia  115 149 
Montana  75 74 
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Table B.6.1 (continued)   
District Demographics   
Percent 
Latino Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections Mean Min, Max 
Arizona  29.05 6.6, 68.3 
Georgia  7.22 1.1, 51.0 
Montana  2.62 .8, 10.9 
Percent 
White Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections   
Arizona  56.03 17.8, 82.7 
Georgia  57..30 10.8, 92.2 
Montana  88.06 31.4, 96.8 
Average 
Income Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections   
Arizona  $56,650 38,144, 103,008 
Georgia  $62,315 33,484, 195,622 
Montana  $47,120 32,858,  77,002 
Percent in 
Poverty Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections   
Arizona  15.16 5.1, 32.5 
Georgia  15.86 2.4, 34.9 
Montana  18.55 8.9, 32.0 
Electoral 
Margin 
(2006) Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections   
Arizona  69.18 49, 100 
Georgia  88.51 51, 100 
Montana  67.71 48, 100 
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Appendix C. Supplementary Tables 
Table C.6.1 2007 State Immigration Legislation Introductions, Types and Frequency    









Law Enforcement - TOTAL  187 27 Education - TOTAL  106 30 
Law Enforcement - Federal cooperation  77 20 Education - Enrollment denial  13 9 
Law Enforcement - State enforcement of 
immigration law  70 21 Education - Status information collection  12 9 
Law Enforcement - Prohibit sanctuary cities  19 10 Education - In-state tuition*  44 19 
Law Enforcement - Non-enforcement  7 5 
Education - K-12 English language 
instruction  7 6 
Law Enforcement - Other  14 8 Education - Other  30 13 
Firearms  Permits  6 4 Housing  12 9 
Family Law  21 15 Identification  120 41 
Criminal Justice & New Offenses  106 29    
Employment - TOTAL  364 46 Health Care - TOTAL  91 48 
Employment - Civil penalties & license revocation  72 32 Health Care - General health benefits** 48 16 
Employment - Criminal penalties  26 13 Health Care - Emergency services  5 4 
Employment - State contracts  80 35 Health Care - Medicaid  6 4 
Employment - Professional and commercial licenses  23 14 Health Care - Children's benefits  19 8 
Employment - Employment benefits  ̂ 43 21 Health Care - Other  13 9 
Employment - Other  120 34    
Integration - TOTAL  56 19 Requests for Federal Reimbursement  19 10 
Integration - English as official/common language  9 6 Resolutions to Federal Government  83 28 
Integration -Translation/interpretation & public 
documents  10 7 Task Forces & Studies  74 30 
Integration - Adult English language education  3 3 Trafficking  114 28 
Integration - Other^  ̂ 34 15 Voting  41 20 
Public Benefit Eligibility  116 38 Other  42 22 
Regulation of Immigrant Service Providers  29 13       
^Includes both legislation denying benefits to undocumented workers and those providing benefits to undocumented workers 
^^Mainly symbolic legislation such as declaring Immigrant awareness days, and calling on local jurisdictions to be mindful of human rights when 
crafting immigration legislation 
*Includes both legislation that expands instate tuition to undocumented students and legislation that prohibits instate tuition for undocumented 
students. 
**Includes both legislation expanding benefits to immigrants and denying benefits to immigrants  
 
 299  
Bibliography 
 
Aguilera, Michael Bernabe. 2002. The Impact of Social Capital on Labor Force 
Participation: Evidence from the 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Social 
Science Quarterly 83 (3):853-874. 
Aguirre Jr., Adalberto. 2004. Profiling Mexican American Identity: Issues and Concerns. 
American Behavioral Scientist 47 (7):928-942. 
Alba, Richard D. 1990. Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Alba, Richard D., and John R. Logan. 1991. Variations on Two Themes: Racial and 
Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence. Demography 28 
(3):431-453. 
Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: 
Assimilation and the New Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2000. Participation in Heterogeneous 
Communities. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3):847-904. 
Allport, Gordon W. 1954. The Politics of Prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. 
Alozie, Nicholas O. 1999. Segregation and Black and Hispanic Group Outcomes. 
American Politics Quarterly 27 (3):354-375. 
Archibold, Randal C. 2009. Report Questions Immigration Program. The New York 
Times, March 4, 2009. 
Arvizu, John R., and F. Chris Garcia. 1996. Latino voting participation: explaining and 
differentiating Latino voter turnout. Hispanic Journal of Political Science 18 
(2):104-128. 
Balfanz, Robert, and Nettie Legters. 2004. Locating the Dropout Crisis: Which High 
Schools Produce the Nation's Dropouts. In Dropouts in America: Confronting the 
Graduation Rate Crisis, edited by G. Orfield. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. Minority Representation, 
Empowerment, and Participation. The Journal of Politics 66 (2): 534-556. 
Banfield, Edward C. 1970. The Unheavenly City. Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
 300  
Bansak, Cynthia. 2005. The Differential Wage Impact of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act on Latino Ethnic Subgroups. Social Science Quarterly 86 (s1):1279-
1298. 
Bansak, Cynthia, and Steven Raphael. 1998. Immigration Reform and the Earnings of 
Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination? In University of 
California, San Diego: Department of Economics, UCSD. 
Barretto, Matt. 2007. ¡Si' Se Puede! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino 
Voters. American Political Science Review 101 (3):425-441. 
Bartos, Otomar J., and Paul Wehr. 2002. Using Conflict Theory. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bean, Frank D., and Gillian Stevens. 2003. America's Newcomers: Immigrant 
Incorporation and the Dynamics of Diversity. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Belluck, Pam. 1995. New Comer Schools Raise Old Questions. The New York Times, 
March 26, 1995. 
Berry, Frances Stokes. 1994. Sizing up state policy innovation research. Policy Studies 
Journal 22 (3):442-456. 
Berry, Frances Stokes, and William D. Berry. 1998. Innovation and Diffusion Models in 
Policy Research. In Theories of the Policy Process, edited by P. A. Sabatier. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Berry, Jeffrey, Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thompson. 1993. The Rebirth of Urban 
Democracy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institutions Press. 
Berry, William D., and Richard C. Fording. 1997. Measuring State Tax Capacity and 
Effort. Social Science Quarterly 78 (1):158-166. 
Bishop, Bill. 2008. The Big Sort. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Blalock, Hubert. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: Wiley. 
Blau, Francine D., and John W. Graham. 1990. Black-White Differences in Wealth and 
Asset Composition. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2):321-339. 
Blau, Peter. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bledsoe, Timothy, Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman, and Michael Combs. 1995. Residential 
Context and Racial Solidarity Among African Americans. American Journal of 
Political Science 39 (2):434-458. 
 
 301  
Blumenberg, Evelyn. 2004. En-gendering Effective Planning. Journal of the American 
Planning Association 70 (3):269-281. 
Blumer, Herbert. 1958. Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Pacific Sociological 
Review 1 (1):3-7. 
Bobo, Lawrence D., and Howard Gilliam. 1990. 
Race, Sociopolitical Participation and Black Empowerment. American Political 
Science Review 84 (2):377-393. 
Bocian, Debbie, Keith Ernst, and Wei Li. 2006. Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and 
Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages. Durham, NC: Center for 
Responsible Lending. 
Boger, John C. 2005. The Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools: A crucial 
consideration in student assignment policy. Chapel Hill, NC: Center for Civil 
Rights. 
Bonacich, Edna. 1972. A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market. 
American Sociological Review 37 (5):547-559. 
Borjas, George J. 2001. Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bowen, William G., and Derek Bok. 1998. The Shape of the River: Long-Term 
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Brace, Kimball, and Lisa Handley. 1995. Minority turnout and the creation of majority-
minority districts. American Politics Quarterly 23 (2):190-103. 
Branton, Regina. 2007. Latino Attitudes toward Various Areas of Public Policy: The 
Importance of Acculturation. Political Research Quarterly 60 (2):293-303. 
Branton, Regina, Gavin Dillingham, Johanna Dunaway, and Elizabeth Miller. 2007. 
Anglo Voting on Nativist Ballot Initiatives: The Partisan Impact of Spatial 
Proximity to the U.S. Mexico Border. Social Science Quarterly 88 (3):868-881. 
Bratton, Kathleen A. 2002. The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting. 
American Politics Research 30 (2):115-142. 
Bratton, Kathleen A. 2006. The Behavior and Success of Latino Legislators: Evidence 
from the States. Social Science Quarterly 87 (5):1136-1157. 
Bridges, Amy. 1997. Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 302  
Briggs, Xavier de Sousa. 1998. Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility and the 
Many Faces of Social Capital. Housing Policy Debate 9 (1):177-221. 
Brown, Susan K. 2007. Delayed Spatial Assimilation: Multigenerational Incorporation of 
the Mexican-Origin Population in Los Angeles. City and Community 6 (3):193-
209. 
Brown, Thad. 1988. Migration and Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Brownell, Peter. 2006. Sanctions for Whom? The Immigration Reform and Control Act's 
"Employer Sanctions" Provisions and the Wages of Mexican Immigrants: Paper 
Presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting 2006.  Los 
Angeles, California. March 30-April 1, 2006. 
Browning, Rufus, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1984. Protest is Not 
Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Buchanan, Patrick J. 2006. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and the 
Conquest of America. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Burns, Peter F. 2006. Electoral Politics is Not Enough: Racial and Ethnic Minorities and 
Urban Politics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Burns, Peter, and James G. Gimpel. 2000. Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, 
and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy. Political Science Quarterly 115 
(2):201-225. 
Burr, Jeffrey A., Omer R. Galle, and Mark A. Fossett. 1991. Racial Occupational 
Inequality in Southern Metropolitan Areas, 1940-1980: Revisiting the Visibility-
Discrimination Hypothesis. Social Forces 69 (3):831-850. 
Camarota, Steven A. 1997. The Effect of Immigrants on the Earnings of Low-Skilled 
Native Workers: Evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey. Social 
Science Quarterly 78 (2):417-431. 
Camarota, Steven A., and Nora McArdle. 2003. Where Immigrants Live: An 
Examination of State Residency of the Foreign Born by Country of Origin in 
1990 and 2000. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. 
Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. Do Majority-Minority 
Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? The American 
Political Science Review 90 (4):794-812. 
 
 303  
Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. 
The American Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Campbell, David E. 2006. Why We Vote. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Canon, David T. 1999. Race, Redistricting and Representation: The Unintended 
Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Carr, James H., and Nandinee K. Kutty. 2008. Segregation: The Rising Costs for 
America. New York: Routledge. 
Carsey, Thomas M. 1995. The Contextual Effects of Race on White Behavior: The 1989 
New York City Mayoral Election. Journal of Politics 57 (1):221-228. 
Cataldo, Everett F., and John D. Holm. 1983. Voting on School Finances: A Test of 
Competing Theories. Western Political Quarterly 36 (6):619-631. 
Cattel, Vicky. 2001. Poor People, Poor Places, and Poor Health: The Mediating Role of 
Social Networks and Social Capital. Social Science and Medicine 52 (10):1501-
1516. 
Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. Public Opinion 
Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations. Journal of 
Politics 59 (3):858-881. 
Coleman, J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. London: Belknap. 
Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1984. The Influence of Group Identification on Political 
Perception and Evaluation. The Journal of Politics 46 (3):760-785. 
Cornelius, Wayne. 2005. Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United 
States, 1993-2004. Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 31 (4):775-794. 
Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn. 2003. Civic Engagement and Community 
Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective. PS: Political Science & Politics 1 
(1):103-111. 
Crain, Robert, and Rita Mahard. 1978. School Racial Composition and Black College 
Attendance and Achievement Test Performance. Sociology of Education 51 
(2):81-101. 
Crary, David. 2008. Report: Anti- immigrant feelings fuel hate groups. USA Today, 
March 10, 2008. 
Creswell, John W. 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
 304  
Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser. 1997. Are Ghettos Good or Bad? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3):827-872. 
Dahl, Robert. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Darling-Hammond, Linda. 2001. Apartheid in American Education: How Opportunity is 
Rationed to Children of Color in the United States. In Racial Profiling and 
Punishment in the U.S. Public Schools, edited by T. Johnson, J. E. Byoden and W. 
J. Pittz. Oakland, CA: Applied Research Center. 
Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American 
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
De Genova, Nicholas, and Ana Y. Ramos-Zayas. 2003. Latino Crossings: Mexicans, 
Puerto Ricans, and the politics of race and citizenship. New York: Routledge. 
de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Fujia Lu. 1999. Explorations into Latino Voluntarism. In 
Nuevos Senderos: Reflections on Hispanics and Philanthropy, edited by D. 
Camoamor, W. A. Dýaz and H. A. J. Ramos. Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press. 
de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Jerry L. Polinard, Robert D. Wrinkle, and Tomás Longoria Jr. 
1991. Understanding Intra-Ethnic Attitude Variations: Mexican Origin Population 
Views of Immigration. Social Science Quarterly 72 (2):379-387. 
De Sipio, Louis. 1996. Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate. 
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press. 
DiPrete, Thomas A., Gregory M. Eirich, Karen S. Cook, and Douglas S. Massey. 2006. 
Cumulative Advantage as a Mechanism for Inequality: A Review of Theoretical 
and Empirical Developments. Annual Review of Sociology 32 (1):271-297. 
Dixon, Jeffrey C., and Michael S. Rosenbaum. 2004. Nice to Know You?  Testing 
Contact, Cultural, and Group Threat Theories of Anti-Black and Anti-Hispanic 
Stereotypes. Social Science Quarterly 85 (2):257-280. 
Djupe, Paul, and Scott D. McClurg. 2000. What Do You Think? An Examination of 
Social 
Communication and Issue Importance. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC. 
Donovan, Todd. 2007. Diversity and Democracy. Political Research Quarterly 60 
(2):274-276. 
 
 305  
Dreier, Peter, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom. 2001. Place Matters: 
Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas. 
Dye, Thomas. 1994. Who's Running America? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Edmonston, Barry, and James Smith. 1998. The Immigration Debate: Studies on the 
Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: 
National Academic Press. 
Emerson, Michael O., Karen J. Chai, and George Yancey. 2001. Does Race Matter in 
Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans. 
American Sociological Review 66 (6):922-935. 
Engstrom, Richard L., and Malcolm D. MacDonald. 1981. The Election of Blacks to City 
Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the 
Seats/Population Relationship. American Political Science Review 75 (2):344-
354. 
Espino, Rodolfo, and Michael Franz. 2002. Latino Phenotypic Discrimination Revisited: 
The Impact of Skin Color on Occupational Status. Social Science Quarterly 83 
(2):612-623. 
Fainstein, Norman. 1995. Black Ghettoization and Social Mobility. In Bubbling 
Cauldron: Race, Ethnicity, and the Urban Crisis, edited by M. P. Smith and J. R. 
Feagin. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Fairlie, Robert. 2004. Race and the Digital Divide. Berkeley Electronic Journals, 
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 3 (1):1-38. 
Fischer, Claude S. 1982. To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fischer, Mary J., and Marta Tienda. 2006. Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Hispanic 
Metropolitan Dispersion, Segregation and Economic Opportunity. In Hispanics 
and the Future of America, edited by M. Tienda and F. Mitchell. Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press. 
Fix, Michael E, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1994. Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the 
Record Straight. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
Fix, Michael, Margie McHugh, Aaron Matteo Terrazas, and Laureen Laglagaron. 2008. 
Los Angeles on the Leading Edge: Immigrant Integration Indicators and Their 
Policy Implications. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
Foley, Michael W., and Dean R. Hoge. 2007. Religion and the New Immigrants: How 
Faith Communities Form Our Newest Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 306  
Forbes, Hugh D. 1997. Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Linda Lopez, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Ricardo Ramirez. 2006. 
Gender and Ethnicity: Patterns of Electoral Success and Legislative Advocacy 
among Latina and Latino State Officials in Four States. Journal of Women, 
Politics & Policy 28 (3/4):121-145. 
Fry, Richard. 2003. Hispanic Youth Dropping Out of U.S. Schools: Measuring the 
Problem. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Furuseth, Owen J., and Heather A. Smith. 2006. From Winn-Dixie to Tiendas: The 
Remaking of the New South. In Latinos in the New South: Transformations of 
Place, edited by H. A. Smith and O. J. Furuseth. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Garand, James, Stella M. Rouse, and Betina Wilkinson. 2006. Understanding Latinos' 
Attitudes toward U.S. Immigration. Paper read at Presented at the American 
Political Science Association, August 31- September 3, at Philadelphia, PA. 
Garcia, John A. 1981. The Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Explorations into 
the Naturalization Process. International Migration Review 15 (4):608-625. 
Garcia, John A. 1987. The Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Examining Some 
Political Orientations. International Migration Review 21 (2):372-389. 
Garcia, Juan Ramon. 1980. Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican 
Undocumented Workers in 1954. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Garcia-Bedolla, Lisa. 2005a. Fluid Boarders: Latino Power, Identity, and Politics in Los 
Angeles. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Garcia-Bedolla, Lisa. 2005b. Resources and Civic Engagement: The Importance of 
Social Capital for Latino Political Incorporation. Harvard Journal of Hispanic 
Policy 17:41-54. 
Gay, Claudine. 2001. The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political 
Participation. American Political Science Review 95 (3):589-602. 
Gay, Claudine. 2002a. Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the 
Relationship between Citizens and Their Government. American Journal of 
Political Science 46 (4): 717-732. 
Gay, Claudine. 2007. Legislating Without Constraints: The Effect of Minority Districting 
on Legislators' Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences. Journal of Politics 
69 (4):442-456. 
 
 307  
Gay, Claudine. 2002b. Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the 
Relationship between Citizens and Their Government. American Journal of 
Political Science 46 (4):717-732. 
Georges-Abeyie, Daniel. 2001. Petit Apartheid in Criminal Justice: The More 'Things' 
Change, The More 'Things' Remain The Same. In Petit Apartheid in the U.S. 
Criminal Justice System, edited by D. Milovanovic and K. Russell. Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Georing, John, and Judith Feins. 2003. Choosing a Better Life: Evaluating the Moving to 
Opportunity Social Experiment. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2004. Get Out the Vote! Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Gershtenson, Joseph. 2003. Mobilization Strategies of the Democrats and Republicans, 
1956-2000. Political Research Quarterly 56 (3):293-308. 
Gilens, Martin. 2000. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of 
Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Giles, Michael W., and Melanie Buckner. 1993. David Duke and Black Threat: An Old 
Hypothesis Revisited. Journal Of Politics 55 (3):702–713. 
Giles, Michael W., and Kaenan Hertz. 1994. Racial Threat and Partisan Identification. 
American Political Science Review 88 (2):317-326. 
Giles, Micheal W., and Arthur Evans. 1986. The Power Approach to Intergroup Hostility. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 30 (3):469-486. 
Gimpel, James G. 1999. Separate Destinations: Migration, Immigration and the Politics 
of Place. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Gimpel, James G., Joshua J. Dyck, and Daron R. Shaw. 2004. Registrants, Voters, and 
Turnout Variability across Neighborhoods. Political Behavior 26 (4):343-375. 
Gimpel, James G., and James Edwards. 1998. The Congressional Politics of Immigration 
Reform. New York: Longman. 
Gimpel, James G., Karen Kaufmann, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2007. 
Battleground States versus Blackout States: The Behavioral Implications of 
Modern Presidential Campaigns. Journal of Politics 69 (3):789-797. 
Gimpel, James G., and J. Celeste Lay. 2008. Political Socialization and Reactions to 
Immigration-Related Diversity in Rural America. Rural Sociology 73 (2):180-
204. 
 
 308  
Gimpel, James G., J. Celeste Lay, and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2003. Cultivating 
Democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. 
Gimpel, James G., Frances Lee, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2008. The Check is in 
the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections. American 
Journal of Political Science 52 (2):231-252. 
Gittleman, Maury, and Edward N. Wolff. 2004. Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth 
Accumulation. The Journal of Human Resources 39 (1):193-227. 
Glaser, James M. 1994. Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial 
Attitudes in the South. Journal of Politics 56 (1):21-41. 
Goering, John. 2005. The Political Origins and Implementation of a Federal Social 
Experiment in Housing Integration: Lessons for the 21st Century? In The 
Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America, 
edited by X. d. S. Briggs. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Goering, John, Judith Feins, and Todd Richardson. 2002. A Cross-Site Analysis of Initial 
Moving to Opportunity Demonstration Results. Journal of Housing Research 13 
(1):1-30. 
Gordon, Milton. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, REligion, and 
National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Graham Jr., Otis L. 2006. Unguarded Gates: A History of America's Immigration Crisis. 
Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1983. The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. 
Sociological Theory 1 (1):201-233. 
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 
78 (6):1360-1380. 
Granovetter, Mark S. 1974. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Grebler, Leo. 1966. Mexican Immigration to the United States: the record and its 
implications. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Grey, Mark A., and Anne C. Woodrick. 2005. "Latinos Have Revitalized Our 
Community": Mexican Migration and Anglo Responses in Marshalltown, Iowa. 
In New Destinations: Mexican Immigration in the United States, edited by V. 
Zuniga and R. Hernandez-Leon. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
 309  
Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1998. Voting Rights in the 1960s: An Overview. In 
Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by B. Grofman. New York: Agathon 
Press. 
Guinier, Lani. 1994. The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in 
Representative Democracy. New York: Free Press. 
Haider-Markel, Donald. 2007. Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative 
Influence of Descriptive Representation. Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 (1):107-
133. 
Hajnal, Zoltan L. 2001. White Residents, Black Incumbents, and a Declining Racial 
Divide. The American Political Science Review 95 (3):603-617. 
Hajnal, Zoltan L., Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. 2002. Municipal Elections in 
California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition. San Francisco: Public Policy 
Institute of California. 
Hajnal, Zoltan, and Jessica Trounstine. 2005. Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences 
of Uneven Turnout in City Politics. The Journal of Politics 67 (2):515–535. 
Hamilton, James T. 1995. Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political 
Power? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14 (1):107-132. 
Hardy-Fanta, Carol. 1993. Latina Politics/Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political 
Participation in Boston. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. African American Legislators in the American States. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Hero, Rodney E. 2003. Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America. PS: Political 
Science & Politics 1 (1):103-111. 
Hero, Rodney E., and Anne G. Campbell. 1996. Understanding Latino Political 
Participation: Exploring the Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey. 
Hispanic Journal of Political Science 18 (2):129–141. 
Hero, Rodney E., and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. Immigration and the Evolving American 
Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States. American Journal of 
Political Science 51 (3):498-517. 
Herring, Mary, and John Forbes. 1994. The Overrepresentation of a White Minority: 
Detroit's At-Large City Council, 1961-1989. Social Science Quarterly (University 
of Texas Press) 75 (2):431-445. 
 
 310  
Highton, Benjamin, and Arthur L. Burris. 2002. New Perspectives on Latino Voter 
Turnout in the United States. American Politics Research 30 (3):285-306. 
Hill, Kevin. 1995. Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? 
Journal of Politics 57 (2):384-401. 
Hill, Kim Quaile, and Jan E. Leighley. 1999. Racial Diversity, Voter Turnout, and 
Mobilizing Institutions in the United States. American Politics Quarterly 27 
(3):275-295. 
Hill, Mark E. 2000. Color Differences in the Socioeconomic Status of African American 
Men: Results of a Longitudinal Study. Social Forces 78 (4):1437-1460. 
Hood III, M. V., and Irwin L. Morris. 1997. Â¿Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, 
and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration. Social Science Quarterly 78 
(2):309-323. 
Hood III, M. V., and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor,... But Make 
Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented 
Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion toward Immigration. Political Behavior 20 
(1):1-15. 
Hood III, M. V., Irwin L. Morris, and Kurt A. Shirkey. 1997. "!Quedate o Vente!": 
Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion toward Immigration. 
Political Research Quarterly 50 (3):627-647. 
Hritzuk, Natasha, and David K. Park. 2000. The Question of Latino Participation: From 
an SES to a Social Structural Explanation. Social Science Quarterly 81 (1):155-
166. 
Hsu, Spencer S. 2008. Immigration Raid Jars a Small Town. The Washington Post, May 
18, 2008. 
Huckfeldt, R. Robert. 1979. Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context. 
American Journal of Political Science 23 (3):579-592. 
Huckfeldt, R. Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social 
Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Huckfeldt, Robert. 1986. Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban 
Neighborhoods. New York: Agathon Press. 
Huckfeldt, Robert. 2001. The Social Communication of Political Expertise. American 
Journal of Political Science 45 (2):425-438. 
 
 311  
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1992. Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: 
Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvas. The American Political 
Science Review 86 (1):70-86. 
Huddy, Leonie, and David O. Sears. 1995. Opposition to Bilingual Education: Prejudice 
or the Defense of Realistic Interests. Social Psychology Quarterly 58 (2):133-143. 
Hughes, Michael, and Bradley B. Hertel. 1990. The Significance of Color Remains: A 
Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black 
Americans. Social Forces 68 (4):1105-1120. 
Hunter, Lori M. 2000. The Spatial Association between U.S. Immigrant Residential 
Concentration and Environmental Hazards. International Migration Review 34 
(2):460-488. 
Hunter, Margaret. 2007. The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and 
Inequality. Sociology Compass 1 (1):237-254. 
Huntington, Samuel. 2004. Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hurtado, Sylvia. 1999. Reaffirming Educators' Judgment: Educational Value of 
Diversity. Liberal Education 85 (1):24-32. 
Hutchings, Vincent L. 1998. Issue Salience and Support for Civil Right s Legislation 
Among Southern Democrats. Legislative Studies Quarterly 28 (4):521-544. 
Hutchinson, Edward P. 1981. Legislative History of American Immigration Policy: 1798-
1965. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Iceland, John, and Kyle Anne Nelson. 2008. Hispanic Segregation in Metropolitan 
America: Exploring the Multiple Forms of Spatial Assimilation. American 
Sociological Review 73 (5):741-765. 
Iceland, John, Daniel H. Weinberg, and Erika Steinmetz. 2002. Racial and Ethnic 
Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000: Census 2000 Special 
Reports. 
Idler, Jose Enrique. 2007. Officially Hispanic: Classification Policy and Identity. 
Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Immergluck, Dan, and Geoff Smith. 2005. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Effect of 
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values. Chicago, IL: 
Woodstock Institute. 
 
 312  
Jackson, Robert A. 2003. Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation. 
Political Behavior 25 (4):339-366. 
Jencks, Christopher, and Susan Mayer. 1990a. The Social Consequences of Growing Up 
in a Poor Neighborhood. In Inner-City Poverty in the United States, edited by L. 
Lynn and M. McGeary. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Johnson, Jr., James H., Jr. Farrell, Walter C., and Chandra Guinn. 1999. 
Immigration Reform and the Browning of America: Tensions, Conflicts, and Com
munity Instability in Metropolitan Los Angeles. In 
The Handbook of International Migration, edited by Charles Hirschman, 
Philip Kasinitz and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Johnson, Hans P., Belinda I. Reyes, Laura Mameesh, and Elisa Barbour. 1999. Taking 
the Oath: An Analysis of Naturalization in California and the United States. San 
Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. 
Johnson, Kevin  R. 2001. The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement. 
Washington University Law Quarterly 78. 
Johnson, Martin. 2003. Racial Context, Public Attitudes, and Welfare Effort. In Race and 
the Politics of Welfare Reform, edited by S. F. Schram, J. Soss and R. C. Fording. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Jones-Correa, Michael A. 1998a. Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of 
Latinos in New York City. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Jones-Correa, Michael A. 1998b. Different Paths: Gender, Immigration and Political 
Participation. International Migration Review 32 (2):326-349. 
Jones-Correa, Michael A. 2001. Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant 
Naturalization and Voting. Citizenship Studies 5 (1):41-56. 
Jones-Correa, Michael A., and David L. Leal. 2001. Political Participation: Does 
Religion Matter? Political Research Quarterly 54 (4):751-770. 
Judd, Dennis, and Todd Swanstrom. 2005. City Politics. New York: Harper Collins. 
Kaufmann, Karen. 2002. Culture Wars, Secular Realignment and the Gender Gap in 
Party Identification. Political Behavior 24 (3):283-307. 
Kaufmann, Karen. 2003. Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for 
Latino and African-American Political Coalitions. Political Research Quarterly 
56 (2):199-210. 
 
 313  
Kaufmann, Karen. 2004. The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior 
in American Cities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Kehrberg, Jason, and Adam Butz. 2006. Cross-Generational Attitudes of Latino Groups 
On Immigration Into the United States. Paper read at the Midwest Political 
Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL. April 20-23. 
Kenney, Christopher B. 1992. Political Participation and Effects from the Social 
Environment. American Journal of Political Science 36 (1):259-267. 
Key, V.O. 1949. Southern Politics In State and Nation. Knoxville: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 
Kinder, Donald R., and Tali Mendelberg. 1995. Cracks in the American Apartheid: The 
Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites. Journal of Politics 57 
(2):402-424. 
Kirchhoff, Sue, and Judy Keen. 2007. Minorities Hit Hard by Rising Costs of Subprime 
Loans. USA Today, April 26, 2007. 
Kling, Jeffrey R., Jens Ludwig, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2005. Neighborhood Effects on 
Crime for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing 
Voucher Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (1):87-130. 
Kochhar, Rakesh. 2009. Unemployment Rose Sharply Among Latino Immigrants in 
2008. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Krasner, Michael, and Francois Pierre-Louis. 2006. Promoting Empowerment in Low 
Income, Minority, and New Immigrant Communities. Philadelphia, PA: Paper 
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Krugman, Paul. 2007. Immigration and Politics. The New York Times, May 25, 2007. 
Krysan, Maria. 2002. Community Undesirability in Black and White: Examining Racial 
Residential Preferences through Community Perceptions. Social Problems 49 
(4):521-543. 
Krysan, Maria, and Reynolds Farley. 2002. The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do 
They Explain Persistent Segregation? Social Forces 80 (3):937-980. 
LaVeist, Thomas, Roland Thorpe, Terra Bowen-Reid, John Jackson, Tiffany Gary, 
Darrell Gaskin, and Dorothy Browne. 2008. Exploring Health Disparities in 
Integrated Communities: Overview of the EHDIC Study. Journal of Urban 
Health 85 (1):11-21. 
Leal, David. 2000. Latino Public Opinion. Available at: 
http://perg.tamu.edu/lpc/Leal.pdf. 
 
 314  
Leal, David, and Frederick Hess. 2000. The Politics of Bilingual Education Expenditures 
in Urban School Districts. Social Science Quarterly 81 (4):1064-1072. 
Leal, David L. 2008. Latino Public Opinion: Does it Exist? In Latino Politics: Identity, 
Mobilization, and Representation (Race, Ethnicity, and Politics), edited by R. 
Espino, D. L. Leal and K. J. Meier. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press. 
Leal, David L., Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. The Politics of 
Latino Education: The Biases of at-Large Elections. The Journal of Politics 66 
(4):1224-1244. 
Lee, Yueh-Ting, and Victor Ottati. 2002. Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration Policy: The 
Roles of In-Group-Out-Group Bias, Economic Concern, and Obedience to Law. 
Journal of Social Psychology 142 (5):617-634. 
Lee, Yueh-Ting, Victor Ottati, and Imtiaz Hussain. 2001. Attitudes Toward "Illegal" 
Immigration Into the United States: California Proposition 187. Hispanic Journal 
of Behavioral Sciences 23 (4):430. 
Leighley, Jan E. 2001. Strength in Numbers? Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Leighley, Jan E., and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: 
Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations. Journal of Politics 61 (4):1092-
1114. 
Lewis, Oscar. 1965. La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty--San Juan 
and New York. New York: Random House. 
Lien, Pei- te. 1994. Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian 
and Mexican Americans. Political Behavior 16 (2):237-264. 
Lilley III, William, Laurence J. DeFranco, Mark F. Bernstein, and Kari L. Ramsby. 2007. 
Almanac of State Legislative Elections: voting patterns and demographics 2000-
2006. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Lockhart, William B., Yale Kasmisar, Jesse H. Choper, Steven H. Shiffrin, and Richard 
H. Fallon. 1996. The American Constitution: Cases--Comments--Questions. St. 
Paul, MN: West. 
Logan, John R. 1978. Growth, Politics, and the Stratification of Places. American Journal 
of Sociology 84 (2):404-416. 
Logan, John R., and Harvey L. Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy 
of Place. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
 315  
Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Longoria, Thomas. 1996. White Attitudes toward Minority Electoral Districts: Minority 
Population Size, National Politics, and Local Policy. Social Science Quarterly 77 
(4):877-887. 
Lopez, Alejandra. 2003. Race and Income in California: Census 2000 Profiles, edited by 
M. Snipp and A. Camarillo. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. 
Lopez, Mark Hugo. 2008a. 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanics See Their 
Situation in U.S. Deteriorating; Oppose Key Immigration Enforcement Measures. 
Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Lowell, Lindsay, and Roberto Suro. 2002. How many undocumented: The numbers 
behind the U.S.—Mexico Migration Talks. Washington, DC: PEW Hispanic 
Center. 
Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of 
Public Authority. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Lublin, David. 1997a. The Election of African Americans and Latinos to the U.S. House 
of Representatives, 1972-1994. American Politics Quarterly 25 (3): 269-286. 
Lublin, David. 1997b. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and 
Minority  
Issues in Congress. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Lublin, David, and D. Stephen Voss. 2000. Racial Redistricting and Realignment in 
Southern State Legislatures. American Journal of Political Science 44 (4):792-
810. 
MacDonald, Heather. 2004. A New Latino Underclass. Dallas Morning News. 
MacDonald, Heather, Victor Davis Hanson, and Steven Malanga. 2007. The Immigration 
Solution. Chicago: The Manhattan Institute. 
Macedo, Stephen, and Others. 2005. Democracy at Risk. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Magana, Lisa, and Robert Short. 2002. The Social Construction of Mexican and Cuban 
Immigrants by Politicians. Review of Policy Research 19 (4):78-94. 
Mangum, Maurice. 2003. Psychological Involvement and Black Voter Turnout. Political 
Research Quarterly 56 (1):41-48. 
 
 316  
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent 
Women? A Contingent "Yes".  The Journal of Politics 61 (3):628-657. 
Marquez, Benjamin. 2006. Latino Identity Politics Research: Problems and 
Opportunities. In Latino Politics: Identity, Mobilization, and Representation, 
edited by R. Espino, D. Leal and K. J. Meier. Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press. 
Marsden, Peter V. 1987. Core Discussion Networks of Americans. American 
Sociological Review 52 (1):122-131. 
Martinez-Ebers, Valerie, Luis Fraga, Linda Lopez, and Arturo Vega. 2000. Latino 
Interests in Education, Health, and Criminal Justice Policy. PS: Political Science 
& Politics 33 (3):547-554. 
Mason, Patrick L. 2004. Annual Income, Hourly Wages, and Identity Formation Among 
Mexican Americans and other Latinos. Industrial Relations 43 (4):817-834. 
Massey, Douglas. 1993. Latinos, Poverty, and the Underclass: A New Agenda for 
Research. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 15 (4):449-475. 
Massey, Douglas. 2005. Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions 
Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy. In Immigration Policy in Focus. 
Washington, DC: American Immigration Law Foundation. 
Massey, Douglas, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2003. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: 
Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration: Russell Sage 
Foundation Publications. 
Massey, Douglas S. 1996. The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in 
the Twenty-First Century. Demography 33 (4):395-412. 
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and 
the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Massey, Douglas S., and Mary J. Fischer. 2003. The Geography of Inequality in the 
United States, 1950-2000. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs.1-40. 
Massey, Douglas S., and Brendan P. Mullan. 1984. Processes of Hispanic and Black 
Spatial Assimilation. American Journal of Sociology 89 (4):836-873. 
Masuoka, Natalie. 2006. Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of 
Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans and Latinos. Social 
Science Quarterly 87 (5): 993-1011. 
 
 317  
Mayer, Susan. 1991. How Much Does a High School's Racial and Socioeconomic Mix 
Affect Graduation Rates and Teenage Fertility Rates? In The Urban Underclass, 
edited by C. Jencks and P. E. Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
McClain, Paula D. 2003. Social Capital and Diversity: An Introduction. PS: Political 
Science & Politics 1 (1):101-102. 
McClurg, Scott D. 2003. Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social 
Interaction in Explaining Political Participation. Political Research Quarterly 56 
(4):449-464. 
McDonald, Laughlin, ed. 1992. The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority 
Representation. Edited by B. Grofman and C. Davidson, Controversies in 
Minority Voting. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
McKanders, Karla. 2007. Welcome to Hazleton! (“Illegal” Immigrants Beware): Local 
Employment Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must 
Do About It. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 39 (1):49. 
McKenzie, Brian D. 2004. Religious Social Networks, Indirect Mobilization, and 
African-American Political Participation. Political Research Quarterly 57 
(4):621-632. 
McKoy, Deborah L., and Jeffrey M. Vincent. 2008. Housing and Education: The 
Inextricable Link. In Segregation: The Rising Costs for America, edited by J. H. 
Carr and N. K. Kutty. New York: Routledge. 
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27 (1):415-444. 
Mead, Lawrence M. 1986. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship. 
New York: Free Press. 
Meier, Kenneth J., Joseph Stewart, and Robert E. England. 1991a. The Politics of 
Bureaucratic Discretion: Educational Access as an Urban Service. American 
Journal of Political Science 35 (1):155-177. 
Meier, Kenneth J., Joseph Stewart, and Robert E. England. 1991b. Race, Class, and 
Education: The Politics of Second-Generation Discrimination. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
Melia, Marilyn Kennedy. 2005. Foreclosures Hurt Neighbors. The Chicago Tribune, 
August 14, 2005. 
 
 318  
Michelson, Melissa R. 2003a. Boricua in the Barrio: Political Trust among Puerto Ricans 
in Chicago and Nationwide. Centro Journal 15 (1):139-151. 
Michelson, Melissa R. 2003b. The Corrosive Effect of Acculturation: How Mexican 
Americans Lose Political Trust. Social Science Quarterly 84 (4):918-933. 
Michelson, Melissa R. 2003c. Getting out the Latino Vote: How Door-to-Door 
Canvassing Influences Voter Turnout in Rural Central California. Political 
Behavior 25 (3):247-263. 
Miller, Edward Alan. 2004. Advancing Comparative State Policy Research: Toward 
Conceptual Integration and Methodological Expansion. State & Local 
Government  Review 36 (1):35-58. 
Morris, Irwin L. 1993. African American Voting on Proposition 187: Rethinking the 
Prevalence of Interminority Conflict. Political Research Quarterly 53 (1):77-98. 
MPI. 2003. Unauthorized Immigration to the United States. Washington, DC: Migration 
Policy Institute. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2002a. The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political 
Participation. American Journal of Political Science 46 (4):838-855. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2002b. Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in 
Practice. American Political Science Review 96 (1):111-126. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory 
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem in Modern 
Democracy. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
NALEO. 2008. 2008 Latino Voter Survey in Key Battleground States. Washington, DC: 
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Educational 
Fund. 
National Conference on Citizenship, The. 2006. America's Civic Health Index: Broken 
Engagement. Washington, DC: The National Conference on Citizenship in 
Association with CIRCLE and Saguaro Seminar. 
NCLR. 2004. Lost Opportunities: The Reality of Latinos in the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System. Washington, DC: National Council of La Raza. 
NCSL. 2007. Federal Gridlock on Immigration Reform Leads States to Action. Denver, 
CO: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
 319  
NCSL. 2008. 2007 Enacted State Legislation Related to Immigrants and Immigration. 
Washington, DC: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Nelson Jr., William E. 2005. Introduction: Race, Politics, and Political Development in 
the United States. In Black and Latino/a Politics: Issues in Political Development 
in the United States, edited by W. E. Nelson and J. L. Monforti. Miami: Barnhardt 
and Ashe Publishing, Inc. 
Neuman, Rusell W. 1986. Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the 
American Electorate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Newton, Lisa. 2008. Illegal, Alien, or Immigrant. New York: New York University Press. 
Nicholson, Stephen P., Adrian Pantoja, and Gary M. Segura. 2006. Political Knowledge 
and Issue Voting among the Latino Electorate. Political Research Quarterly 59 
(2):259-271. 
Odem, Mary E. 2008. Subaltern Immigrants: Undocumented Workers and National 
Belonging in the United States. Interventions 10 (3):359-380. 
Olivas, Michael A. 2007. Immigration Related State Statutes and Local Ordinances: 
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement. University of 
Chicago Legal Forum. 
Oliver, J. Eric. 2001. Democracy in Suburbia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Oliver, J. Eric, and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. Reconsidering the Environmental 
Determinants of White Racial Attitudes. American Journal of Political Science 44 
(3):574-589. 
Olzak, Susan. 1992. The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Orfield, Gary, and Chungmei Lee. 2004. Brown at 50: King's dream or Plessy's 
nightmare? Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University. 
Orfield, Gary, and Chungmei Lee. 2005. Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and 
Educational Inequality. Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project at Harvard 
University. 
O'Regan, Katherine. 1993. The Effect of Social Networks and Concentrated Poverty on 
Black and Hispanic Youth Unemployment. Annals of Regional Science 27 
(4):327-342. 
Orr, Amy J. 2003. Black-White Differences in Achievement: The Importance of Wealth. 
Sociology of Education 76 (4):281-304. 
 
 320  
Pantoja, Adrian. 2005. Transnational Ties and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The 
Case of Dominicans in Washington Heights, New York. International Migration 
Review 43 (4):123-146. 
Pantoja, Adrian D., Ricardo Ramirez, and Gary M. Segura. 2001. Citizens by Choice, 
Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos. 
Political Research Quarterly 54 (4):729-750. 
Pantoja, Adrian D., and Sarah Allen Gershon. 2006. Political Orientations and 
Naturalization Among Latino and Latina Immigrants. Social Science Quarterly 87 
(5):247-263. 
Pantoja, Adrian D., and Gary M. Segura. 2003. Fear and Loathing in California: 
Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication Among Latino Voters. Political 
Behavior 25 (3):265-286. 
Parker, Suzanne L., Glenn R. Paker, and James A. McCann. 2008. Opinion Taking within 
Friendship Networks. American Journal of Political Science 52 (2):412-420. 
Passel, Jeffrey S. 2002. New Estimates of the Undocumented Population in the United 
States. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
Passel, Jeffrey S., Randolph Capps, and Michael E. Fix. 2004. Undocumented 
Immigrants: Facts and Figures. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
Pastor, Manuel, and Ara Robinson Adams. 1996. Keeping Down with the Joneses: 
Neighbors, Networks, and Wages. Review of Regional Economics 26 (2):115-145. 
Peterson, Paul E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Peterson, Paul E. 1997. The Price of Federalism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Pew. 2004. A Look at Where Latinos Live. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Pew. 2006. A Statistical Portrait of Hispanics at Mid-Decade. 
Pew. 2008. Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2006: Pew Hispanic 
Center. 
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 2000. Why Americans Still Don't Vote: And 
Why Politicians Want It That Way. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Popkin, Susan J., Bruce Katz, Mary K. Cunningham, Karen D. Brown, Jeremy 
Gustafson, and Margery Austin Turner. 2004. A Decade of HOPE VI: Research 
Findings and Policy Challenges. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
 
 321  
Portes, Alehandro, and John W. Curtis. 1987. Changing Flags: Naturalization and its 
Determinents among Mexican Immigrants. International Migration Review 21 
(2):352-371. 
Portes, Alehandro, M. Partricia Fernandez-Kelly, and William Haller. 2005. Segmented 
assimilation on the ground: The new second generation in early adulthood. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 28 (6):1000-1040. 
Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant 
Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. The New Second Generation: Segmented 
Assimilation and Its Variants. The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 530 (1):74-96. 
Preston, Julia. 2009. Obama to Push Immigration Bill as One Priority. The New York 
Times, April 9, 2009. 
Preuhs, Robert R. 1999. State Policy Components of Interstate Migration in the United 
States. Political Research Quarterly 52 (3):527-547. 
Preuhs, Robert R. 2007. Descriptive Representation as a Mechanism to Mitigate Policy 
Backlash: Latino Incorporation and Welfare Policy in the American States. 
Political Research Quarterly 60 (2):277-292. 
Pulido, Laura. 2004. Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban 
Development in Southern California. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 90 (1):12-40. 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Putnam, Robert D. 2007. E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first 
Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. Scandinavian Political Studies 30 
(2):137-174. 
Putnam, Robert D., and Lewis M. Feldstein. 2003. Better Together: Restoring the 
American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Quiroga, Jorge. 1999. Hispanic Voices: Is the Press Listening? In Politics and the Press: 
The News Media and their Influence, edited by P. Norris. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. 2006. Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing 
Demographics and Political Participation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
 322  
Ramirez, Ricardo. 2005. Giving Voice to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the 
Effectiveness of a National Non-Partisan Mobilization Effort. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 601 (1):66-84. 
Richwine, Jason. 2009. Indian Americans: The New Model Minority. Forbes, February 
24, 2009. 
Rocha, Rene R., and Rodolfo Espino. Forthcoming. Racial Threat, Residential 
Segregation, and the Policy Attitudes of Anglos. Political Research Quarterly. 
Rodgers, Harrell R., and Kent L. Tedin. 2006. State TANF Spending: Predictors of State 
Tax Effort to Support Welfare Reform. Review of Policy Research 23 (3):745-
759. 
Rogers, Everett M. 1979. Network Analysis of the Diffusion of Innovations. In 
Perspectives on Social Network Research, edited by P. W. Holland and S. 
Leinhardt. New York: Academic Press. 
Rogers, Everett M., and D. Lawrence Kincaid. 1981. Communications Networks: Toward 
a New Paradigm for Research. New York: The Free Press. 
Romero, Mary. 2000a. State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino 
Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member. Denver University Law Review 
78:1081. 
Romero, Mary. 2006. Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up 
of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community. Critical Sociology 32 (2/3):447-473. 
Romero, Mary, and Marwah Serag. 2004. Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting 
from INS and Local Police's Use of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case 
of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona. Cleveland State Law Review 52 :75-96. 
Romero, Victor. 2000b. Racial Profiling: "Driving while Mexican" and Affirmative 
Action. Michigan Journal of race and Law 6:195-207. 
Rosenbaum, Michael S., S. DeLuca, and Tammy Tuck. 2005. New capabilities in new 
places: low income black families in suburbia. In The Geography of opportunity: 
race and housing choice and metropolitan America, edited by X. d. Briggs. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and 
Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan. 
Rouse, Stella M. 2008. Latino Representation in U.S. Legislatures: Interests, Behavior, 
and Influence. Ph.D Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Louisiana 
State University. 
 
 323  
Rubenson, Daniel. 2006. Race, Racial Environment and Political Participation in 
American Cities: Paper Presented at the 2006 Midwestern Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting. 
Rubinowitz, Leonard S., and James E. Rosenbaum. 2002. Crossing the Class and Color 
Lines: From Public Housing to White Suburbia. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Rushton, Michael. 2008. A Note on the Use and Misuse of the Racial Diversity Index. 
The Policy Studies Journal 36 (3):445-459. 
Rusk, David. 1999. Inside Game/ Outside Game. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Rutenberg, Jim. 2009. Bush Calls on Republican Party to Be Inclusive. The New York 
Times, January 11, 2009. 
Saint-Germain, Michelle. 1989. Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The Impact 
of Women of Public Policy in the Arizona Legislature. Social Science Quarterly 
70 (4):956-968. 
Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006. The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation 
Among Latinos in the United States. American Politics Research 34 (4):427-450. 
Santiago, Anne M. , and Margaret G. Wilder. 1991. Residential Segregation and Links to 
Minority Poverty: The Case of Latinos in the United States. Social Problems 38 
(4):492-515. 
Schafer, Joseph A., David L. Carter, Andra J. Katz-Bannister, and William M. Wells. 
2006. Decision Making in Traffic Stop Encounters: A Multivariate Analysis of 
Police Behavior. Police Quarterly 9 (2):184-209. 
Schattschneider, E.E. 1975. A Semisovereign People. Fort Worth: Holt, Reinhart, and 
Winston, Inc. 
Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement Among Latinos: 
The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination. Political Behavior 69 
(3):285-312. 
Schneider, Mark, and John R. Logan. 1982. Suburban Racial Segregation and Black 
Access to Local Public Resources. Social Science Quarterly 63 (4):762-770. 
Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, and Richard C. Fording, eds. 2003. Race and the Politics 
of Welfare Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
 324  
Sears, David O., and Victoria Savalei. 2006. The Political Color Line in America: Many 
“Peoples of Color” or Black Exceptionalism? Political Psychology 27 (6):895-
924. 
Seghetti, Lisa M., Stephen R. Vina, and Karma Ester. 2006. Enforcing Immigration Law: 
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: CRS Report fo r 
Congress. 
Shaw, Daron, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, and Lee Jongho. 2000. Examining Latino Turnout 
in 1996: A Three-state, Validated Survey Approach. American Journal of 
Political Science 44 (2):332-340. 
Shingles, Richard D. 1981. Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing 
Link. American Political Science Review 75 (1):76-91. 
Short, Robert, and Lisa Magaña. 2002. Political Rhetoric, Immigration Attitudes, and 
Contemporary Prejudice: A Mexican American Dilemma. Journal of Social 
Psychology 142 (6):701–712. 
Siegel, Paul, Elizabeth Martin, and Rosalind Bruno. 2001. Language Use and Linguistic 
Isolation: Historical Data and Methodological Issues. Washington, DC: US 
Census Bureau. 
Sigelman, Lee, and Susan Welch. 1993. The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White 
Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes. Social Forces 71 (3):781-795. 
Simon, Julian Linconln. 1999. The Economic Consequences of Immigration. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Singer, Audrey, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds. 2008. Twenty-First 
Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Singer, Audrey, Jill Wilson, and Brooke DeRenzis. 2009. Prince William County Case 
Study: Immigrants, Politics, and Local Response in Suburban Washington. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Skerry, Peter. 1993. Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Skerry, Peter. 1995. Many Borders to Cross: Is Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility 
of the Federal Government? Publius 25 (3):71-85. 
Smith, Heather A., and Owen J. Furuseth, eds. 2006. Latinos in the New South: 
transformations of place. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
 325  
South, Scott J., Kyle Crowder, and Erick Chavez. 2005. Migration and Spatial 
Assimilation Among U.S. Latinos: Classical Versus Segmented Trajectories. 
Demography 42 (3):497-521. 
Southwelll, Priscilla L., and Kevin D. Pirch. 2003. Political Cynicism and the 
Mobilization of Black Voters. Social Science Quarterly 84 (4):906-917. 
Speasmaker, Leya. ND. Challenges to Federal Immigration Regulation: The Possible 
Consequences of State Imposed Employer Sanctions. available at: 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/ilassa/2007/speasmaker.pdf. 
Squires, Gregory D., and Charis E. Kubrin. 2006. Privileged Places: Race, Residence, 
and the Structure of Opportunity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Steinmetz, Erika, and John Iceland. 2003. The Effects of Using Newly-Defined 
Metropolitan Area Boundaries When Examining Residential Housing Patterns. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau working paper. 
Stewart, Kristen. 2009. Are 'new comer' schools inherently segregated? The Salt Lake 
Tribune, March 1, 2009. 
Stokes, Atia K. 2003. Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation. American 
Politics Research 31 (4):361-378. 
Sugrue, Thomas J. 1996. The Origins of the Urban Crisis:  Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Suro, Roberto. 1999. Strangers Among Us: Latino Lives in a Changing America. New 
York: Vintage. 
Suro, Roberto, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 2003. The Rise of the Second Generation: Changing 
Patterns in Hispanic Population Growth. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Swain, Carol. 1993. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African 
Americans in Congress. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Swain, Carol, ed. 2007. Debating Immigration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Swers, Michele L. 2002. The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in 
Congress. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of In-Group 
Behavior. In The Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by S. Worchel and 
W. G. Austin. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
 
 326  
Tam Cho, Wendy, James G. Gimpel, and Joshua J. Dyck. 2006. Residential 
Concentration, Political Socialization, and Voter Turnout. The Journal of Politics 
68 (1):158-167. 
Tannenwald, Robert. 1999. Fiscal Disparity Among the States Revisited. New England 
Economic Review July: 3-25. 
Tatalovich, Raymond. 1995. Nativism Reborn?  The Official English Language 
Movement and the American States. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky 
Press. 
Taylor, Marylee C. 1998. How White Attitudes Vary With the Racial Composition of 
Local Populations: Numbers Count. American Sociological Review 63 (4):512-
535. 
Teixeira, Ruy A. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Telles, Edward E., and Edward Murguia. 1990. Phenotypic Discrimination and Income 
Differences among Mexican Americans. Social Science Quarterly 71 (4):682-96. 
Thernstrom, Abigail. 1987. Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting 
Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thomas, Sue. 1991. The Impact of Women on State Legislatures. Journal of Politics 53 
(4):958-976. 
Tichenor, Daniel. 2002. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tienda, Marta, and L. Niedart. 1980. Segmented markets and earnings inequality of 
native and immigrant Hispanics in the United States, Working Paper series. 
Madison, WI: Institute for Research in Poverty. 
Timberlake, Jeffrey, and John Iceland. 2007. Change in Racial and Ethnic Residential 
Inequality in American Cities, 1970-2000. City and Community 6 (4):335-365. 
Timberlake, Jeffrey M. 2002. Separate, but How Unequal? Ethnic Residential 
Stratification, 1980 to 1990. City & Community 1 (3):251-266. 
Tolbert, C, and Rodney E. Hero. 1996. Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An 
Analysis of California's Illegal Immigration Initiative. Journal of Politics 58 
(3):806-818. 
Tolbert, C, and Rodney E. Hero. 2001. Dealing with Diversity: Racial/Ethnic Context 
and Social Policy Change. Political Research Quarterly 54 (3):571-604. 
 
 327  
Tolbert, C, and Rodney E. Hero. 2003. White Voter Support for California's Proposition 
209: Revisiting the Racial Threat Hypothesis. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 
3 (2):183-202. 
Tolbert, Caroline J. 2003. Revisiting the Racial Threat Hypothesis: White Voter Support 
for California's Proposition 209. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3 (2):183-202. 
Torney-Purta, Judith, Carolyn H. Barber, and Britt Wilkenfeld. 2007. Latino 
Adolescents’ Civic Development in the United States: Research Results from the 
IEA Civic Education Study. Journal of Youth & Adolescence 36 (2):111-125. 
Torrens, Claudia. 2008. U.S. economic woes hit Hispanics especially hard. Newsday, 
August 4, 2008. 
Turner, Margery Austin, Stephen L. Ross, George Galster, and John Yinger. 2002. 
Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets. Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute. 
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. 2005. The 
nation's report card: Reading 2005. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office. 
Uhlaner, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation 
of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. Political Behavior 11:195–231. 
Valenty, Linda O., and Ronald D. Sylvia. 2004. Thresholds for Tolerance: The Impact of 
Racial and Ethnic Population Composition on the Vote for California Propositions 
187 and 209. Social Science Journal 41 (3):433-446. 
Vanderleeuw, James M., and Richard L. Engstrom. 1987. Race, Referendums, and Roll-
Off. The Journal of Politics 49 (4):1081-1092. 
Vanderleeuw, James M., and Baodong Liu. 2002. Political Empowerment, Mobilization, 
and Black Voter Roll-Off. Urban Affairs Review 37 (1): 380-396. 
Vanderleeuw, James M., and Thomas E. Sowers. 2007. Race, Roll-Off, and Racial 
Transition: The Influence of Political Change on Racial Group Voter Roll-Off in 
Urban Elections. Social Science Quarterly 88 (4):937-952. 
Vedlitz, Arnold, and Charles A. Johnson. 1982. Community Racial Segregation, Electoral 
Structure, and Minority Representation. Social Science Quarterly 63 (4):729-736. 
Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 2003. Unequal at the Starting 
Line: Creating Participatory Inequalities across Generations and among Groups. 
The American Sociologist 34 (1-2):45-69. 
 
 328  
Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Harper Collins. 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, 
Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. British 
Journal of Political Science 23 (4):453-497. 
Voss, D. Stephen. 1996. Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New 
South. Journal of Politics 58 (4):1156-1170. 
Wahl, Ana-Maria Gonzalez, R. Saylor Breckenridge, and Steven E. Gunkel. 2007. 
Latinos, residential segregation and spatial assimilation in micropolitan areas: 
Exploring the American dilemma on a new frontier. Social Science Research 36 
(3):995-1020. 
Waldinger, Roger. 1997. Still the Promised City? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Waldinger, Roger, ed. 2001. Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Waldinger, Roger, and Cynthia Feliciano. 2004. Will the new second generation 
experience 'downward assimilation'? Segmented assimilation re-assessed. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 27 (3):376-402. 
Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2004. Talking About Politics: Informal Groups and Social 
Identity in American Life. Chicago: University Press of Chicago. 
Walton, Hanes Jr. 1985. Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Weissman, Deborah M., Rebecca C. Headen, and Katherine Lewis Parker. 2009. The 
Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws 287(g) Program in 
North Carolina. Chapel Hill: American Civil Liberties Union Of North Carolina 
Legal Foundation and the Immigration & Human Rights Policy Clinic at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Welch, Susan, Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe, and Michael Combs. 2001. Race and 
Place: Race Relations in an American City. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Whitby, Kenneth J. 1989. Measuring Congressional Responsiveness to the Policy 
Interests of Black Constituents. Social Science Quarterly 68:367-377. 
 
 329  
Whitby, Kenny J., and George A. Krause. 2001. Race, Issue Heterogeneity and Public 
Policy: The Republican Revolution in the 104th US Congress. British Journal of 
Political Science 31 (3):555-572. 
Widestrom, Amy. 2008. Neglected Neighborhoods: Economic Inequality, Residential 
Segregation & Declining Voter Turnout in Low-Income Communities. Paper read 
at 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 
28-31, 2008, at Boston, MA. 
Wilkes, Rima, and John Iceland. 2004. Hypersegregation in the Twenty-First Century: 
An Update and Analysis. Demography 41 (1):23-36. 
Williams, Linda Faye. 2004. The Constraint of Race: White Skin Privilege in America. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Williams, Robin. 1947. The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on 
Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations. New York: Social 
Science Research Council. 
Wilson, Thomas C. 2001. Americans' Views on Immigration Policy: Testing the Role of 
Threatened Group Interests. Sociological Perspectives 44 (4):485-501. 
Wilson, William Julius. 1990. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, 
and Public Policy. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Wilson, William Julius. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban 
Poor. New York: Knopf. 
Witte, Griff, and Nell Henderson. 2004. Wealth Gap Widens For Blacks, Hispanics. The 
Washington Post, Monday, October 18, 2004. 
Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Wong, Janelle S. 2006. Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic 
Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Yang, Phillip. 1994. Explaining Immigrant Naturalization. International Migration 
Review 28 (3):449-477. 
Yatrakis, K. 1981. Electoral Demands and Political Benefits: Minority as Majority: a 
Case Study of Two Newark Elections, 1970, 1974. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Yoder, Janice D. 1991. Rethinking Tokenism: Looking beyond Numbers. Gender and 
Society 5 (2):178-192. 
 
 330  
Zaller, John. 1990. Political Awareness, Elite Opinion Leadership, and the Mass Survey 
Response. Social Cognition 8 (1):125-153 
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zhou, Min. 1997. Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research 
on the New Second Generation. International Migration Review 31 (4):975-1008. 
Zhou, Min. 2003. Urban Education: Challenges in Educating Culturally Diverse 
Children. Teachers College Record 105 (2):13-19. 
Zweigenhaft, Richard L, and G. William Domhoff. 1998. Diversity in the Power Elite: 
Have Women and Minorities Reached the Top? New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Zweigenhaft, Richard L, and G. William Domhoff. 2006. Diversity in the Power Elite: 
How It Happened, Why It Matters. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
 
 
 
 
